Opinion
Civil Action AP-22-41
12-15-2023
JAMES GALLAGHER, ANNE GALLAGHER, NORMA DREW, and JEFFREY DREW, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF CHEBEAGUE ISLAND, MICHAEL MAKEE, and MARY MAKEE, Defendants.
Plaintiffs-Keith Richard, Esq. Defendant Town-Benjamin McCall, Esq. Defendants Makees-Scott Dolan, Esq.
Plaintiffs-Keith Richard, Esq.
Defendant Town-Benjamin McCall, Esq.
Defendants Makees-Scott Dolan, Esq.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND MOTION FOR FINDINGS
Deborah P. Cashman Justice, Superior Court
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' M. R. Civ. P. 59(e) Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order docketed on July 7, 2023 and Plaintiffs' Motion for Findings. The Court held oral argument on these motions on November 7, 2023. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' motions are DENIED.
I. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their M.R. Civ. P. Rule 80B complaint on September 30, 2022, seeking to vacate a Zoning Ordinance building permit granted to the Makees by the Code Enforcement Officer ("CEO") of the Town of Chebeague Island, alleging, inter alia, the permitting decision was unlawful under state and local law. On the same day, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enlarge the Deadline for Filing an Appeal to the Town and a Motion to Stay, arguing that they could not appeal the permit to the Town Board of Adjustments and Appeals ("BAA") before the deadline and the Court should grant a "good cause exception" and remand the matter to the BAA to hear the appeal.
Plaintiffs now ask the Court to reconsider its July 7, 2023 Order. Before the Court were five motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion to Enlarge the Deadline for Filing an Appeal to the Town; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay; (3) Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Withdraw Stay, Grant Enlargement, and for Remand; (4) Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Portions of Makee Defendants' Opposition to Amended Motion; and (5) Defendants Makees' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Judgment on the Pleadings, and/or Dismissal for Want of Prosecution. In its July 7, 2023 Order, the Court denied the Motion to Strike, denied the Motion to Enlarge, granted in part the Motion for Judgment, and denied the remaining motions as moot. In its Order, the Court determined that the Plaintiffs did not meet the criteria for the Court to grant a "good cause exception" for missing the appeal window and therefore dismissed the 80B appeal, disposing of the case. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider primarily seeks reconsideration of their Motion to Enlarge and implicitly Defendants' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law.
II. Standard of Review
Plaintiffs move pursuant to M.R. Civ, P. 59(e) for the Court to reconsider its judgment. M.R. Civ. P. 59(e) treats motions to reconsider as motions to amend or alter the judgment. M.R. Civ. P. 59(e). Therefore, the standard of review for motions to alter or amend judgment and motions to reconsider is the same. A motion for reconsideration "shall not be filed unless required to bring to the court's attention an error, omission or new material that could not previously have been presented." M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5). "Rule 7(b)(5) is intended to deter disappointed litigants from seeking to reargue points that were or could have been presented to the court on the underlying motion." Shaw v. Shaw, 2003 ME 153, ¶ 8, 839 A.2d 714 (quotation marks omitted); see Roalsvik v. Comack, 2019 ME 71, ¶ 3, 208 A.3d 367. On a motion to alter or amend judgment, "a court 'is not free to litigate anew ... [and] may only reexamine those facts already presented to determine whether an error of law or fact has taken place and whether substantial justice has been rendered.'" Manning, 2020 ME 42, ¶ 35, 228 A.3d 726 (quoting Most, 477 A.2d at 260).
III. Discussion
Plaintiffs advance five arguments in support of their motion to reconsider. The Court considers each in turn.
A. Incorrect Statement of Fact Regarding the Town Board's Consideration of the Appeal.
Plaintiffs first argue that the Court, in two places, incorrectly stated that the BAA refused to hear the Plaintiffs' late appeal from the CEO's grant of the permit under the Zoning Ordinance to the Makees. Plaintiffs argue that this "error appears to have informed the court's good cause conclusion." (Mot. Recons. 2.) Plaintiffs instead represent that they did not bother filing an appeal with the BAA because the BAA did not have authority to grant a good cause exception under the Zoning Ordinance. Rather, Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of a judicial good cause exception directly with the Court.
The Court acknowledges that it made this error twice in the July 7, 2023 Order. However, whether the BAA refused to hear the late appeal or whether the request for a good cause exception was made directly with the Court was immaterial to the Court's good cause analysis. In its Order, the Court noted that the Zoning Ordinance does not allow the BAA to grant a good cause exception. (Order July 7, 2023 at 2.) Even if the Court was mistaken in determining that the BAA refused to hear the appeal, this did not affect the Court's good cause analysis because the Court was aware that the BAA did not have authority to grant a good cause exception. (Id., at 2-3.) Because the Court was aware of the BAA's lack of jurisdiction, it would not have drawn any inference from the BAA's refusal to hear the appeal. The Court made its own independent determination that the good cause exception was not warranted under the circumstances despite the minor error recounting the procedural history. This error of fact was immaterial and does not bear on whether the Court's order rendered substantial justice. See Manning, 2020 ME 42, ¶ 35, 228 A.3d 726 (quoting Most, 477 A.2d at 260).
B. The Court's determination of the date of "actual notice."
Plaintiffs next argue that the Court erred in failing to identify the date Plaintiffs had "actual notice" of the permit for purposes of applying the good cause exception and that the Court appeared to construe the record against the Plaintiffs contrary to the M.R. Civ. P. Rules 12 and 56 standards. The Court first notes that it was not required to draw inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue of whether the good cause exception should be granted. Plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the good cause exception should apply; the motion for judgment on the pleadings was considered and granted after the Court determined that the good cause exception did not apply. The Court granted the motion under Rule 12(c) because there was no dispute that without the good cause exception, Plaintiffs' case failed as a matter of law. (Order July 7, 2023 at 9.)
On the issue of the date that Plaintiffs had "actual notice" of the permit, Plaintiffs now represent to the Court that they did not receive a copy of the permit itself from the CEO or any other source until some time between September 12 and September 15, 2022, when Plaintiffs' counsel received "the file" via mail from their clients. This is not material that could not have been presented to the court on the underlying motion. See Shaw, 2003 ME 153, ¶ 8, 839 A.2d 714. Rather, this is information Plaintiffs and their counsel possessed when they filed their complaint and made their subsequent motions and argument but failed to ever present to the Court with specificity. Because this information could have been presented to and argued to the Court on the underlying motion, granting reconsideration on this basis would be inappropriate.
C. The complexity of the appeal.
Plaintiffs argue, without any citations to authority, that the complexity of the appeal should be (re)considered by the Court in its good cause analysis. Plaintiffs do not identify any case law for this proposition and the Court is not aware of any case law stating that the complexity of an appeal is relevant to the good cause analysis. Even if it were, this is, again, all information that the Plaintiffs and their counsel possessed and could have presented and argued to the Court on the underlying motion, but they did not. This is not grounds for reconsideration.
D. The lack of prejudice to the Makees.
Plaintiffs argue that reconsideration will not prejudice the Makees because the same legal arguments and factual issues will resurface in the Makees' pending M.R. Civ. P. 80B appeal regarding the Shoreland Zoning permit. Without determining whether the Makees will be prejudiced or not, the Court notes that the degree of prejudice to the opposing party is simply not relevant to whether the Court should reconsider its Order. A motion for reconsideration "shall not be filed unless required to bring to the court's attention an error, omission or new material that could not previously have been presented." M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5). Prejudice or the lack thereof is not grounds for reconsideration.
E. The Town violated its ordinance and Makee violated the terms of his permit.
Plaintiffs finally argue that the Court should reconsider its Order on good cause because "the court erred in finding that the Town had not violated its ordinance and that Makee had not violated the terms of his permit." (Mot. Recons. 7.) Plaintiffs do not point to any errors, omissions, or material that could not previously been presented on these points. In its July 7, 2023 Order, the Court considered the information before it in this matter and determined that Plaintiffs had not shown that the Town violated the Zoning Ordinance or that the Makees violated the permit granted under the Zoning Ordinance. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider seeks to reargue points that were or could have presented to the Court on the underlying motion and therefore must be denied. See Shaw, 2003 ME 153, ¶ 8, 839 A.2d 714.
IV. Order
The entry is:
1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Findings with Proposed Amended and Add'tl Finding of Fact is DENIED.
The clerk may enter this Order on the docket by reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
SO ORDERED.
Entered on the Docket: 12/20/2023.