The bond is liable in each license year to benefit all parties who prove injuries suffered in the particular license year. General Electric Credit Corp. v. Wolverine Insurance Co., 420 Mich. 176, 362 N.W.2d 595 (1984). 13.
Unlike active fraud, constructive fraud has been defined as a breach of a legal or equitable duty that tends to deceive others, regardless of the moral guilt of the person committing the fraud. Goodrich v Waller, 314 Mich. 456; 22 N.W.2d 862 (1946); General Electric Credit Corp v Wolverine Ins Co, 420 Mich. 176; 362 N.W.2d 595 (1984). There is no dispute that the deceased had been married four times, had three children, and the plaintiff had been married twice prior to the present marriage.
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1992), p 385. Our Supreme Court in General Electric Credit Corp v Wolverine Ins Co, 420 Mich 176, 179, 188; 362 NW2d 595 (1984), discussed the "natural, common, ordinary, and primarily understood meaning" of the word "fraud," as used in MCL 257.248 requiring a surety bond of motor vehicle dealers providing indemnification of certain persons for loss "caused through fraud, cheating, or misrepresentation in the conduct of the vehicle business." The Court noted that the "natural, common, and ordinarily understood definition of the word 'fraud' embraces both actual and constructive fraud."
In addition, the Legislature is presumed to know the primary, ordinary, and generally understood meaning of words used in a statute, unless a contrary intent is manifest. Gen Electric Credit Corp v Wolverine Ins Co, 420 Mich 176, 189; 362 NW2d 595 (1984). "Fraud" is defined as " '[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.' "
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1992), p 385. Our Supreme Court in General Electric Credit Corp v Wolverine Ins Co, 420 Mich 176, 179, 188; 362 NW2d 595 (1984), discussed the "natural, common, ordinary, and primarily understood meaning" of the word "fraud," as used in MCL 257.248 requiring a surety bond of motor vehicle dealers providing indemnification of certain persons for loss "caused through fraud, cheating, or misrepresentation in the conduct of the vehicle business." The Court noted that the "natural, common, and ordinarily understood definition of the word 'fraud' embraces both actual and constructive fraud."
Under Michigan law, a finding of intentional misrepresentation is the same as a finding of fraud. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 420 Mich. 176, 188-89, 362 N.W.2d 595 (1984). Both consist of the following six elements:
"Constructive fraud" differs from intentional misrepresentation only in that constructive fraud "requires a misrepresentation which need not amount to a purposeful design to defraud." General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 420 Mich. 176, 188; 362 N.W.2d 595 (1984).
1964) ("Where the state sets up an annual licensing system and requires a bond for the protection of the public, the bonds must be construed as giving protection for their full face amount for each year that they are in force, and any provision in the bond attempting to limit this liability is a nullity."); General Electric Credit Corp. v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 595, 604 (Mich. 1985) ("The legislative purpose in requiring a yearly bond is to provide protection to the general public. An interpretation of the statute which provides only limited or static protection would defeat the legislative purpose in enacting the statute.").
Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1992), p. 385. Our Supreme Court in General Electric Credit Corp. v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 420 Mich. 176, 179, 188, 362 N.W.2d 595 (1984), discussed the "natural, common, ordinary, and primarily understood meaning" of the word "fraud," as used in MCL 257.248 requiring a surety bond of motor vehicle dealers providing indemnification of certain persons for loss "caused through fraud, cheating, or misrepresentation in the conduct of the vehicle business." The Court noted that the "natural, common, and ordinarily understood definition of the word ‘fraud’ embraces both actual and constructive fraud."
In sum, I believe that abandonment satisfies the "good cause" requirement to set aside a default or default judgment under MCR 2.603(D)(1) only when principles of agency would not impute the attorney's negligent omissions to the client. "Fraud" is generally defined as "all acts, omissions, and concealments involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to another, or the taking of undue or unconscientious advantage of another...." General Electric Credit Corp. v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 420 Mich. 176, 189, 362 N.W.2d 595 (1984)(quoting 37 CJS, Fraud, § 1, p. 204). "Fraud" encompasses both actual fraud--an intentional perversion of the truth-and constructive fraud--an act of deception or a misrepresentation without an evil intent.