Opinion
No. CV05-0332-PHX-MHM.
March 21, 2006
ORDER
Currently before the Court is Defendant Amkor Technologies, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "Amkor") Motion for summary judgment (Dkt#8) and Plaintiff Luke Galinis' ("Plaintiff") Motions requesting mediation. (Dkt#10,16,19,20). After reviewing the pleadings and determining oral argument is not necessary the Court issues the following order.
I. Procedural History
On January 28, 2005 Plaintiff brought the present action asserting employment discrimination pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA" or the "Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Dkt.#1). On April 29, 2005, Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.#8). Instead of filing a responding pleading to the motion, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting mediation. (Dkt.#10). On May 20, 2004 the Court issued an order, upon receiving a stipulation from the parties, that Plaintiff's motion for mediation would be construed as Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment as well as Plaintiff's separate request for mediation. (Dkt.#11,12). Further, the Court ordered that Defendant's reply in support of its request for summary judgment would also constitute a response to Plaintiff's motion for mediation. (Dkt.#12). On May 24, 2005, Defendant filed its reply. (Dkt#14). Again, on June 20, 2005, Plaintiff filed another motion requesting a mediation as well as a document entitled "Plaintiff Supplemental Statement of Facts." (Dkt.#16,17). Upon receiving these documents, without addressing the merits or adequacy of Plaintiff's motions, the Court issued an order informing the Plaintiff of the significance of the pending motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant and informed Plaintiff of the requirements for responding to Defendant's motion under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998) (Dkt.#18). Specifically, Plaintiff was instructed that when a motion for summary judgment is supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony) "you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents as provided in Rule 56(e) . . ." The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a response to Defendant's motion within 20 days of the date of the order. In response to the Court's order, on July 21, 2005, the Plaintiff filed another document requesting the Court order a mediation date. (Dkt.#19). Another such document was filed on October 31, 2005. (Dkt.20).
In reviewing the documents filed by Plaintiff, it is clear that despite the Court's direction and warning, Plaintiff has not substantially responded to Defendant's pending motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Local Rule 56.1 provides that "[a]ny party opposing a motion for summary judgment must comply with the foregoing in setting forth those facts which establish a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment in favor of the moving party." However, rather than set forth specific factual evidence supporting Plaintiff's position, Plaintiff has repeatedly requested that a mediation be ordered. Plaintiff has; however, submitted with his requests for mediation accompanying statements of fact and exhibits. (Dkt.#10,16,17). To the extent these documents are relevant to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court will review them in determining whether Plaintiff has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.
II. Factual Background
On May 24, 2005, Plaintiff was hired and began work for Amkor as a senior payroll specialist. (Defendant's Statement of Facts ("DSOF") ¶ 4,5). According to Defendant, on July 1, 2004, Plaintiff's employment was terminated for poor performance. (DSOF ¶ 6). On June 30, 2004, Plaintiff's supervisor, Karen Oswald, received an email from Mike Gentry, vice president of human resources, stating that Plaintiff was to be terminated "effective July 1, 2004," however Plaintiff was to receive severance pay through July 9, 2004. (Defendant's Supplemental Statement of Facts ("DSSOF") ¶ 3).
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that he was a full time employee through July 9, 2004 and that he was terminated on this day because the Defendant learned that he had been approved for short-term disability benefits. (Plaintiff's Statement of Facts ("PSOF") ¶ 4, Dkt.#16). On July 17, 2004, Aetna Life Insurance Company approved Plaintiff's short-term disability request beginning on July 9, 2004. (PSOF ¶ 2, Dkt.#16). Plaintiff's disability was certified from July 9, 2004 though August 5, 2004. (Plaintiff's Motion for mediation, Dkt#10, Exhibit 2). However, on July 21, 2004, this approval was revoked by Aetna on the basis that Plaintiff was terminated on July 1, 2004. (Plaintiff's Motion Requesting Mediation, Dkt#10, Exhibit 3). Mr. Gentry provides in his declaration that Amkor did not even become aware that Plaintiff was claiming to be disabled until July 17, 2004, over two weeks subsequent to his July 1, 2004 termination. (DSOF ¶ 10).
