It is important to note at the outset that while other courts have concluded that similar language is merely descriptive of the property covered by the policy, no court in the country has found this or similar language to be ambiguous. See Hill v Nationwide Mut Fire Ins Co, 214 Ga. App. 715; 448 S.E.2d 747 (1994); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co v Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423; 439 S.E.2d 682 (1993); Ins Co of North America v Howard, 679 F.2d 147, 148 (CA 9, 1982) ("We also find the provision unambiguous"); Shepard v Keystone Ins Co, 743 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D Md, 1990) ("There is no ambiguity as to the meaning of the terms `residence' or `reside' in the insurance contract between Shepard and Keystone"); Nancarrow v Aetna Casualty Surety, 932 F.2d 742, 744 (CA 8, 1991); Epps v Nicholson, 187 Ga. App. 246, 247; 370 S.E.2d 13 (1988) ("we do not find the provisions here to be conflicting, or the policy language ambiguous"). Our conclusion that the policy is unambiguous is further strengthened by the language Heniser included in the land contract when he sold the property.

(Emphasis supplied.) 1. The issue of Frances Roland's failure to maintain exclusive residence in the insured premises at the time of the fire is controlled by the decisions of this court in Schroeder v. Ga. Farm c. Ins. Co., 211 Ga. App. 302 ( 439 S.E.2d 18) (1993) and Ga. Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423 ( 439 S.E.2d 682) (1993) (involving identical policy language). Because the evidence established that the policy unambiguously required Frances Roland, as a named insured, to live at the "residence premises," and she was not living there at the time of the fire, no coverage existed for her claim.

And unlike other insurance policies, it did not include an express condition requiring the insured to reside only at the residence premises. Compare Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423, 424 (1) (a), 439 S.E.2d 682 (1993) (physical precedent only). While the application instructed the insured to "check all that apply" and listed "primary" and "occupied by Named Insured," as options to select, the policy did not incorporate the application by reference and the application does not state that it would become part of the policy.

Under Georgia law, "[n]o construction of an insurance contract is required or even permissible when the language is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation." Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 439 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Ga. App. 1993). However, an insurance contract "should be construed by the court where the language is undisputed but the meaning of that language is in dispute."

Further, some homeowner's insurance policies have "exclusive" residence clauses. For example, in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423, 439 S.E.2d 682 (1993), the court interpreted the insurance policy, which required that the residence premises be the insured's exclusive residence, to preclude coverage when the plaintiff did not reside at the house that was named on the policy's declaration page. Id. at 424-25, 439 S.E.2d at 683-84 (emphasis added) (the policy required "the residence premises [must be] the only premises where the named insured or spouse maintains a residence other than business or farm properties" Id. at 424, 439 S.E.2d at 682).

"No construction of an insurance contract is required or even permissible when the language is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation." Ga. Farm c. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423, 424 ( 439 SE2d 682) (1993). When the language of an insurance policy defining the extent of the insurer's liability is unambiguous and capable of but one reasonable construction, the courts must expound the contract as made by the parties. Courts have no more right by strained construction to make an insurance policy more beneficial by extending the coverage contracted for than they would have to increase the amount of coverage.

Under Georgia law, an insurance policy -- like all contracts -- "must be construed according to its plain language and express terms." See Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 439 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Ga.Ct.App. 1993). "Unless otherwise defined in the contract, terms in an insurance policy are given their ordinary and customary meaning."

Grath v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 Mich.App. 434, 802 N.W.2d 619, 622–23 (2010) (“definition of ‘residence premise’ uses the word ‘dwelling,’ which is specifically defined as a building structure ‘ where you reside and which is principally used as a private residence’ ... ‘where you reside’ ... is not merely an affirmative warranty, but requires the insured reside at the premises at the time of the loss”); Williamson v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., C.A. No. 04C–07–033 RFS, 2005 WL 6318348, *4 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 19, 2005) (policy's definition of “[r]esidence premises” as “the one or two family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any building where you reside and which is shown as the ‘residence premises' in the Declarations,” required residency); Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. DeMoonie, 227 Ga.App. 812, 490 S.E.2d 451, 453–54 (1997) (concluding that a residency requirement existed where the policy defined the covered premises as “the one or two family dwelling where you reside”); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga.App. 423, 439 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1993) (determining that a residency requirement existed where the insurance policy defined the covered “residence premises” as “the one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds; or ... that part of any other building; where you reside”). The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive.

Id. at 246, 370 S.E.2d at 13-14. Further, in Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423, 439 S.E.2d 682 (1993), the court interpreted the insurance policy, which required that the residence premises be the insured's exclusive residence, to preclude coverage when the plaintiff did not reside at the house that was named on the policy's declaration page. Id. at 424-25, 439 S.E.2d at 683-84 (emphasis added).

Allstate also argues that the Policy required Mahens to reside at the Property. In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kephart, 211 Ga. App. 423 (1993), the plaintiff sued to recover for fire damage under an insurance policy. The policy provided coverage for "the dwelling on the residence premises" defined as "the one family dwelling . . . or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown as the `residence premises' in the Declarations."