Opinion
01-22-00598-CV
11-01-2022
SUSAN GAITAN, Appellant v. JOSE R. VENTURA, Appellee
On Appeal from the 215th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2018-02809
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Susan Gaitan, has filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's July 14, 2022 order granting partial summary judgment in favor of appellee, Jose R. Ventura.
We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
In her original petition, Gaitan brought claims against Ventura and another party, Lannis Kirkland, for physical assault, attempted assault, severe emotional distress, and burglary.
Ventura answered, generally denying the allegations in Gaitan's petition and asserting certain defenses. Ventura also brought counterclaims against Gaitan for tortious interference with existing contracts or business relations, elder abuse, harassment, infliction of bodily injury, defamation, invasion of privacy, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. And Ventura brought third-party claims against Maria Victoria Martin, appellant's mother.
Kirkland also answered, generally denying the allegations in Gaitan's petition and asserting certain defenses. Kirkland sought sanctions against Gaitan and attorney's fees.
Ventura also filed an application for a temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, and permanent injunction against Gaitan and Martin.
Ventura then moved for summary judgment on Gaitan's claims against him, asserting that no evidence supported Gaitan's claims against him and he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Gaitan's burglary claim. Gaitan did not file a response.
On July 14, 2022, the trial court granted Ventura partial summary judgment on Gaitan's claims against him, ordering that Gaitan "recover nothing on any of [her] claims against" Ventura and that Gaitan's claims against Ventura be dismissed with prejudice.
"[C]ourts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction." Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 146 n.14 (Tex. 2012) (internal quotations omitted); see also Royal Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (jurisdiction fundamental in nature and cannot be ignored). If this case is an appeal over which we have no jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. V.I.P. Royal Palace, LLC v. Hobby Event Ctr. LLC, No. 01-18-00621-CV, 2020 WL 3579563, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Ragsdale, 273 S.W.3d at 763.
Generally, this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments and specific interlocutory orders that the Legislature has designated as appealable orders. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012; CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447-48 (Tex. 2011); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a) (authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders). A judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for appeal only if it: (1) actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language or (2) states with "unmistakable clarity" that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93, 200, 204 (Tex. 2001).
Here, the trial court's July 14, 2022 order does not actually dispose of all claims against all parties. The trial court's order only granted summary judgment on Gaitan's claims against Ventura and only dismissed Gaitan's claims against Ventura with prejudice. At the very least, Gaitan's claims against Kirkland and Ventura's counterclaims and third-party claims remain pending in the trial court.
Additionally, the trial court's July 14, 2022 order does not contain finality language that could turn an otherwise interlocutory order into a final judgment. The order does not claim to be anything other than a partial-summary-judgment order resolving only Gaitan's claims against Ventura. See Banda v. Herba Ricemills, S.L.V., No. 01-19-00802-CV, 2020 WL 5552461, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
On September 20, 2022, this Clerk of this Court notified Gaitan that we lacked jurisdiction over her appeal and directed Gaitan that, unless a response was provided within ten days, in writing, demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal, the appeal would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Gaitan did not adequately respond.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). All pending motions are dismissed as moot.