That the courts have no authority to interfere with fraternal benefit associations by directing or controlling them as to questions of internal policy, nor to decide questions relating to the discipline of their members, but leave such associations free to carry out any lawful purpose in accordance with their rules and regulations, is well established, and the rule applies whether the association is incorporated or unincorporated. But while the courts will not undertake to direct or control such associations in the matter of discipline or internal policy, they will not hesitate when some valuable or property right is involved to entertain jurisdiction and afford relief. 29 Cyc., 199-200; Thompson v. Grand International Brotherhood of L. E., 41 Texas Civ. App. 176[ 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176] ( 91 S.W. 834); Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Texas Civ. App. 601[ 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601] ( 119 S.W. 874); Clark v. Wallace (Ky.), 45 S.W. 504; and Wellenvoss v. Grand Lodge K. of P., of Ky., 45 S.W. 360. The question then arises: Were any property rights of the plaintiffs affected by the suspension of the local lodge of which they were members, and if not, was notice to the lodge or some member thereof prior to the issuance of the order of suspension, essential to the validity of said order?
, 4 Cal.App. 565 ( 88 P. 597); State Council v. Enterprise Council, 75 N.J. Eq. 245 (72 A. 19); Kalbitzer v. Goodhue, 52 W. Va. 435 (44 S.E. 264); Brownfield v. Simon, 94 Misc. Rep. 720 (158 N.Y. Supp. 187); Strauss v. Thoman, 60 Misc. Rep. 72 (111 N.Y. Supp. 745); Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601 ( 119 S.W. 874). It would seem to follow from this doctrine that the question of whether or not the local association has complied with the requirements of the constitution and by-laws of the international is wholly a question between them, and so long as no complaint is being made by the international against the local for noncompliance, it does not lie with third parties to raise such a question.
This appeal primarily concerns the requirement to exhaust the administrative remedies of a voluntary association within the context of the judicial nonintervention doctrine, a longstanding and "well-established rule of law that the civil courts will not interfere with the internal operations of [voluntary] associations of private individuals." Dallas Athletic Club Protective Comm. v. Dallas Athletic Club , 407 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Gaines v. Farmer , 55 Tex.Civ.App. 601, 119 S.W. 874, 877 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1909, writ dism'd) ). Here, the South Texas Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (STYSA) suspended John Gordon.
Lundine v. McKinney , 183 S.W.2d 265, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1944, no writ). "By-laws adopted for the government of such organizations are regarded as the contract of the members with one another, and by these their individual rights as such members are to be determined in the conduct of the business affairs of the association." Gaines v. Farmer , 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 606–07, 119 S.W. 874, 877 (Texarkana 1909, writ dism'd). Laws of the Order § 16.030, Opinion 2 ("All separate corporations, regardless of when organized, are subject to the provisions of this Section, and subject to all provisions of the Laws of the Order.")
The seven votes required for approval was met. Texas courts have recognized that association bylaws may constitute a contract between the parties. Lundine v. McKinney, 183 S.W.2d 265, 273 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1944, no writ) (articles of association and bylaws agreed on by the parties constitute a contract which the courts will enforce both as between the members themselves and as between the association on the one side and the individual members on the other, citing 7 C.J.S., Associations, § 11, p. 36); Brown v. Harris County Med. Soc., 194 S.W. 1179, 1180 (Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston 1917, no writ) (association rules which regulate conduct and measure rights constitute articles of agreement to which all who have become members are parties and are governed in their relations to such associations); Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex.Civ.App. 601, 119 S.W. 874, 877 (1909) (association bylaws are contract of members with each other, and by them their rights as members are to be determined); see also Cline v. Ins. Exch. of Houston, 140 Tex. 175, 166 S.W.2d 677 (1942) (voluntary association has power to enact rules governing admission of members and prescribing certain qualifications for membership; such rules will be enforced, unless they are against good morals or violate state law). The trial court's finding that Monasco was bound by Article IV, Section 5 of the bylaws implicitly recognizes (as sought in the petition for declaratory judgment) a binding contract between Monasco and the Club.
As to which of the two was entitled to the office in question is not of itself a civil right over which the courts of law or equity have jurisdiction, but is purely a fraternal right created under and determined by the constitution and by-laws of the fraternity. A settlement of the controversy between Farmer and Gaines as to which was the lawful Master of the National Grand Lodge was sought in the courts of Texas in Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 119 S.W. 874, wherein the same election was contested and wherein the Texas Civil Court of Appeals in declining jurisdiction over the controversy, held: "We think it is a well-established rule of law that the civil courts will not interfere with the internal operation of such association of private individuals or assume to review their failure to conduct their business affairs according to the laws and rules of the order, except for the purpose of protecting some civil or property right of the party complaining.
Accordingly, a review of a private association's actions are severely limited under the common law in Texas. Courts have gone so far as to state that they will not review a private association's failure to conduct its business according to its own procedures except for the purpose of protecting some civil or property right. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1937, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Gaines v. Farmer, 119 S.W. 874, 877 (Tex.Civ.App. 1909, writ dism'd w.o.j.). In discussing the review of membership in a voluntary association, the Texas Supreme Court has stated:
There suit was brought allegedly for the purpose of stopping the diversion of certain funds and actions in violation of the bylaws by the board members of the Athletic Club. Citing Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Price, 108 S.W.2d 239 (Tex.Civ.App. 1937, writ dism'd), we held that courts are not disposed to interfere with the internal management of a voluntary association, that the right of such an organization to interpret its own organic agreements, its laws and regulations, after they are made and adopted, is not inferior to its right to make and adopt them, and a member, by becoming such, subjects himself, within legal limits, to his organization's power to administer, as well as to its power to make its rules. Hoey v. San Antonio Real Estate Board, 297 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Civ.App. 1956, no writ); Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 119 S.W. 874 (Tex.Civ.App. 1909, writ dism'd). The record discloses that the point in controversy is by no means self-evident. Indeed, the governing body of the Association had sought a legal opinion from its attorney as to the propriety of its action.
The Dallas Athletic Club is a voluntary association for athletic, health and social purposes, organized as a non-profit corporation. Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex.Civ.App. 601, 119 S.W. 874, error dism., w.o.j., which even appellants recognize to be a leading case in this field, states: 'We think it is a well-established rule of law that the civil courts will not interfere with the internal operations of such associations of private individuals, or assume to review their failure to conduct their business affairs according to the laws and rules of the order, except for the purpose of protecting some civil or property right of the party complaining.'
Assuming, as we must, the truth of these allegations, it appears that the suit involves property rights and civil rights. According to the allegations, the suit is not one to contest an election of officers of the Association, such as Gaines v. Farmer, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 601, 119 S.W. 874, 877. The distinction to be noted between that case and this is well illustrated by the following excerpt from the opinion in that case: "In asking for the writ of injunction, Farmer does not claim that he does so as a member, or representative, of the association for the purpose of preserving the property rights of the association or its members, or to prevent a diversion of the funds to an unauthorized purpose; neither does he say that any injury will or is likely to result to the association or its members from the payment of the money by Bledsoe upon the order of Gaines * * *."