On September 1, 2004, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). He related,
"I began my employment on approximately May 24, 2004, my last job was Payroll Processor. On approximately July 9, 2004 my employer was notified that I was approved for short term disability and I was discharged from my position. I believe I have been discriminated against in violation of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990."
(DSOF ¶ 11).
On October 28, 2004, the EEOC issued its "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" letter to Plaintiff. (DSOF ¶ 13). Plaintiff asserted the present action on January 28, 2005. (Dkt#1).
III. Standard of Review
A court shall grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that summary judgment is appropriate, then the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To defeat the motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are genuine factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A "genuine issue" exists when a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [the party's] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(e).
IV. Discussion
Defendant moves for summary judgment on several grounds. Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any factual issue suggesting that he is a "disabled" person within the American with Disabilities Act and that Defendant terminated his employment because of this disability. Moreover, Defendant contends that Plaintiff's action before this Court is untimely.
A. ADA's Protection Applies To "Disabled" Persons Within The Meaning Of The Act.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1112(a) provides in pertinent part:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
The Act defines "disability" as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
The Supreme Court recently explained in Toyota Motor Mfg.Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194-98, 122 S.Ct. 681, 690-91 (2002) the specific showing that must be made by individuals seeking to fall within the scope of the definition of "disability." The Court explained that "[t]o qualify as disabled under subsection (A) of the ADA's definition of disability, a claimant must initially prove that he or she has a physical or mental impairment." Furthermore, "[m]erely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA." "Claimants also need to demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity. . . . [A] claimant must further show that the limitation on the major life activity is "substantial."" Id. "To be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. The impairment must also be permanent or long term." Id. at 198.
In the present case, it is unclear as to which subsection of the definition of "disability" Plaintiff seeks the Court to consider in determining whether he qualifies for ADA protection. Based upon the limited documents provided to the Court by Plaintiff that are relevant to Defendant's motion, it appears that the only applicable subsection is subsection (A) of § 1112(a). Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that he has a record of impairment under subsection (B). See Madjlessi v. Macy's West, Inc., 993 F. Supp 736, 742 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that under definition of having "disability" due to record of impairment, plaintiff may qualify by showing history of, or being misclassified as having a mental or physical limitation that limits one or more of the major life activities."). Further, Plaintiff offers no evidence as being regarded as having an impairment under subsection (C). See Wilmarth v. City of Santa Rosa, 945 F. Supp. 1271, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that individual is "regarded as having a disability" if the individual has an impairment which is not substantially limiting but is perceived by the employer as substantially limiting."). The only indication from the pleadings filed with the Court hinting at a "disability" within the protection of the ADA is that Plaintiff related that "[o]n July 21, 2004, my eye surgery helped resolve my disability." (PSOF ¶ 3, Dkt.#16). Additionally, in Plaintiff's subsequent Supplemental Statement of Facts he stated, "[o]n July 21, 2004, I had eye surgery that corrected my double vision to my right eye by Doctor James Plotnic in Scottsdale, Arizona. This surgical procedure to my right eye helped resolve my disability but Karen Oswald did not give me the opportunity to return to work nor did Amkor honor my disability." (PSSOF ¶ 6, Dkt#17). Lastly, on August 25, 2004, Plaintiff authored a letter to Jolana Beloney, Benefits Manager of Amkor, requesting that Amkor change his termination date "back" to July 9, 2004, and "approve the four weeks of disability" he requested. (DSSOF ¶ 1).
Nothing in the record before the Court would lead it to conclude that Plaintiff was "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. At best, the record demonstrates Plaintiff sustained a short term medical issue with his right eye that has since been resolved. Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that at the time of his hiring he suffered from any impairment. Moreover, his alleged impairment was remedied on July 21, 2004. (PSSOF ¶ 6, Dkt.#17). Under such circumstances demonstrating an insignificant period of impairment, this Court cannot find that Plaintiff has presented a factual issue suggesting that he was "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. See Toyota Motor, 534 U.S. at 198.
