248 Ga. 760 ( 286 SE2d 30) (1982). 263 Ga. 591 ( 436 SE2d 219) (1993). "While repeal by implication is not favored, a statute will be held to have repealed a prior statute where the latter is clearly inconsistent and contrary to the most recently enacted law or where the later enactment appears to cover the entire subject matter and give expression to the whole law on the subject.
Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC v. Cobb County , 305 Ga. 144, 151 (1), 824 S.E.2d 233 (2019). See also Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady , 263 Ga. 591, 592 (2), 436 S.E.2d 219 (1993). But the alternative dispute resolution provision is silent on pre-dispute arbitration agreements, so there is no conflict between the specific and general statutes, and this principle does not apply.
OCGA § 7-4-18. Where statutes are in conflict, later statutes prevail over earlier statutes, Copeland v. State, 268 Ga. 375, 379 ( 490 S.E.2d 68) (1997); and specific statutes govern over more general statutes, Georgia Mental Health Institute v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 592 (2) ( 436 S.E.2d 219) (1993). The pawnshop statute was enacted long after the criminal usury statute and it is more specific than the criminal usury statute.
252 Ga. 210 ( 312 S.E.2d 330) (1984).Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 592(2) ( 436 S.E.2d 219) (1993). See also OCGA § 9-11-81; OCGA § 19-5-8.
Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27, 40 (6) ( 55 S.E.2d 711) (1949).Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 592 (2) (a) ( 436 S.E.2d 219) (1993). 3. Focusing on the "discharge . . . from commitment" language of the first sentence of § 17-7-131 (e) (5) (B), Sikes contends that the word "commitment" should be interpreted to include involuntary inpatient and outpatient treatment.
To apply OCGA § 9-11-25 (c) to result in such an untenable situation would violate the cardinal rule that a statute must not be construed to "result in unreasonable consequences and must square with common sense and sound reasoning." Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 593 ( 436 S.E.2d 219) (1993). OCGA § 9-11-25 (c) provides for the continuation of the action against the original party where a transfer of interest occurs, but requires that a party move to remove the transferor through substitution.
And because it is impossible to determine whether the superior court erred in dismissing Singh's petition, we vacate its decision in Case No. A25A0021 and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.See Glinton v. And R, Inc., 271 Ga. 864, 867 (524 S.E.2d 481) (1999) ("[S]pecific statutes govern over more general statutes[.]"); Ga. Mental Health Inst. v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 592 (2) (436 S.E.2d 219) (1993) ("[A] specific statute governs over a more general statute where they are in conflict."). McQueen v. Long, 372 Ga.App. 840, 844 (906 S.E.2d 909) (2024) (punctuation omitted); accord Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 (I) (B) n.7 (125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020) (2005)
See Southern States Chemical v. Tampa Tank & Welding , 316 Ga. 701, 712 (2), 888 S.E.2d 553 (2023). Further, "a specific statute governs over a more general statute where they are in conflict." Ga. Mental Health Inst. v. Brady , 263 Ga. 591, 592 (2), 436 S.E.2d 219 (1993). Assuming that the statutes here conflict regarding renewal, OCGA § 11-2-725 (3), which specifically governs the renewal of actions under the UCC arising from contracts for the sale of goods, prevails over OCGA § 9-11-41, which governs dismissals of civil actions.
(punctuation omitted)). SeeGa. Mental Health Inst. v. Brady , 263 Ga. 591, 593 (2) (a), 436 S.E.2d 219 (1993) ("It would be unreasonable to conclude that the General Assembly, as part of those comprehensive and exhaustive reforms, did not intend for the appeal rights of applicants for commitment [to mental health institutes] to be governed by those comprehensive provisions but by the general appeal statutes, especially considering that for so long before 1969 the General Assembly had specified that applicants had the right to appeal."); see alsoScott v. State , 295 Ga. 39, 41 (2), 757 S.E.2d 106 (2014) ; Holland v. Caviness , 292 Ga. 332, 335, 737 S.E.2d 669 (2013).
See Jones v. Peach Trader Inc., 302 Ga. 504, 515 (III) (807 S.E.2d 840) (2017) ("Our rules of statutory interpretation demand that we attach significance to [the General Assembly's removal of language.]"); Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 219 (2) (85 S.E.2d 25) (1954) ("A legislative body should always be presumed to mean something by the passage of an act." (punctuation omitted)). See Ga. Mental Health Inst. v. Brady, 263 Ga. 591, 593 (2) (a) (436 S.E.2d 219) (1993) ("It would be unreasonable to conclude that the General Assembly, as part of those comprehensive and exhaustive reforms, did not intend for the appeal rights of applicants for commitment [to mental health institutes] to be governed by those comprehensive provisions but by the general appeal statutes, especially considering that for so long before 1969 the General Assembly had specified that applicants had the right to appeal."); see also Scott v. State, 295 Ga. 39, 41 (2) (757 S.E.2d 106) (2014); Holland v. Caviness, 292 Ga. 332, 335 (737 S.E.2d 669) (2013). See Sons of Confederate Veterans II, 315 Ga. at 42 (1) (b) n.2