See Greene v. Transport Ins. Co., 169 Ga. App. 504(3) ( 313 S.E.2d 761) (1984). But we apply the law as it is at the time of our decision, see Galletta v. Hardison, 168 Ga. App. 36 ( 308 S.E.2d 47) (1983), and despite language suggesting otherwise in Greene, we can take judicial notice of proceedings before this court. See Lee, 205 Ga. App. at 498(1); Talley v. State, 200 Ga. App. 442(3a) ( 408 S.E.2d 463) (1991).
The State appeals from the trial court's order which dismissed a count of an indictment alleging John Bradley Oliver violated OCGA § 40-5-58 (c) because the 1990 amendment to OCGA § 40-5-58 eliminated convictions for driving on a suspended license as one of the offenses for which one could be declared an habitual violator. See Galletta v. Hardison, 168 Ga. App. 36 ( 308 S.E.2d 47). The record shows that Oliver was indicted for operating a motor vehicle on May 18, 1991, within five years after he had been declared an habitual violator under the provisions of OCGA § 40-5-58 (a) (1). After the trial court granted Oliver's oral motion to dismiss the habitual violator count because of the change in the law, the State appealed. Held: On May 16, 1987, Oliver was declared an habitual violator and his driver's license was revoked because he had been convicted of driving on a suspended license on April 11, 1986, driving under the influence of alcohol on February 28, 1987, and driving on a suspended license on that same date.
City of Valdosta v. Singleton, 197 Ga. 194, 208 ( 28 S.E.2d 759) (1944). Accord Galletta v. Hardison, 168 Ga. App. 36 ( 308 S.E.2d 47) (1983). Thus, applied to the facts of this case, at the time it was ordered the trial court was correct in granting appellee's motion to dismiss for improper venue.