For instance, in Wilmarth, 945 F. Supp at 1277, the district court ruled upon summary judgment that the plaintiff's request for "disability" status based upon the nature of her carpal tunnel syndrome injury and the approximate two-year period that was of "relatively short" duration rendered any limitations on plaintiff's life activity insubstantial and thus did not fall within the scope of the ADA's protections. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 1246-47 (1999) stated that "[a] person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently "substantially limits" a major life activity. Here, the record reveals that Plaintiff's short-term alleged impairment was remedied shortly after he was hired and terminated. See also Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that temporary injury with minimal residual effects cannot be a basis for sustainable claim under the ADA) (citations omitted).
Thus, in reviewing the record before the Court, it is apparent that Plaintiff has failed to raise a factual issue suggesting that he is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. As such, Plaintiff's ADA claim fails.
B. Termination "Because of" Plaintiff's Disability
Alternatively, even though the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a factual issue suggesting that he is "disabled," the Court will address Defendant's argument regarding Plaintiff's failure to demonstrate any evidence that Plaintiff was terminated "because of" his alleged disability. Defendant relies on the overwhelming evidence suggesting Plaintiff was terminated on July 1, 2004. Specifically, Defendant has offered the declaration of its vice president of human resources Michael Gentry stating that Plaintiff was fired on July 1, 2004. (DSOF ¶ 6). Mr. Gentry provides a declaration stating that he personally met with Plaintiff on Thursday, July 1, 2004, and advised him of his termination, but related to him that he would receive severance pay through July 9, 2004. (DSSOF ¶ 2). This procedure is confirmed with an email from Mr. Gentry to Ms. Karen Oswald the day prior, June 30, 2004. (DSSOF ¶ 3). Moreover, Mr. Gentry declares that Defendant did not even learn of Plaintiff's alleged disability until July 17, 2004. (DSOF ¶ 10). The obvious significance of this evidence is that it demonstrates that Plaintiff was terminated prior to Defendant even learning of Plaintiff's alleged disability.
To controvert Defendant's evidence, Plaintiff offers only his conclusory statement that he was actually terminated on July 9, 2004 and Defendant received notice of his application for disability the same day. However, absent from these statements is any supporting evidence controverting Mr. Gentry's declaration. (Plaintiff's Motion for mediation, Dkt#16 Complaint). This is not sufficient to generate a factual issue suggesting Defendant was on notice of his application for disability and took adverse employment action as a result. See Rivera v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data are insufficient to defeat summary judgment). The only evidence suggesting that Plaintiff was terminated on July 9, 2004 is his payment stub disclosing that he received pay through this date. (Plaintiff's Motion for Mediation, Statement of Facts ¶ 5). However, this does not adequately controvert the declaration from Mr. Gentry explaining that Plaintiff's name was kept in the system through the severance date of July 9, 2004. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to controvert Mr. Gentry's declaration that Amkor did not even become aware of his application for disability until July 17, 2004, a date this is subsequent to the termination date pointed to by Plaintiff. (DSOF ¶ 10).
The Court, with its order on June 24, 2005, explained to Plaintiff that to controvert sworn statements such as declarations that he would have to point to specific facts and not rely on what the complaint says. (Dkt.#18).
Thus, in reviewing the evidence presented before the Court, it appears beyond any genuine issue of material fact that Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment prior to it becoming aware that Plaintiff was seeking disability benefits. There is substantial persuasive authority suggesting that under circumstances a claim based upon disability fails. For instance, as Defendant notes, inHedberg v. Indian Bell Telephone Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1995) the Seventh circuit affirmed the district court's ruling of summary judgment where the employer could not have known of the alleged disability when it determined that the termination was to be made. see also Morisky v. Broward Co., 80 F.3d 445, 448 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that employer cannot be liable under the ADA for firing an employee when it indisputably had not knowledge of the disability.). This line of reasoning is equally applicable in the present case. Other than Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, there is no material evidence suggesting that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's alleged disability when it terminated his employment. As such, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is proper.
Lastly, because there is no issue suggesting Plaintiff was "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA and that he was terminated "because of" this disability, the Court will not reach the merits of the argument that Plaintiff's cause of action is untimely.
Accordingly,IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant's Motion for summary judgment. (Dkt.#8).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff's requests for mediation. (Dkt.# 10,16,19,20).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment accordingly.