Opinion
38641, 38642.
DECIDED APRIL 5, 1961. REHEARING DENIED APRIL 14, 1961.
Condemnation. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Moore.
Harold Sheats, Paul Anderson, Martin Peabody, for plaintiff in error.
Robert W. Spears, Albert G. Callaway, contra.
The court did not err in dismissing the condemnor's appeal from the award of the assessors.
DECIDED APRIL 5, 1961 — REHEARING DENIED APRIL 14, 1961.
Fulton County filed an action in Fulton Superior Court against M. W. Harmon under the provisions of Ch. 36-11 of the Code of Georgia, as amended, to acquire, by condemnation, fee-simple title to certain real property and certain easement rights over other described real property. Assessors were duly selected and appointed, and the assessors made an award fixing the amount of compensation to be paid to M. W. Harmon for the property and easement rights sought to be acquired by Fulton County. The award was filed in the office of the Clerk of Fulton Superior Court on June 29, 1955. On June 29, 1955, Fulton County filed its appeal from the award of the assessors, but it did not pay the amount of the award into the registry of the court until July 13, 1955. On July 21, 1955, acting under authority of an order of court, the clerk of court paid to M. W. Harmon the amount of the award. Thereafter, M. W. Harmon died, and on September 13, 1960, Citizens Southern National Bank, as executor of his last will and testament, was, by order of court, made a party defendant in the case in lieu of M. W. Harmon, deceased. Thereafter, Citizens Southern National Bank, party defendant as representative of the estate of M. W. Harmon, deceased, filed its motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the judgment condemning the property was entered June 29, 1955; that the appeal from the award of the assessors was filed on June 29, 1955, and that the amount of the award was not paid into the registry of the court until July 13, 1955, thereby rendering the appeal void. The court sustained the motion to dismiss the appeal, to which ruling the plaintiff in error excepts and assigns same as error.
The attorneys for the plaintiff in error state in their brief the following: "Now, as a prologue to our argument, we wish to approach the court in a spirit of honesty and frankness. The recent decisions, both of this court and of the Supreme Court, dealing with these questions, are against the position which we now take. In the case of Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75 (3), the court said: `For the reason stated in the corresponding division of the opinion, tender to the condemnees of the assessors' award of compensation for the property sought to be condemned, or payment of it into the registry of the court on their refusal to accept it, was a condition precedent to the condemnor's right to file and prosecute an appeal to a jury in the Superior Court of Fulton County.' The above ruling of the Supreme Court was followed by this court in the three cases reported in 99 Ga. App. 24, and the case of State Highway Department v. Wilson, 98 Ga. App. 619, et seq.; and, in this latter case, the Supreme Court denied our application for certiorari. Thus, we are compelled to face up to the fact that, in order for this court to sustain our position and reverse the court below in the instant case, it will be necessary for this court not to only reverse its position in the above cited cases, but that it would also be necessary for this court to undertake to reverse the above quoted ruling of the Supreme Court in the Woodside case. We are neither stupid nor so naive as to be able to delude ourselves into the belief that we have any chance whatsoever of getting this court to deliver such an opinion. However, as to this case, this court is the `door' through which we must enter if we are to get this question again before the Supreme Court."
The instant case is controlled by the decision in Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 214 Ga. 75 ( 103 S.E.2d 108).
Because the judgment complained of in the main bill of exceptions disposes of the case in the trial court, the cross-bill will not be considered and is dismissed. Code Ann. § 6-901; Statham v. Saxon, 210 Ga. 369 ( 80 S.E.2d 182).
Judgment affirmed on main bill of exceptions; cross-bill dismissed. Townsend, P. J., Carlisle and Jordan, JJ., concur.