Having considered [the employee's] method of service, we find that simply `[b]ecause the manner of delivery is unusual does not make it illegal'" (Citations omitted.) Id. at 204, 12 0.0.3d 198, 389 N.E.2d 1113, quoting Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494, 5 0.0. 142, 200 N.E. 636, paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 19} We then held that "there [was] evidence in the record that [the housing authority] did eventually receive the mailed copy of the notice," and thus the salient question was "whether it received the notice within the * * * time limit prescribed" by R.C., 2505.07.
{¶ 17}Dudukovich held that "the act of depositing the notice in the mail, in itself, does not constitute a `filing,' at least where the notice is not received until after the expiration of the prescribed time limit. Fulton, Supt. of Banks v. State ex rel. General Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494[, 5 O.O. 142, 200 N.E. 636]. Rather, `[t]he term "filed" * * * requires actual delivery * * *.' Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
The "generally accepted sense" of the word "filed" "implies actual rather than constructive delivery * * * into the official custody and control" of the relevant official. Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp., 130 Ohio St. 494, 497, 200 N.E. 636 (1936). This rule has been acknowledged as applying to valuation complaints under R.C. 5715.19.
See also State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108 Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, ¶ 26. {¶ 25} Similarly, in Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494, 5 O.O. 142, 200 N.E. 636, we concluded that the word "filed" in G.C. 710-98a required actual delivery into the custody of the addressee. Id., paragraph one of the syllabus, cited with approval in Elkem Metals Co. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 683, 687, 693 N.E.2d 276.
Turning now to a consideration of Elkem's 1994 complaint, we conclude that our decision here must turn upon the meaning of the word "filed" as used in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). In Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494, 5 O.O. 142, 200 N.E. 636, we considered a statute that required preference claims to be filed within a certain period of time. In determining what the word "filed" meant, we cited at 497-498, 5 O.O. at 144, 200 N.E. at 637, definitions for the words "file" and "filed" from several different sources, all of which could be summed up by the quotation quoted from United States v. Lombardo (1916), 241 U.S. 73, 76, 36 S.Ct. 508, 509, 60 L.Ed. 897, 898, that "`[a] paper is filed when it is delivered to the proper official and by him received and filed.'"
It is established that the act of depositing the notice in the mail, in itself, does not constitute a "filing," at least where the notice is not received until after the expiration of the prescribed time limit. Fulton, Supt. of Banks, v. State, ex rel. General Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494. Rather, "[t]he term `filed' * * * requires actual delivery * * *."
The complaints and notices contained a praecipe for the clerk of courts to serve WCRPC by certified mail, and WCRPC received the service within the time prescribed by R.C. 2505.07 to file their appeals. Because copies of the notices of appeal and complaints were delivered timely to WCRPC, they were "filed" based on our definition of the term as set forth in *478 Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. (1936), 130 Ohio St. 494, 5 O.O. 142, 200 N.E. 636, paragraph one of the syllabus ("The term 'filed' * * * requires actual delivery * * * ").
See Ross v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 155 Ohio St.3d 373, 2018-Ohio-4746, 121 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 13 ("A filing requires physical delivery of the item to be filed to the proper official."); L.J. Smith, Inc. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 114, 2014-Ohio-2872, 16 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 21, quoting Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp., 130 Ohio St. 494, 497, 200 N.E. 636 (1936) ("[T]he 'generally accepted sense' of the word 'filed' 'implies actual rather than constructive delivery * * * into the official custody and control' of the relevant official.") (Emphasis added throughout.)
"The 'generally accepted sense' of the word 'filed' 'implies actual rather than constructive delivery * * * into the official custody and control' of the relevant official." L.J. Smith, Inc. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Revision, 140 Ohio St.3d 114, 2014-Ohio-2872, ¶ 21, quoting Fulton v. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp., 130 Ohio St. 494, 497 (1936). "Statutes that provide for filing documents require physical delivery to the official or agency, unless the statute at issue states a mailbox rule that deems the [document] filed when mailed."
The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined filing as actual delivery of a document into the official custody and control of the appropriate government official. Fulton v. State ex rel Gen. Motors Corp., 130 Ohio St. 494, 498 (1936). Dealing with a statute similar to the statute at issue here, the Eighth District Court of Appeals has held likewise that filing contemplates both delivery and receipt within the statutory time limit.