Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC257767, Terry A. Green, Judge. Orders reversed. Defendant’s appeal dismissed as moot.
Bostwick & Jassy, Gary L. Bostwick, Jean-Paul Jassy; Westlake Law Group and David Blake Chatfield, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Epport, Richman & Robbins, Steven N. Richman, and Lawrence A. Abelson for Defendant and Appellant.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Plaintiff Stephen Gaggero appeals from a postjudgment order awarding defendant First Federal Bank of California (hereafter “the bank”) attorney fees incurred in obtaining a previous order for attorney fees and from an order awarding the bank interest on the attorney fees previously awarded. The bank appeals from the supplemental attorney fees award on the ground it should have been higher.
Gaggero’s notice of appeal from “the Order entered August 20, 2008” is ambiguous because there were two orders entered on that date; one order awarded the bank supplemental attorney fees and the other awarded the bank interest on the initial attorney fee award. Because the use of the word “order” instead of “orders” may have been a typographical mistake and because Gaggero’s brief challenges both orders we will exercise our discretion to liberally construe the notice of appeal construing it as an appeal from both orders. (See In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272.)
For the reasons explained below, we summarily reverse the orders appealed from without further briefing or oral argument and dismiss the bank’s appeal as moot.
BACKGROUND
In Gagerro’s previous appeal from the initial award of attorney fees and costs to the bank, Gaggero I, we reversed the attorney fees award and affirmed the award of costs. While that appeal was pending, however, the trial court entered an order on August 20, 2008, awarding the bank its attorney fees incurred in obtaining the initial fee award and a separate order awarding the bank interest on the initial fee award. Plaintiff appealed from those orders and the bank filed an appeal from the supplemental attorney fee award challenging the amount of the award. After the appeals from the August 20, 2008 orders were fully briefed, we filed our opinion in Gaggero I holding that the bank was not entitled to any attorney fees in this action.
Gaggero v. First Federal Bank of California (Nov. 30, 2009 B207273 [nonpub. opn.])
Following our decision in Gaggero I, the bank moved to dismiss the appeals from the August 20, 2008 supplemental attorney fees award as moot. The bank conceded that in light of our opinion in Gaggero I it was not entitled to the initial award of attorney fees and therefore, “the award of supplemental attorneys’ fees which was founded upon the same facts and legal authority must unfortunately meet the same fate.”
Gaggero opposes the bank’s motion to dismiss his appeal. He “requests that this Court immediately enter an order striking or reversing the two orders subject to this Appeal, without requiring any further briefing or oral argument.”
SUMMARY REVERSAL
The remedy here is not to dismiss Gaggero’s appeal from the supplemental attorney fees award, as the bank urges, because doing so would leave the supplemental attorney fee award of $104,000 as a final, enforceable order-a result wholly inconsistent with our opinion in Gaggero I and the bank’s concession of error in this appeal. Furthermore, dismissal of Gaggero’s appeal would leave standing the court’s order granting the bank interest on the initial award of attorney fees which we struck down. On the other hand, dismissal of the bank’s appeal from the amount of the supplemental attorney fee award is proper because, as the bank admits, it is not entitled to any attorney fees award in that case.
We have inherent authority to summarily reverse a trial court order if (1) “the proper resolution of the appeal is... obvious and without dispute” (Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1224; Melancon v. Walt Disney Productions (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 213, 214–215) and (2) the parties have explicitly or implicitly waived their right to present oral argument (see Moles v. Regents of University of Calif. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 867, 870.) Here it is undisputed that the bank is not entitled to supplemental attorney fees nor to interest on the initial attorney fees. Both parties have waived oral argument: Gaggero explicitly, the bank implicitly by moving to dismiss the appeals. We recognize that the parties fully briefed the appeals, nevertheless judicial economy and the parties’ resources are served by reversing the trial court’s orders without a hearing. (Cf. Weinstat, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224.)
DISPOSITION
The “Order Granting Motion For Supplemental Award Of Attorney Fees” is reversed and the trial court is directed to enter a new order denying the motion. The “Order Granting Motion For Order Clarifying Court’s Ruling On Motion To Tax Costs” is reversed insofar as it awards defendant interest on attorney fees in the amount of $3962.15 and the court is directed to enter a new order denying any interest on attorney fees. In all other respects that order is affirmed. Defendant’s appeal is dismissed as moot. Each party to bear its costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J. JOHNSON, J.