Summary
holding that no violation of the MCRA exists where excessive force against a prisoner was not used in furtherance of violating some additional right
Summary of this case from Fontanez v. City of WorcesterOpinion
Civil Action No. 00-11859-RWZ.
March 11, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Old Colony Correctional Center ("OCCC"), alleges that on September 15, 1997, correctional officer Gregory Turner ("Turner") handcuffed him and placed him in a cell with two other inmates, defendants Adam Rosier ("Rosier") and Peter Murphy ("Murphy"), who were both uncuffed and who beat him severely. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries as a result of this attack: he was in the hospital in a coma for two months and confined to the prison health unit for an additional six months. He suffered partial loss of his vision and hearing, a stroke, constant seizures, and now walks with a limp. It is plaintiff's contention that this attack was planned by Turner, Rosier, and Murphy in retaliation for plaintiff having assaulted another inmate on September 10, 1997. Plaintiff also alleges that Turner and the other OCCC correctional officers, Michael Sousa, Al Saucier, Michael Powers, and Janice Pina (collectively, the "correctional officer defendants"), as well as Massachusetts Department of Corrections Commissioners Larry Dubois and Michael T. Maloney and OCCC Superintendent Paul B. Murphy (collectively, the "DOC defendants"), covered up the incident by moving plaintiff to the prison recreational yard after the attack, falsifying reports of the attack, and giving false testimony at the criminal trial of Rosier and Murphy.
Although another defendant, the Superintendent of OCCC, is also named Murphy, plaintiff addresses the claims against him collectively with those against other supervisory personnel. Accordingly, all references to "Murphy" herein are to the inmate defendant.
The initial complaint set forth, in nine counts, a variety of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and 1986, the Massachusetts civil rights statute, and state common law. In response to motions to dismiss, plaintiff withdrew four counts in their entirety and two others as to certain defendants. In the evolution through the first to the second amended complaint, a number of defendants also disappeared. Although the pending motions to dismiss address the first amended complaint, since the second amended version is substantially identical, I deem the motions to apply to that latest version. These then are the claims, using the numbering of the second amended complaint: Count I against Turner, Rosier and Inmate Murphy for conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II against Sousa, Saucier and the DOC defendants in their individual capacities for failure to adequately train and supervise correctional officers regarding the use of force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count III against the DOC defendants in their individual capacities for failure to maintain and enforce appropriate policies to protect inmates from harm by other inmates, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count IV against all defendants except Pina for deprivation of plaintiff's civil rights by threats, intimidation or coercion, in violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), M.G.L. c. 12 § 11I; Count V (newly added) against Turner and the correctional officer defendants for failure to protect the plaintiff, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count VI against Rosier and Inmate Murphy for assault and battery. I address the defendants' motions to dismiss as they pertain to these claims.
Plaintiff's original complaint named as defendants the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, and Suffolk County. Plaintiff does not name these parties in his amended complaints. Consequently, I treat all claims against them as voluntarily dismissed. The same pattern holds true for OCCC Superintendent Luis Spencer, a defendant named in the original and first amended complaints but not in the second amended complaint. His omission is likewise treated as a voluntary dismissal.
Count I alleges that Turner, Rosier and Murphy conspired to inflict excessive, deadly force upon the plaintiff, depriving him of his constitutional rights. Whatever constitutional right plaintiff claims was violated, the record is devoid of any facts that might support the existence of a conspiracy between Turner, Rosier and Murphy. Plaintiff alleges that, five days after he attacked inmate Michael Sullivan, Turner came to his cell, ordered him to "cuff up," and then led him to an empty room where Rosier and Murphy were waiting; Turner then left him in the room with Rosier and Murphy, who were uncuffed, and they beat him until he was unconscious. Plaintiff has offered no facts which indicate that Turner, Rosier or Murphy knew of his previous fight with Sullivan, that they had any reason to retaliate for that fight, or that Turner communicated in any way with Rosier and Murphy before they assaulted the plaintiff. He simply states, "on information and belief," that this attack was the result of a conspiracy by Turner, Rosier and Murphy to retaliate against him for assaulting Sullivan. He argues that the mere fact that Turner left him in the room with Rosier and Murphy is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support his claim that the defendants were engaged in such a conspiracy. But, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "with specificity" facts establishing a conspiracy. Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1977). Conclusory allegations of a conspiracy, without supporting material facts, will not suffice. Id. The motion to dismiss Count I is thus allowed.
Plaintiff further alleges that Sousa, Saucier and the DOC defendants failed to adequately train and supervise their employees in the use of force (Count II), and that they maintained unconstitutional policies and customs regarding the protection of inmates from harm by other inmates (Count III), in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff does not claim that these defendants were directly responsible for his constitutional deprivations, only that they failed to adequately supervise Turner and are thus liable for his violations. A supervisor cannot be held liable for the actions of subordinates under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Rather, the plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights by maintaining a policy or custom which violated those rights, and (2) the supervisor's conduct was causally connected to the constitutional violation caused by his subordinates. Maldondo-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581-82 (1st Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not only failed to identify any policy or custom which violated his constitutional rights, but he has alleged only a single incident of constitutional deprivation. This Circuit has held in the context of municipal liability that a "policy or custom" cannot be inferred from a single constitutional violation caused by an individual state actor. Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1157 (1st Cir. 1989)); Altman v. Kelly, 36 F. Supp.2d 433 (D.Mass. 1999). This logic applies equally here. Plaintiff relies on a single incident, involving a single guard. Even if Turner's actions led to a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, this single incident, while it might provide the basis for a constitutional claim against Turner, cannot be the basis for supervisory liability claims against Sousa, Saucier and the DOC defendants. Without a more substantial showing that these defendants maintained a policy or custom which resulted in the constitutional violation, they are not liable for Turner's one bad act.
Furthermore, Counts II and III fail because the facts alleged by the plaintiff do not support a finding that Sousa, Saucier, or the DOC defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from excessive force. To prove a supervisor was deliberately indifferent, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) a grave risk of harm, (2) the [supervisor's] actual or constructive knowledge of that risk, and (3) his failure to take easily available measures to address the risk." Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998). Under this strict standard, the facts presented by the plaintiff do not support even a preliminary determination that Sousa, Saucier and the DOC defendants were deliberately indifferent to the use of any excessive force. Plaintiff does not allege that they knew anything about his fight with Sullivan, or any other reason he might have been at risk of physical harm. Since plaintiff has not stated any facts to even suggest policies or supervisory conduct inimical to his rights, the defendants' motions to dismiss Counts II and III are granted.
Count IV alleges that the defendants interfered with the plaintiff's civil rights, in violation of the MCRA, M.G.L. c. 12 § 11I. Under the MCRA, a plaintiff must ultimately show not merely infringement of a constitutional right, but infringement by means of "threats, intimidation or coercion." As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has explained, "[a] direct violation of a person's rights does not by itself involve threats, intimidation or coercion and thus does not implicate the Act." Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 404 Mass. 325, 333 (1989). The use of force is not, in itself, "coercive" within the meaning of the act unless such force is inflicted in order to achieve "some further purpose." Id. at 333-334. The right that the plaintiff here says was violated by Rosier and Inmate Murphy was the right to be free from excessive force. However, as Longval points out, plaintiff cannot establish a violation of the MCRA by claiming that his right to be free from excessive force was violated by means of force. That is, the constitutional violation itself cannot also serve as the prerequisite "threats, intimidation or coercion" under the MCRA. Claim IV fails as a matter of law.
Count V, which first surfaced in the second amended complaint, charges that Turner and the correctional officer defendants failed to protect plaintiff from assault by Rosier and Murphy, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Given the duty imposed on prison officials "to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners," Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citing Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)) (internal quotes omitted), this count remains. So, too, does Count VI against Rosier and Murphy for assault and battery.
In summary, the motions to dismiss Counts I, II, III and IV are GRANTED. The motions to dismiss Count V and VI are DENIED.