Nor is the force of the precedents impaired by the fact that, of necessity, some exceptions to the application of the doctrine have been recognized, as in the case of bequests to an executor to pay funeral expenses, which have been permitted to take effect notwithstanding the want of a beneficiary capable of invoking judicial power for their enforcement. 15 Harv. L. Rev. 515, 530; Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, 356. See Smart v. Durham, 77 N.H. 56, 58-60.

It is no objection to the validity of a charitable gift that it is made up of several parts which are to be administered together, the income to be divided according to the discretion of the trustee. Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N.H. 380, 383; Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, 357. The next, and apparently the principal, objection of the plaintiffs is that the objects of the testator's bounty are too indefinite; that the plan of distribution is so vague that it would be impossible for a court to determine whether it was executed as the testator intended, and therefore it cannot be carried out.

Such has been the construction placed upon the word in the interpretation of similar provisions in jurisdictions where liberal rules of construction prevail. Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, 356, 357; Langmaid v. Hurd, 64 N.H. 526, 527; White, Ex'r, v. White, 30 Vt. 338, 343; Crosgrove v. Crosgrove, 69 Conn. 416; Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670, 672; Downes v. Long, 79 Md. 382. See Eaton v. Eaton, 81 N.H. 275. That "family" was here used in neither a broader nor a narrower sense than this is evidenced by the qualifying words "if she have any.

McDonald McDonald submit: Appellant is embraced in the word "family" asit is used in the will of Robert McElroy: 65 Mo. 670; 8 Allen (Mass.) 339; 2 Bland (Md.) 627; 64 N.H. 354; 1 Keen 176; 69 Conn. 416; 137 Mass. 50; 128 Mass. 334; 10 Ala. 722; 21 Ill. 40; 26 Fla. 31; 619 Mo. 415; 68 Mo. 388; 48 Ark. 539; 12 Am. Eng. Enc. L. 872-3; 55 Ala. 318; 14 Howard Prac. 519; note 61 Am. Dec., pp. 588-589; 3 S.C. 226; 13 S.C. 318; 32 S.C. 167; 36 S.C. 576; 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 365 (note); 64 N.H. 354; 10 A. 76-78; 6 N.Y. Supp. 161; 53 Hun. 149; 58 S.W. 529-30; 109 Ky. 113; 83 Conn. 369; 77 A. 770-2; 93 N.Y. Supp. 599; 51 Mich. 494; 16 N.W. 71; 129 N. Supp. 814-15; 3 Words and Phrases, Title "Family," pp. 2673-2691, and 2 Words and Phrases, Second Series, Title "Family," pp. 461-66. However, the construction of the word "family," as used inthe will of Robert McElroy is not necessarily an issue inthis case.

In Webster v. Sughrow, 69 N.H. 380, it was held that a provision in a will, that the residue of the testator's estate shall be held by his executor and expended at his discretion for the saying of masses for certain persons, is a valid bequest to a charitable use; and the court quote with approval the following language from the opinion in Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 558: "A charity, in the legal sense, may be . . . defined as gift to be applied, consistently with existing law, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." In Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, it was held that a provision in a will that the income of a certain fund shall be applied for the relief of the most destitute of the testator's relatives creates a valid charitable trust. For other cases illustrating the liberality of construction applied in upholding trusts as charitable, see: Orford etc. Society v. Society, 55 N.H. 463; Goodale v. Mooney, 60 N.H. 528; Lovell v. Charlestown, 66 N.H. 584; Rolfe and Rumford Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N.H. 238; Haynes v. Carr, 70 N.H. 463; 2 Per. Tr, ss. 699-705.

In respect to the income, it has already been decided that a charitable trust was created, the beneficiaries of which were limited to such of the testator's relatives as were not more remote than nephews and nieces and their families. Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354. The time for the distribution of the principal of the fund having arrived, the question arises, who are entitled to shares? This depends upon the intention of the testator expressed by the pronoun "them" and the words following it. That this pronoun was designed to take the place of the noun "relatives," in some sense of the word, is apparent.

We have not hesitated in the past to carry out what appeared to be the wishes of the testatrix, even though the limits of a class have not been spelled out with legal precision. See Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354. This is especially true when an interpretation may be reached which seemed consistent with other provisions of the will. In re Mooney Estate, 97 N.H. 187, 189.

In determining what might be reasonably necessary to meet the personal necessities and needs of the beneficiary under all the circumstances the manner and style to which he was accustomed to live at or about the time of the death of the testatrix (Ellis v. Aldrich, 70 N.H. 219, 222) and his other resources if any are to be considered. Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 218; Nashua Trust Co. v. Burke, supra; anno. 2 A.L.R. (2d) 1383, 1431. The third question does not state any matter upon which the jurisdiction of the court to advise in the administration of a trust should be exercised. Cart v. St. Paul's Parish, 71 N.H. 231, 233. If specific questions of doubt or of conflicting claims should arise later where the advice of the court is necessary for the protection of the trustee application may then be made therefor and further instruction will be given. Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, 357; Orr v. Moses, supra, 312. Remanded.

The purpose of the remedy is the protection of fiduciaries. Wallace v. Brown, 89 N.H. 561; Harvey v. Harvey, 73 N.H. 106; Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354. Petitions dismissed.

Under all the circumstances, advice fixing maximum and minimum limits within which the trustee's discretion shall be exercised in the future may not properly be given. The court may "decide upon the rights of parties as they exist in the present, but it is not within their province, nor will they assume jurisdiction, to decide in advance what such rights may be in the future." Gafney v. Kenison, 64 N.H. 354, 357. The testator did not see fit to set fixed limits, and "it has not been the practice to speculate upon the intention of a testator under mooted contingencies which may never occur."