The plaintiff argues that “[t]he fact that the bystander emotional distress claim arises out of a [workers'] compensation claim should not be the operating factor in deciding whether or not the claim is a viable one.” Given the clear statutory language, and this court's previous construction of the act, the plaintiff's argument is meritless. See, e.g., Driscoll v. General Nutrition Corp., supra, 252 Conn. at 226, 752 A.2d 1069 (explaining that plaintiff's emotional distress arose from or was caused by physical injury and thus triggered exclusivity provision of act). This court previously has held that “bystander emotional distress derives from bodily injury to another....” Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 521, 838 A.2d 993 (2004). “[B]ecause emotional distress, by itself, is not a bodily injury, it can be compensable only if it flows from the bodily injury of another person.
The trend noted by the Leiendecker Court, that the majority of courts find that emotional distress is not encompassed within the meaning of "bodily injury", has continued. See the following cases National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. NWM-Oklahoma, LLC, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (Oklahoma law) (commercial liability policy); Home Insurance Com. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1289 (M.D. Ala. 2005), aff'd, 164 Fed. Appx. 950 (11th Cir. 2006) (S. Carolina law) (CGL policy); Johnson v. Am. Family Ins., 827 N. E.2d 403, 407 (Ohio App.Ct. 2005) (UM coverage); Nance v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 118 Fed. Appx. 640, 642 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pennsylvania law) (home owners policy); Tackett v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 584 S. E.2d 158, 166 (W. Va. 2003) (CGL policy); Armstrong v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 785 N.E.2d 284, 292-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (UM policy); Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Nebraska v. Martinsen, 659 N. W.2d 823, 827 (Neb. 2003) (automobile policy); Galgano v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 838 A.2d 993, 999 (Conn. 2004) (UM policy); Smith v. Animal Urgent Care, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 827, 830-31 (W. Va. 2000) (CGL policy); SCR Medical Transp. Services, Inc. v. Browne, 781 N.E.2d 564, 571 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002) (automobile liability policy). Insurance Claims and Disputes 5th § 11:2, Insurance Claims Disputes: Representation of Insurance Companies Insureds Database, updated March 2011 Allan D. Windt.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Galgano v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519 (2004). The automobile exclusion to the Policy excludes claims for bodily injury or property damage (Coverage A) arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any automobile owned by, operated by, or rented or loaned to any insured. Under the terms of the Policy, the Town of Trumbull Police Department is the named insured.
These underlying questions of tort law are, therefore, irrelevant. See, e.g., Galgano v. Metro. Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 838 A.2d 993, 997 (2004) ("How the law defines particular claims does not control. Rather, we must look to the relevant policy language and apply the limits of liability as provided in the policy."); see also Estate of Gocha v. Shimon, 215 Wis.2d 586, 573 N.W.2d 218, 220 (1997); Mullen v. Walczak, 257 Wis.2d 928, 653 N.W.2d 529, 532 (2002). Because the policy caps Allstate's liability for all damages "resulting from" Kyle's injuries at $100,000, and Nicholas's and Christina's emotional distress result from his injuries, the insurer's liability for these claims is exhausted.
) “[E]motional distress, by itself, is not a bodily injury . . . .” Velecela v. All Habitat Serv., LLC, 322 Conn. 335, 340 (2016)(quoting Galgano v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 521 (2004). “The majority rule is that, as a matter of law, the term bodily injury in a liability policy does not include emotional distress unaccompanied by physical harm.”
Under Connecticut law, "[t]he terms of an insurance policy are to be construed according to the general rules of contract construction." Galgano v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 267 Conn. 512, 838 A.2d 993, 997 (2004) ; see alsoHanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp. , 276 Conn. 314, 885 A.2d 734, 739 (2005) ("[W]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual commitments is a question of law.") (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he determinative question is the intent of the parties, that is, what coverage the ... [insured] expected to receive and what the [insurer] was to provide, as disclosed by the provisions of the policy."
"It is well settled that insurance policies are construed and enforced under principles of contract law." Discuillo v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:17-CV-234 (KAD), 2019 WL 499255, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2019) ((citing R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 273 Conn. 448, 462 (2005) and Galgano v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519 (2004)). "Where such a contract contains a provision 'requiring an action to be brought within a particular time period' the provision is binding and enforceable."
It is well settled that insurance policies are construed and enforced under principles of contract law. R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 273 Conn. 448, 462 (2005); Galgano v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519 (2004). Where such a contract contains a provision "requiring an action to be brought within a particular time period" the provision is binding and enforceable.
If the insurance contract contained a condition precedent requiring the insured to provide a sprinkler system - a system all parties agree was not present - then Great Lakes is not obligated to pay any insurance claims, unless certain defenses apply. Under Connecticut law, the "[c]onstruction of a contract of insurance presents a question of law for the court." Connecticut Med. Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 5 (2008) (quoting Galgano v. Met. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519 (2004)). Such contracts are "to be interpreted by the same general rules that govern the construction of any written contract."
To add in those words would require the court to narrow the scope of coverage within the policy, and the court may not interpret the policy in a way that gives new meaning to the terms of the policy.”); Galgano v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 267 Conn. 512, 519, 838 A.2d 993 (2004) (“If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, then the language, from which the intention of the parties is to be deduced, must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning.... [C]ourts cannot indulge in a forced construction ignoring provisions or so distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by the parties.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).