Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County

99 Citing cases

  1. DeJulio v. Georgia

    127 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2001)   Cited 9 times
    Noting that there exists no parallel provision to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, to regulate admission of amicus briefs in district court, and therefore leave to file is entirely discretionary

    Georgia law recognizes three categories of legal entities: (1) natural persons, (2) corporations, and (3) "such quasi-artificial entities as the law recognizes as being capable to sue." Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 258 Ga. 317, 318, 368 S.E.2d 500 (1988); Cravey, 214 Ga. at 453, 105 S.E.2d 497. The question is whether the Georgia House of Representatives, the Georgia State Senate, and their various local delegations fall within the third category.

  2. Attorney General ex rel. Department of Natural Resources v. Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n

    218 Mich. App. 342 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 4 times

    Accordingly, Michigan is included within the definition of person as "any other legal entity." Oakland Co Rd Comm v Michigan Property Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 217 Mich. App. 154; 550 N.W.2d 856 (1996); see Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v Elbert Co, 258 Ga. 317, 318; 368 S.E.2d 500 (1988). This interpretation is consistent with another chapter of the Michigan Insurance Code.

  3. Brannon v. Thomas

    280 F. App'x 930 (11th Cir. 2008)   Cited 87 times
    Holding that case of prisoner who claimed deliberate indifference toward medical treatment, waiting several days for an orthopedist visit after breaking his hand and being deprived of pain killers during that period, did not warrant reversal of summary judgment in sheriff's office's favor

    The undisputed facts are that there were no delays in plaintiffs medical treatment. It could not reasonably be said that a jail officer responsible for seeing to it that plaintiff received appropriate medical attention and treatment was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. We note that the Thomas County Jail is not an entity capable of being sued under Georgia law. Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 258 Ga. 317, 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (1988). The district court's judgment is, accordingly,

  4. Spencer v. Wheeler Corr. Facility Med. Staff

    CV 324-046 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2025)

    Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 include “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted).

  5. Lawrence v. Charles B. Webster Det. Ctr.

    CV 124-108 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2025)

    Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 include “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert County, 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue

  6. Sartin v. Statesboro Police Dep't

    CV 624-041 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2024)

    (explaining “the police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”), adopted by 2019 WL 136991 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2019). Further, appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 include “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (subjecting only “persons” to liability); Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted). Thus, neither Defendant Bulloch County Sheriff s Office nor Statesboro Police Department are not capable of being sued and are subject to dismissal.

  7. Argueta v. Smith State Prison

    CV 624-029 (S.D. Ga. Jul. 9, 2024)

    Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 included “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (subjecting only “persons” to liability); Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted)

  8. Capehart v. Comm'r of the Ga. Dep't of Corr.

    CV 324-030 (S.D. Ga. May. 10, 2024)

    Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 include “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West, 487 U.S. at 48; see also Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such

  9. Cadet v. Edward

    CV 2:24-025 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2024)

    Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (quoting Cravey v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 105 S.E.2d 497, 500 (Ga. 1958)).

  10. Jones v. Hall

    CV 123-160 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 23, 2024)

    Appropriate parties for suit under § 1983 include “persons” who participated in the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool v. Elbert Cnty., 368 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ga. 1988) (limiting § 1983 liability to “(1) natural persons; (2) an artificial person (a corporation); and (3) such quasi-artificial persons as the law recognizes as being capable to sue”) (quotations omitted).