Opinion
1D15-4951
06-07-2023
Jerry L. Rumph, Jr., Brooks Law; and Jennifer L. Sweeting, Sweeting &Hendrix, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant. James M. Durant, Jr., Boyd &Durant, P.L., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Jackson County. William L. Wright, Judge.
Jerry L. Rumph, Jr., Brooks Law; and Jennifer L. Sweeting, Sweeting &Hendrix, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James M. Durant, Jr., Boyd &Durant, P.L., Tallahassee, for Appellee.
B.L. THOMAS, J.
In this dissolution appeal, the former husband seeks review of the trial court's rulings on equitable distribution, a motion for continuance and motion in limine, child support, and trial court attorney's fees. As explained below, we reverse the trial court's order addressing equitable distribution. We also reverse the award of trial court attorney's fees. We reject all other grounds raised by Appellant.
Appellee properly concedes that the trial court erred in providing for an impermissible double credit of the farming equipment in the equitable distribution scheme.
"In awarding attorney's fees, the trial court must make specific findings as to hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors." Davis v. Davis, 613 So.2d 147, 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); see also Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 115152 (Fla. 1985). An award of attorney's fees without the requisite findings is error even if there is competent substantial evidence to support the award. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 141 So.3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The record does not contain any evidence presented below concerning the hourly rate, number of hours expended, or the appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors. Accordingly, we reverse the award of trial court attorney's fees. The trial court must reconsider the appropriateness of an attorney's fees award after it reconsiders the equitable distribution and considers any changes to the parties' relative financial circumstances. We note that, because the purpose of awarding attorney's fees is to ensure that the parties have a similar ability to obtain competent counsel, "[i]f the equitable distribution scheme places the parties in substantially the same financial positions with equal abilities to pay attorney's fees, it is an abuse of discretion to award attorney's fees to one former spouse." See Stewart v. Stewart, 290 So.3d 607, 609 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). If the court again awards Appellee attorney's fees, it must make written findings that after the equitable distribution, Appellee remains in need of assistance to obtain competent counsel. See id.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KELSEY and LONG, JJ., concur.