Having invoked this state's jurisdiction to attempt to accomplish his ends, he could not then renounce it for a related cause unfavorable to him. See Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808 ( 58 S.E.2d 834) (1950). The fact that the UCCJA may have prescribed that, at the time, Mulle bring the action for modification in Georgia does not alter this.
"A decree rendered in accordance with a consent verdict, though it may not be valid as a judgment of the court, will, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, be operative as an agreement binding upon all the parties thereto." Driver v. Wood, 114 Ga. 296 ( 40 S.E. 257); Kidd v. Huff, 105 Ga. 209 ( 31 S.E. 430); Sapp v. Williamson, 128 Ga. 743, 750 ( 58 S.E. 447); Wilbanks v. Wilbanks, 159 Ga. 196 ( 125 S.E. 202); Lunsford v. Kersey, 191 Ga. 738, 744 ( 13 S.E.2d 803); Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 94 ( 14 S.E.2d 681); Bedenbaugh v. Burgin, 197 Ga. 175, 180 ( 28 S.E.2d 652); Gaither v. Gaither, 205 Ga. 572 ( 54 S.E.2d 600); Fowler v. Fowler, 206 Ga. 542 ( 57 S.E.2d 593); Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 812 ( 58 S.E.2d 834); Lewis v. Lewis, 213 Ga. 856 ( 102 S.E.2d 559). The statement of the court in White v. Murden, 190 Ga. 536, supra, that "Our conclusion is that an allowance of money in a decree for divorce and alimony, made purely for the use of the wife and payable in monthly installments, ceases upon her remarriage," is in conflict with both our statutory law and the decisions of this court.
" Thus it is shown that a jury trial not only was not expressly waived but was expressly demanded. The error in denying a jury trial is assigned as a reason why the final judgment is contrary to law. Such assignments of error subject the final judgment to review upon the exceptions to the antecedent rulings thus excepted to. Cheatham v. Palmer, 191 Ga. 617 ( 13 S.E.2d 674); Ga. Veneer Package Co. v. Florida Nat. Bank, 198 Ga. 591 ( 32 S.E.2d 465); Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808 ( 58 S.E.2d 834). With the final judgment thus brought under review upon the specific ground that a request for a jury trial was denied, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no error was assigned on the denial of a jury trial and that a jury trial was waived. Error is assigned, and it shows reversible error in denying the request for a jury.
( a) The exceptions to antecedent findings of the examiner set forth the reasons relied upon to have those findings set aside, and the alleged errors in such antecedent rulings, if erroneous, entered into the subsequent final judgment decreeing title in the defendant. Accordingly, general assignments of error to subsequent rulings were sufficient. Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808 (1) ( 58 S.E.2d 834), and cases cited. ( b) The final report of the examiner containing the evidence upon which he made his findings, and no additional evidence having been introduced at the hearing before the trial judge, the bill of exceptions was not subject to dismissal on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff in error nowhere in his bill of exceptions specified a complete brief of the evidence before the trial judge, or (2) there was no approved brief of evidence as required by the Code, ยง 6-802.
The Civil Practice Act has not changed this principle. Yount v. Mulle, 266 Ga. 729 ( 470 S.E.2d 647) (1996); Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808 ( 58 S.E.2d 834) (1950). The day after appellee Mitchell Goldstein instituted his two separate actions in Cobb County against appellant for (1) contempt of the custody provisions of the divorce decree and (2) modification of the custody provisions of the divorce decree, Goldstein v. Goldstein, Civil Action Nos. 96-1-6974 and 96-1-6975, appellant filed her own, separate complaint against appellee in Cobb County to modify the Cobb County custody decree through the domestication of the Swiss temporary custody order, Pfisterer v. Goldstein, Civil Action No. 96-1-6998-24.
Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Paulding, 131 Ga. 693 ( 63 S.E. 213); Wilson v. Groover, 146 Ga. 369 ( 91 S.E. 113); Auld v. Schmelz, 199 Ga. 633 (2) ( 34 S.E.2d 860); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 206 Ga. 540 (1) ( 57 S.E.2d 668); Nichols v. Nichols, 209 Ga. 811 (2) ( 76 S.E.2d 400); Wright v. Florida-Georgia Tractor Co., 218 Ga. 824 (2) ( 130 S.E.2d 736); McCollum v. Thomason, 32 Ga. App. 160 (4) ( 122 S.E. 800); Henderson v. Ellarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5 (4) ( 131 S.E. 524). This is particularly true since the amendment was ordered filed subject to objection and demurrer, and none was interposed. Moreover, a single ad damnum clause or prayer for relief at the end of a count is sufficient for all the counts which precede it, if the language used is broad enough to include them. Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 813-814 ( 58 S.E.2d 834); Henderson v. Stewart, 102 Ga. App. 533 ( 117 S.E.2d 176). While it would have been better practice for the amendment to specifically recite that the additional paragraphs were added before the prayers of the original petition, it is clear that Count 2 was intended to be so added and that the prayers are intended to apply to, and are appropriate to, this count. 2. It is next contended that there is no evidence to support a verdict in the amount returned or in any amount. The basis of this contention is that while there is evidence from which the jury could have found that the brickwork on all four walls of the house was defective as a result of one or more of three possible causes and that the cost of removing and replacing the defective brickwork would amount to $9,851, there is no evidence from which the jury could have determined just how much of the brickwork was defective due to the use of frozen mortar as alleged in Count 2 or what amount of actual damages pla
While the allegations of fact contained in count 2 might be sufficient to authorize the recovery under that count for special damages or general damages, even though no amounts thereof are alleged in that count or incorporated therein by reference, there is nowhere in the petition any prayer for general or special damages referable to count 2. It is fundamental that each count in a multi-count petition must be complete within itself and state a complete cause of action. Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 813 ( 58 S.E.2d 834) and cits. It is equally fundamental that a petition (and for this purpose each separate count must be considered under the foregoing rule as a separate petition) which does not allege and pray for either general, special or nominal damages states no cause of action and is subject to general demurrer. Beverly v. Observer Publishing Co., 88 Ga. App. 490 (2, 3) ( 77 S.E.2d 80); Gartrell v. Afro-American Life Ins. Co., 88 Ga. App. 806 ( 78 S.E.2d 92); Hitchcock Corp. v. Turner, 102 Ga. App. 452 (1) ( 116 S.E.2d 653). Finally, a petition (and in this case count 2) will not be construed as seeking the recovery of any item of damages for which the plaintiff does not pray. Terrell v. McKinny, 26 Ga. 447; Steadman v. Simmons, 39 Ga. 591 (4); Macon c. R. Co. v. Meador Bros., 67 Ga. 672, 675; Georgia R. Bkg. Co. v. Crawley, 87 Ga. 191 (1) ( 13 S.E. 508); Hunnicutt v. Perot, 100 Ga. 312 (1) ( 27 S.E. 787); Thomason v. Moore, 139 Ga. 341 (4) ( 77 S.E. 155); Bennett v. Bagwell St
The single prayer, following the third count, seeks the recovery of actual, general and punitive damages. A single ad damnum clause is usually sufficient in a multi-count petition, provided it follows the last count and is appropriate to each count preceding it. Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808, 814 ( 58 S.E.2d 834). Since general damages are presumed to flow from a tortious act ( Code ยง 105-2006) a prayer for general damages is appropriate to each count of the petition regardless of whether any other class of damages sought therein is sustainable. Accordingly, none of the counts is subject to dismissal on the ground that there is no prayer for general damages and no other sustainable item of damage is pleaded.
3. "Although the final judgment is excepted to on the general ground that it is contrary to law, yet, an examination of the record disclosing that antecedent rulings, duly excepted to in the bill of exceptions, entered into and affected the final judgment, the bill of exceptions is sufficient to present to this court for decision the antecedent rulings excepted to and the final judgment in so far as it is affected by such antecedent rulings." Gaither v. Gaither, 206 Ga. 808 (1) ( 58 S.E.2d 834); Carpenter v. State, 194 Ga. 395 (3) ( 21 S.E.2d 643). The order of the court set out in the bill of exceptions recites, "The caveat to the return of the administratrix having been stricken on motion of the appellee on this day, upon motion of appellee the appeal is hereby dismissed." Thus, it appears that the antecedent ruling controlled the final judgment, and since the antecedent ruling is properly excepted to and assigned as error and the final judgment is excepted to as being contrary to law and error is assigned thereon, there is a proper exception to and assignment of error on both rulings, and this court has jurisdiction.