The portion of the statute relating to "operators" is void. Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1965). The portion of the statute relating to "operators" is void.
The question under point 1 is whether the owner of the vehicle was protected under the statute, and under point 2 whether the statute relieved the operator of the vehicle from ordinary negligence. Our recent case of Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982, conclusively settles both questions. Where the owner is not the operator no cause of action exists against him for the negligence of the operator.
Finally it should be pointed out that Von Kuznick, as distinguished from Arrow, would gain little comfort from a holding to the effect that the New Mexico guest statute applies to the subject accident. In Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760 [ 398 P.2d 982], the Supreme Court of that state held that for technical reasons rooted in its constitution, the statute was invalid insofar as it applied to a non-owner driver. (See also Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. 696 [ 437 P.2d 157].)
Because the constitutionality of § 64-25-9, supra, is not before us for determination, in our discussion we indulge in the usual presumption that legislative acts are legal and valid, and assume that that provision is constitutional. Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964); State ex rel. City of Albuquerque v. Lavender, 69 N.M. 220, 365 P.2d 652 (1961). For purposes of our discussion we also assume the existence of liability insurance coverage for this accident.
We do not require the title to provide an index or table of contents of the enactment, and it is sufficient if the title "give[s] notice of the subject matter of the legislation and ... if, applying every reasonable intendment in favor of its validity, it may be said that the subject of the legislative enactment is expressed in its title." Gallegos v. Wallace , 1964-NMSC-224, ¶ 6, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982, overruled on other grounds by McGeehan v. Bunch , 1975-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 25-26, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238. {61} New Energy argues that the ETA violates Article IV, Section 16 because the title of Senate Bill 489 does not fairly apprise the public that the Act essentially deregulates a public utility with respect to its energy transition costs.
Section 63-9-14, N.M.S.A. 1978, by its terms seems broad enough to cover removals from ratemaking proceedings, but it is part of the Telephone and Telegraph Company Certification Act (Sections 63-9-1 to 63-9-19, N.M.S.A. 1978), and therefore can only apply to certification proceedings. See N.M. Const., Art. IV, § 16; Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964). The substance of the Attorney General's removal is that the Commission erred by not including in its rate determination Mountain Bell's revenues, expenses and investment related to directory advertising.
The constitutionality of our guest statute has been considered four previous times. Cortez v. Martinez, 79 N.M. 506, 445 P.2d 383 (1968); Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964); Mwijage v. Kipkemei, 85 N.M. 360, 512 P.2d 688 (Ct.App. 1973); Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. 696, 437 P.2d 157 (Ct.App. 1967). In deciding the constitutionality of a statute in general, it must be recognized initially that:
State v. Candelaria, 28 N.M. 573, 215 P. 816 (1923). In Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964), we held that the inclusion of non-owner drivers in the provisions of the guest act was not germane to the subject which was expressly limited to owners by the title. Although the limitation on the time to bring an action to collect the oil and gas emergency school tax may be germane to "the collection and administration" of the "privilege tax on persons in the business of severing oil and natural gas * * *" the limitation on the collection of all the taxes covered under the Emergency School Tax Act (§§ 72-16-1 through 72-16-47, supra), is not germane to either § 2 or § 18 of House Bill 10, supra, nor to the collection of the oil and gas emergency school tax.
This court is committed to the principle that the title to a legislative enactment need not be an index of everything in the act itself, but need only give notice of the subject matter of the legislation and is sufficient if, applying every reasonable intendment in favor of its validity, it may be said that the subject of the legislative enactment is expressed in its title. Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1965), and cases there cited. See also, Aragon v. Cox, 75 N.M. 537, 407 P.2d 673 (1965).
It could not have contributed to logrolling or fraud, and it was not necessary for the title of the act to set forth the source of the titles to the property which it directed be transferred to the penitentiary. Cf. State ex rel. State Park and Recreation Commission v. New Mexico State Authority, 76 N.M. 1, 411 P.2d 984 (1966); and Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1964). Certain other contentions raised by the appellant are disposed of by what we have said, or the disposition thereof is unnecessary.