See, e.g., In re Turk , 267 Ga. 30, 30-31 (1), 471 S.E.2d 842 (1996) (declining to allow attorney subject to disciplinary proceeding to open default under excusable neglect ground where attorney's stated reasons for his failure to answer were "personal problems; numerous office moves resulting in disruption of his mail service; improper calendaring of the response date; misunderstanding of the bar rules; and his preoccupation with a prior disciplinary proceeding"); Ga. Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard , 170 Ga. App. 327, 330 (4), 317 S.E.2d 229 (1984) ("The term ‘excusable neglect,’ as used in this code section, refers to a ‘reasonable excuse’ for failing to answer, as distinguished from willful disregard of the process of the court."). This term does not find its roots in this state.
Chenoweth says the opinions relied upon by the Court of Appeals all deal with but one cause of action in tort against joint tortfeasors. Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 S.E.2d 421) (1974), affd., Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 S.E.2d 774) (1975); Ga. Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327 ( 317 S.E.2d 229) (1984). Chenoweth also contends the amount owed under the bond might differ from the amount owed on the contract because it may be that some but not all items covered by the contract entitle one to a lien, and this destroys joint liability.
DECIDED NOVEMBER 28, 1984. REHEARING DISMISSED DECEMBER 18, 1984. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 170 Ga. App. 327 ( 317 S.E.2d 229). Herbert S. Waldman, for appellant.
"The facts of this case do not establish as a matter of law the existence of a reasonable excuse for failing to file a timely answer." Ga. Farm Buildings v. Willard , 170 Ga. App. 327, 330 (4), 317 S.E.2d 229 (1984). (b) Proper case.
In Chenoweth, the Court held: See Ga. Farm Buildings v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 330-331 (5) ( 317 SE2d 229) (1984). 254 Ga. 321 ( 328 SE2d 539) (1985).
The trial court could take Follmer's unexplained delay into consideration as a factor in determining whether to exercise its discretion to open the default. See Ga. Farm Bldgs. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 330 (4) ( 317 S.E.2d 229) (1984). Under these circumstances, and given the minimal amount of evidence presented by Follmer, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default on grounds of excusable neglect.
Thus, we cannot conclude that the judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to open the default." Georgia Farm Bldgs. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 330 (4) ( 317 S.E.2d 229) (1984). 2.
[Cit.]" Georgia Farm Bldgs. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 331 ( 317 S.E.2d 229) (1984), aff'd 253 Ga. 649 ( 325 S.E.2d 591) (1984). An analysis of the alleged facts in the instant case clearly shows that Ms. Westbrook alleges a cause of action against appellant as a successive independent tortfeasor.
Generally speaking, the alleged liability of the defendants in a particular case is joint unless there is some rational basis for apportioning the alleged damages among them. See Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321 ( 205 S.E.2d 421) (1974), aff'd Mitchell v. Gilson, 233 Ga. 453 ( 211 S.E.2d 744) (1975); Ga. Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327, 331 ( 317 S.E.2d 229) (1984). In the present case, there clearly is no basis for such an apportionment.
Compare Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Heard, 123 Ga. App. 635 (3) ( 182 S.E.2d 153) (1971) (where service was effected upon a mere typist in the company's office); Thoni Oil Co. v. Tinsley, 140 Ga. App. 887 (1) ( 232 S.E.2d 162) (1977) (where the employee, though designated on the return of service as "Mgr.," was shown by uncontroverted affidavits to have been a mere service station attendant). Accord Ga. Farm Bldgs., Inc. v. Willard, 170 Ga. App. 327 ( 317 S.E.2d 229) (1984); Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Kennesaw Transp., 168 Ga. App. 701 ( 309 S.E.2d 917) (1983); Adams v. Upjohn Co., 142 Ga. App. 264 ( 235 S.E.2d 584) (1977). Judgment reversed. Pope and Benham, JJ., concur.