It has been held that a motion for new trial can not be employed as a means of withdrawing a guilty plea; nor can there be an appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea. Wofford v. State, 141 Ga. App. 207 ( 233 S.E.2d 53) (1977); Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 S.E.2d 562) (1973). Thus, we find that the only prescribed means for the appellant in this case to challenge the validity of his guilty plea on the ground alleged was through habeas corpus proceedings.

We find no basis upon which to hold the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas after pronouncement of the sentences. See Thomas v. State, 231 Ga. 298, 300 ( 201 S.E.2d 415) (1973), and Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 S.E.2d 562) (1973). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Johnson, P.J., and Mikell, J., concur. Neal v. State, 216 Ga. App. 223, 224 ( 453 S.E.2d 807) (1995); Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179, 180 ( 202 S.E.2d 562) (1973).Reese v. State, 242 Ga. App. 204 ( 529 S.E.2d 196) (2000).

Second, given Manues' first sworn statements at the plea hearing, his later contradictory testimony presented a question of credibility which the trial judge was entitled to resolve against him. See Neal v. State, 216 Ga. App. 223, 224 ( 453 S.E.2d 807) (1995); Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179, 180 ( 202 S.E.2d 562) (1973). Judgment affirmed. Beasley and Ruffin, JJ., concur.

See Marshall v. State, 128 Ga. App. 413 (6) ( 197 S.E.2d 161) (1973); Holston v. State, 103 Ga. App. 373 (2) ( 119 S.E.2d 302) (1961). See also Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179, 180 ( 202 S.E.2d 562) (1973). Viewing the State's unchallenged evidence in light of the foregoing legal parameters, we are unable to find as a matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion in upholding the validity of defendant's guilty plea. Accord Bailey v. Baker, 232 Ga. 84 (4) ( 205 S.E.2d 278) (1974); Huff v. Barnett, 230 Ga. 446 ( 197 S.E.2d 345) (1973).

Where one accused of crime voluntarily pleads guilty to the charge, a new trial can not be granted, for there was no verdict. A plea of guilty may, as a matter of right, be withdrawn before sentence; and after sentence the judge may permit it to be withdrawn upon meritorious grounds, addressed to his discretion; but neither before nor after sentence can a motion for a new trial be employed as a means of withdrawing a plea of guilty.' See also Welch v. State, 63 Ga. App. 277 ( 11 S.E.2d 42); Alligood v. State, 108 Ga. App. 453 ( 133 S.E.2d 431)." Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 S.E.2d 562). Judgment affirmed. Bell, C. J., and Smith, J., concur.

DEEN, Presiding Judge. 1. While several older cases support the proposition that a "motion for new trial" cannot be made by one who has pled guilty in a criminal case, recognizing that substance and not mere nomenclature controls, we consider the motion as one to withdraw the pleas of guilty. Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 S.E.2d 562). While at any time before sentence is passed a defendant may withdraw a plea of "guilty," after sentence is passed a motion to withdraw such a plea is within the sound legal discretion of the judge. Code § 27-1404; Griffin v. State, 12 Ga. App. 615 (4) ( 77 S.E. 1080).