Opinion
37795.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 1959.
Workmen's compensation. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Pharr. April 20, 1959.
Harold Sheats, Martin H. Peabody, for plaintiff in error.
Hewlett, Hewlett Wall, Alford Wall, contra.
Under the provisions of Code Title 114 an accident arises out of employment when any degree of required exertion produces a resulting disability or death, if such exertion is too much for the individual employee.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 25, 1959.
Mrs. Margaret W. Windsor filed a claim with the State Board of Workmen's Compensation asking benefits for her two minor children because of the death of her husband, and the resulting alleged benefits accruing to the minor children. The claim was instituted against Fulton County as the defendant.
The case was heard by a deputy director of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, who held that the minor children were entitled to compensation. The finding of facts and award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation was appealed to the Superior Court of Fulton County, where the finding of facts and award was affirmed. It is to this judgment that the case is here for review.
The evidence shows substantially that the claimant testified that her husband had always been in good health and had evidenced no previous heart trouble; that the deceased had a routine cardiogram made some ten or twelve years previous to the time of the trial, but no defective heart condition was shown at that time.
Another witness testified that on the date of the death of the deceased, the deceased was in the courthouse where he worked; that the witness saw the deceased before the fatal heart attack; that the deceased had walked up approximately 20 steps immediately preceding the heart attack; that the duties of the deceased consisted of serving papers, such as warrants; that such work was sometimes aggravating and nerve wracking and sometimes just routine; that the deceased was later than usual returning to the courthouse on the date in question; that the time of the fatal attack was approximately 4 in the afternoon; that the marshals are required to go back to the courthouse and report in; that the witness and the deceased and other marshals were required to be on duty day and night subject to call.
Another witness who worked with the deceased on the date in question testified that he and the deceased had unusual trouble that day and ran late in returning to the courthouse.
Dr. Purcell Roberts who qualified as a heart specialist, testified that he saw the deceased on the morning of June 11, 1958, in Georgia Baptist Hospital (the heart attack occurred on June 10 and the deceased died on June 14); that the deceased died of acute coronary thrombosis or myocardial infarction resulting from a blood clot in an artery in the heart; the witness testified: "I feel that the factor of exertion is usually coincidental to the formation of the thrombus or clot. I do feel that where we have an instance of a coronary thrombosis following unusual exertion that one cannot rule out the factor as a probable contributory or aggravating cause." The witness further testified that after a person had had one attack of coronary thrombosis such patient should not exert himself for several months.
Counsel for the defendant cite a number of cases which have held various degrees of exertions to be compensable. Those cases and many other cases set out the amount of the exertion expended in each case and the decisions rendered in those cases are accordingly correct. There is expert testimony in the present case to indicate that the exertion expended by the deceased could very well have brought on the attack. For this reason we will not list the cases cited by counsel for the defendant. This court has held many times that a compensable injury arises out of employment when a given degree of exertion is required which is too great for the worker involved. See Bussey v. Globe Indem. Co., 81 Ga. App. 401 ( 59 S.E.2d 34) and Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172 ( 63 S.E.2d 272).
Counsel for the claimant does not contend that the energy expended in the instant case was violent but merely that the undertaking of the work of the marshal's office contributed to the death of the deceased. See in this connection General Motors Corp. v. Hall, 93 Ga. App. 181 ( 91 S.E.2d 57). The facts in that case are very similar to the facts in the case at bar. Even if the deceased had a pre-existing heart attack, which is not shown by the evidence in this case, he would not be precluded from compensation. See Georgia Power Co. v. Reid, 87 Ga. App. 621 ( 74 S.E.2d 672).
Where there is some evidence to support an award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, and where there is no fraud shown, the appellate courts are bound to affirm such award. See Manufacturers Cas. Co. v. Baggett, 93 Ga. App. 449 ( 91 S.E.2d 861).
The Superior Court of Fulton County did not err in affirming the award of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation.
Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.