Therefore, this issue does not entitle Miller to any relief.โMiller v. State, 63 So.3d at 699.See also Futral v. State, 558 So.2d 991 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).
Miller v. State, 63 So. 2d at 699. See also Futral v. State, 558 So. 2d 991 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).
Moreover, the proposed question does not itself suggest the materiality or relevance of the question or the answer sought. Futral v. State, 558 So.2d 991 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989). Thus, the appellant has failed to preserve this contention for review.
"[I]f a witness' testimony about a matter is adverse to the party who called the witness, it is proper for the trial court to permit such party, either for the purpose of proving such party's surprise at such testimony or for the purpose of refreshing the recollection of the witness and thereby inducing the witness to change such testimony, to require of the witness whether he had previously made, and to elicit testimony from him that he has previously made, a specified statement about the matter different from his present testimony and of a tenor favorable to such calling party."Futral v. State, 558 So.2d 991, 993 (Ala.Crim.App. 1989). Futral further held that "[b]ased on the theory of surprise, the State may not only elicit from a witness the fact that he had made a prior statement but may also elicit the contents of the statement."
However, we agree with the state that this issue is not preserved for appellate review, because Myers failed to make an offer of proof summarizing the testimony expected of the witness had she been permitted to testify. See Futral v. State, 558 So.2d 991, 992 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989); C. Gamble, supra, at ยง 425.01(4). II.
See also, Freeman v. State, 453 So.2d 776 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Futral v. State, 558 So.2d 991 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989). Thereafter, the appellant continued his cross-examination of Chambers as follows: