Gagnon v. Dresser Industries

9 Citing cases

  1. Jackson v. Barton Malow Co.

    131 Mich. App. 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 6 times
    In Jackson, supra, 722-723, the Court of Appeals decision was based upon the prior decisions in Gagnon, and Rittenhouse.

    This Court has stated that the formula used by the trial court "would have required jurors to consider plaintiff's degree of fault relative to all parties involved in the incident, including non-party settling tortfeasors, contrary to the policies announced in Mayhew". Gagnon v Dresser Industries Corp, 130 Mich. App. 452; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983). The Court in Gagnon found that it was proper to deduct the amount of the settlement before making the deduction for comparative negligence.

  2. Rittenhouse v. Erhart

    424 Mich. 166 (Mich. 1985)   Cited 40 times
    In Rittenhouse v. Erhart, 380 N.W.2d 440, 462-63 (Mich. 1985), the Michigan Supreme Court held that when a party is added to a lawsuit that is already in progress, interest on the money judgment against that party accrues not from the date of filing the original complaint, but from "the date of the filing of the complaint upon the defendant against whom the judgment has been entered."

    In a per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 130 Mich. App. 452; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983). We, thereafter, granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.

  3. Jones v. United Metal Recyclers

    825 F. Supp. 1288 (W.D. Mich. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    Thus, the Michigan courts have held that the U.C.C. is inapplicable in tort actions alleging breach of a legally-implied warranty. Gagnon v. Dresser Industries Corp., 130 Mich. App. 452, 344 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1983); Williams, 234 N.W.2d at 706 ("The Uniform Commercial Code . . . is inapplicable to a tort action alleging a breach of implied warranty."); Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle Laboratories, Inc., 661 F.2d 1105, 1108 (6th Cir. 1981) ("The Uniform Commercial Code and other contract-based concepts of Michigan law are inapplicable to a tort action alleging a breach of implied warranty."). The facts of Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich. App. 532, 254 N.W.2d 569 (1977), are similar to those of the case before the Court.

  4. Salter v. Patton

    261 Mich. App. 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 13 times
    In Salter, it was undisputed that the notice of nonparty fault could not have been filed within 91 days of when the defendants filed their first responsive pleading or at any time before the settlement.

    Any responsibility to rewrite the statutes lies with the Legislature. Though plaintiff cites several cases in support of the rule that under the law of joint and several liability "a remaining defendant may not allocate fault to any of the settling defendants," see Dep't. of Transportation v. Thrasher, 446 Mich. 61, 82-83; 521 N.W.2d 214 (1994), Gagnon v. Dresser Industries Corp., 130 Mich. App. 452, 460; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983), and Anderson v. Harry's Army Surplus, Inc., 117 Mich. App. 601, 613, 324 N.W.2d 96 (1982), each of those cases was decided before tort reform, and therefore before the enactment of the allocation of fault provisions found in MCL 600.6304 and MCL 600.2957 at issue here. Accordingly, this case law is not persuasive.

  5. DaFoe v. Mich Brass Electric

    175 Mich. App. 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 1 times

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of safety regulations where the purpose of introducing the regulatory codes was already fulfilled by other evidence and where any peripheral reference which the regulations may have to the parties' conduct "would certainly be far outweighed by the confusion to the jury." Gagnon v Dresser Industries, Corp, 130 Mich. App. 452, 462; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983), aff'd 424 Mich. 166; 380 N.W.2d 440 (1985). Here, plaintiff asserts that the "ladder" testimony would have served as a "critical frame of reference" for determining whether the stairway was too steep.

  6. Ferguson v. Delaware Speedway

    164 Mich. App. 283 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that any error as to a comparative negligence instruction was harmless because the jury concluded that the defendant was not negligent

    Other panels have stated that the standard of review is for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Gagnon v Dresser Industries Corp, 130 Mich. App. 452, 463; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983), aff'd 424 Mich. 166 (1985). Errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence shall not be disturbed on appeal unless "refusal to take this action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice."

  7. Peterson v. Trans Dep't

    154 Mich. App. 790 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 9 times

    The stipulation as to plaintiff's hourly wage prior to the accident, together with the severity and permanency of plaintiff's injuries, is evidence from which the trier of fact could have estimated plaintiff's lost wages or lost earning capacity in a manner which went beyond mere conjecture. Gagnon v Dresser Industries Corp, 130 Mich. App. 452, 461; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983), aff'd 424 Mich. 166 (1985). This case must be remanded to the trial court for computation of plaintiff's lost wages and/or loss of earning capacity without deduction for prospective income taxes.

  8. Warner v. General Motors Corp.

    137 Mich. App. 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that a seller has no duty to warn a plaintiff with regard to any defects that were hidden or unknown to the seller

    The court, however, did prohibit some general questioning regarding plaintiff's smoking and use of a seat belt. Admissibility of evidence is within the trial judge's discretion, and his determination will not be set aside by this Court unless there has been an abuse of that discretion. Gagnon v Dresser IndustriesCorp, 130 Mich. App. 452, 463; 344 N.W.2d 582 (1983). In the present case, the trial court properly permitted plaintiffs to be cross-examined concerning Tim Warner's drinking and smoking on the evening of the accident.

  9. Ratcliff v. Sprint

    261 S.W.3d 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 44 times
    Affirming judgment in favor of defendant in a negligence case, and rejecting plaintiff's argument that judgement should have been entered in plaintiff's favor because "the evidence substantiated all of the elements of his cause of action"

    Thus, while the specific regulations may have been relevant to the applicable standard of care, any error in their exclusion was harmless, and Mr. Ratcliff suffered no prejudice. The point is denied. See, e.g. Gagnon v. Dresser Indus. Corp., 130 Mich.App. 452, 344 N.W.2d 582, 587 (1983) (exclusion of evidence of OSHA safety regulations was harmless where jury was informed of similar ANSI standard, which contained applicable standard of care, and expert was permitted to testify that conduct violated the excluded regulations), overruled on other grounds by Salter v. Patton, 261 Mich.App. 559, 682 N.W.2d 537 (2004). Compare LePage v. Walsh Constr. Co., 126 Ill.App.3d 1075, 82 Ill.Dec. 247, 468 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill.Ct.App. 1984) (exclusion of OSHA regulation was prejudicial even though identical ANSI regulation, which was a user-created standard, was introduced because "it would be `of substantial relevance' in evaluating the standard to know that its source was a government agency.")