Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:00CV-77-S.
May 21, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons described below, we will grant this motion by a separate order entered this date.
FACTS
This case arises out of a slip and fall occurring at one of the Defendant's places of business. On January 4, 1999, the Plaintiff, Gloria Gaff ("Gaff"), allegedly slipped on a patch of ice on the property of the Defendant's BigFoot Food Store and injured herself. Gaff was aware of the icy conditions of the Defendant's parking lot. (Gaff Depo. at 15, 16, 18-20). She was also aware enough of the dangerousness of the condition to proceed cautiously as she crossed and re-crossed the store's parking lot and drive. Id. at 16, 18. As she was leaving the BigFoot store for the second time, Gaff began to cross the drive which separated the store from the car wash. Id. at 20. She again noticed the ice on the drive and proceeded cautiously. Id. Nevertheless, she slipped on the ice. Id. at 21.
Gaff claims that she was injured in her fall and has sued the Defendant, Johnson Oil Company, Inc. ("Johnson"), for damages allegedly sustained in her fall. Following discovery, Johnson has filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it owed Gaff any duty regarding the ice patches on its property.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir. 1988). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
However, the moving party's burden may be discharged by demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmoving party's case for which he or she has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party demonstrates this lack of evidence, the burden passes to the nonmoving party to establish, after an adequate opportunity for discovery, the existence of a disputed factual element essential to his or her case with respect to which he or she bears the burden of proof. Id. If the record taken as a whole could not lead the trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, the motion for summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
In order to recover for her fall, Gaff must establish that Johnson owed her a duty of care which it breached causing her damages. Illinois Central Railroad v. Bensent, 412 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Ky. 1967). Johnson argues that, with respect to outdoor, naturally occurring conditions which are open and obvious, it does not owe Gaff or its other customers any duty of care. If it is correct, then Gaff would be unable to establish the first element of her cause of action, and Johnson would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The rule in Kentucky is that " natural outdoor hazards which are as obvious to an invitee as to the owner of the premises do not constitute unreasonable risks to the former which the landowner has a duty to remove or warn against." Standard Oil Co. v. Manis, 433 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. 1968) (holding that gas station had no duty to "stay the elements" or to warn the plaintiff that the "obvious natural conditions may have created a risk."). This ruling has been affirmed by Kentucky courts on several occasions. See Ashcraft v. Peoples Liberty Bank Trust Co., Inc., 724 S.W.2d 228 (Ky.App. 1986) (holding that bank owed no duty to customer because dangers of ice were obvious); PNC Bank of Kentucky, Inc. v. Green, 30 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. 2000) (holding that obvious danger of ice prevented customer from recovering for slip and fall on bank property).
In the present case, there is no dispute that the icy conditions were naturally occurring outdoor hazards. Also, Gaff admitted throughout her deposition that she was aware of the snowy and icy conditions present and, specifically, aware of the patch of ice upon which she slipped. (Gaff Depo. at 16-20). She was also aware of the danger of these conditions and proceeded cautiously. Id. at 18, 20. Thus, these naturally occurring conditions were obvious to Gaff, and under Kentucky law, Johnson owed no duty to warn of or remove the ice.
In her brief, Gaff, while conceding that she saw the ice and was aware of the hazard, argues that the fact that she fell is alone sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether this condition was open and obvious. We note that Gaff has admitted the fact which she now contests, that the danger was open and obvious to her. Also, the fact that ice caused a slip and fall was not sufficient to allow a jury to decide the fates of the plaintiffs in Manis, Ashcraft, or Green. We see no reason why it should dictate a different result in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a duty of care. Therefore, the Defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Its motion will be granted by a separate order entered this date.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered this date and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.