He also acknowledges that other courts of appeals have likewise concluded that section 21.02 does not violate the constitutional jury unanimity requirement. See Navarro v. State, 535 S.W.3d 162, 165-66 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, pet. ref'd); Ingram v. State, 503 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd); Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref'd); McMillian v. State, 388 S.W.3d 866, 872-73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Kennedy v. State, 385 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. ref'd); Casey v. State, 349 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. ref'd); Reckart v. State, 323 S.W.3d 588, 600-01 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, pet. ref'd); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857-58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. ref'd). Similarly, appellant acknowledges that other courts of appeals have also concluded that the statute does not violate due process or due course of law.

"[W]ithin the scope of the right of confrontation is the absolute requirement that a criminal defendant who is threatened with loss of liberty be physically present at all phases of proceedings against him, absent a waiver of that right through defendant's own conduct." Fulmer v. State , 401 S.W.3d 305, 314 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref'd) (citing Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ; TEX. CONST . art. I, § 10. Texas statutory law provides even further protection by stating that the accused has an absolute right to remain in the courtroom until the jury has been selected. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 33.03.

" Thrift, 176 S.W.3d at 224; Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. ref'd).

Sandoval admits in his brief that several appellate courts, including this court, have held that section 21.02 does not violate due process. See Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. ref'd); Casey v. State, 349 S.W.3d 825, 829-30 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2011, pet. ref'd); Jacobsen v. State, 325 S.W.3d 733, 736-37 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, no pet.); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857-58 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. ref'd). Sandoval distinguishes this authority by arguing that those cases dealt with substantive due process and not procedural due process.

However, as Gonzales recognizes, numerous Texas appellate courts, including this court, have addressed this issue and in each instance held section 21.02 constitutional and statutorily sound. See, e.g., Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 405-06 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 436 (2013); Kennedy v. State, 385 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 681 (2013); Casey v. State, 349 S.W.3d 825, 829-30 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, pet. ref'd); Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 872; Jacobsen v. State, 325 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857-58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. ref'd). The courts reasoned:

“A defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the defendant's financial circumstances occurs.” Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p) (West Supp.2014); accord Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex.Crim.App.2013); Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 318 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, pet. ref'd), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 436, 187 L.Ed.2d 293 (2013). On the other hand,

Texas state courts have held that section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code does not violate a defendant's right to jury unanimity. See Fulmer v. Texas, 401 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex. App. 2013); Kennedy v. State, 385 S.W.3d 729, 731-32 (Tex. App. 2012); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857-58 (Tex. App. 2010). Texas courts have held that the individual acts of sexual abuse relate to the manner and means of committing the crime and are not elements of the offense.

Texas state courts have held that Section 21.02 does not violate a defendant's right to jury unanimity. See Fulmer v. Texas, 401 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 2013); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857-58 (Tex. App. - Dallas 2010). The individual acts of sexual abuse relate to the manner and means of committing the crime and are not elements of the offense.

Texas state courts have held that Section 21.02 does not violate a defendant's right to jury unanimity. Fulmer v. Texas, 401 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2013); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857-58 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010). Texas courts have held that the individual acts of sexual abuse relate to the manner and means of committing the crime and are not elements of the offense.

Many other Texas courts have concluded similarly. See Ingram v. State, 503 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref'd); Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013, pet. ref'd); McMillian v. State, 388 S.W.3d 866, 872-73 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Kennedy v. State, 385 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, pet. ref'd); Casey v. State, 349 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2011, pet. ref'd);