Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1993.
April 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court is Defendant Teamsters Local 35's ("Union") Motion for Summary Judgment, Union's supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Andrew Fullman's ("Fullman") oppositions thereto, and Fullman's "Motion for Summary Judgment of Check-Off Authorization and Assignment." For the reasons set forth below, Union's motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In or around January 1998, Fullman began working as a bus driver for Laidlaw Transit-Airport ("Laidlaw"). While employed with Laidlaw, Fullman was a member of International Brotherhood of Teamster's ("IBT") Local 115. During 1998, Laidlaw lost its airport business to another transportation company. Shortly thereafter, Fullman began driving buses for Cape Transit Corporation Adventure Trails ("Adventure Trails"). IBT Local 35 represented bus drivers who were employed by Adventure Trails. Accordingly, IBT transferred Fullman's membership from Local 115 to Local 35.
A. The Three Day Suspension
On or around August 21, 2002, Fullman was involved in an incident with a pedestrian ("Pedestrian"). The Pedestrian called Adventure Trails to complain and alleged that Fullman almost ran over a group of people who were crossing a road. The Pedestrian claims that he had to push an old woman out of the way so that she would not be run over. The Pedestrian further alleged that Fullman's bus came so close to hitting him that the bus actually brushed against his clothing. Fullman never reported the incident to Adventure Trails.
Fullman disputes the Pedestrian's claims and offers his own version of events. This case, however, does not hinge on those disputed facts, and therefore, can be determined as a matter of law.
On or around August 22, 2002, Adventure Trails suspended Fullman without pay pending an investigation into the Pedestrian's complaint. Fullman was ultimately suspended for three days before Adventure Trails reinstated him. On August 27, 2002, Fullman filed a grievance protesting his suspension. Adventure Trails denied the grievance and upheld its three day suspension, stating that at a minimum, Fullman failed to file an incident report, and therefore, he violated company policy. On or around September 12, 2002, Union continued the grievance process by meeting with Adventure Trails to discuss the suspension. Despite the meeting, Adventure Trails refused to pay Fullman for the three days that he was suspended. To support its position, Adventure Trails stated that a serious complaint was filed against Fullman, and even if he did not agree with the Pedestrian's version of events, he was obligated — and failed — to file an incident report. Based on this meeting, and other evidence that Union possessed, Union decided not to advance the grievance to arbitration.
B. Union Dues
As a member of the Union, Fullman was required to pay monthly dues. During the months of November 2000, February 2001 and March 2001, Plaintiff was laid-off and did not work. During these months, Union continued to charge Fullman his monthly dues.
C. Claims Before the Court
On or around January 7, 2003, Fullman filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. On or around March 28, 2003, Defendants removed the case to this Court. Plaintiff's original complaint contained several causes of action against multiple defendants. After the defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, this Court entered an order dismissing several defendants and causes of action. The following two claims against Union are the only two claims that have survived: 1) breach of duty of fair representation for not further advancing Fullman's grievance on the three day suspension; and 2) wrongfully charging Fullman union dues while he was laid-off.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where all of the evidence demonstrates "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Since a grant of summary judgment will deny a party its chance in court, all inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The ultimate question in determining whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted is "whether reasonable minds may differ as to the verdict." Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1998). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation
Fullman alleges that Union breached its duty of fair representation when Union decided not to advance his grievance to arbitration. It is well established that an exclusive bargaining representative of employees has
a statutory duty fairly to represent all of those employees, both in its collective bargaining and in its enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement. Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, and to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. This duty of fair representation is of major importance, but a breach occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.United Steel Workers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372 (1990). The courts have held that mere negligence in the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement is not enough to state a claim for breach of duty of fair representation. Id. 372-73. Additionally, the duty of fair representation
does not confer on an employee an absolute right to force his [union] to press his complaint all the way to the very end of the grievance procedures made possible by the collective bargaining agreement.
* * * *
An employee, therefore, is subject to the union's discretionary power to settle or even to abandon a grievance, so long as it does not act arbitrarily, and this is true even if it can later be demonstrated that the employee's claim was meritorious. It is therefore essential to plaintiff's claim that there should have been proof of arbitrary or bad-faith conduct on the part of the Union in processing his grievance.Bazarte v. United Transportation Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872 (3d Cir. 1970).
In the instant case, Fullman has not submitted any evidence whatsoever that Union acted arbitrarily or in bad-faith. Rather, Fullman's sole argument is that he did not agree with the Pedestrian's version of events, and therefore, Union should have continued to press his grievance. As the above-cited case law states, this is not enough to succeed on a claim for breach of duty of fair representation. A plaintiff must show proof of arbitrary or bad-faith conduct, and Fullman has failed to meet that burden.
Furthermore, Union has submitted several legitimate reasons why it did not further pursue Fullman's grievance. Specifically, the complaint against Fullman was extremely serious — he almost ran over a group of pedestrians. (Def.'s Br. at 13.) Additionally, the Pedestrian had no motive to lie and came across as rational and credible. (Id.) Union believed that an arbitrator would be more likely to believe the Pedestrian over Fullman, as Fullman did have a motive to lie — to avoid discipline. (Id.) Furthermore, regardless of who was telling the truth, it is undisputed that Fullman never filed an incident report, which is against company policy. (Id.) Lastly, any recovery that Fullman might have been able to receive through arbitration was speculative. (Id.) Fullman was a part-time, casual employee, who did not work every day. There is no evidence that Fullman would have been working on any of the three days that he was suspended; therefore, there is no proof that he suffered any damages. Based on all of this information, Union used its discretion and made a decision not to further pursue the grievance.
Based on the reasons stated above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of fact, and Fullman has not presented any evidence to support his claim. Accordingly, the Court grants Union's motion for summary judgment.
B. Wrongfully Charging Union Dues
Fullman next alleges that Union wrongfully charged him for union dues during months when he was laid-off. (Compl. ¶ 31(a).) Specifically, Union charged Fullman for dues for three months when he did not work — December 2000, February 2001 and March 2001. (Lucidi Aff. ¶ 5, Ex. D.)
While it is undisputed that Union charged Fullman for dues during the three months that he was laid-off, it is also undisputed that IBT Local 35's Constitution entitled Union to continue to charge dues unless Fullman requested a "withdrawal card," which would have alleviated him from paying dues while he was laid-off. (Lucidi Aff. ¶ 3.) Fullman, however, never requested a "withdrawal card;" therefore, the Union properly charged Fullman for dues, and Fullman's claim fails. (Def.'s Br. at 14-15.)
Despite Fullman's obligation to pay dues during these months, Union ultimately issued Fullman a credit for February and March of 2001; therefore, Fullman's claim is that he was overcharged for one month — a total of approximately $20. (Lucidi Aff. ¶ 8, ¶ 2.)
Furthermore, Fullman's argument is disingenuous given that he readily admits that there were several months when he was obligated — but failed — to pay union dues. (Lucidi Aff. ¶ 19, Ex. J; See also Pl.'s Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 2.) It is undisputed that Fullman never paid his dues for July, August and September of 2002. (Lucidi Aff. ¶ 18.) Even if somehow Fullman can show that he was overcharged for one month of union dues — which cannot — Fullman still has not suffered any damages, as it is undisputed that there were several months when he failed to pay dues, and any overcharge would be netted against his delinquencies. After netting the overcharges against Fullman's delinquencies, Fullman would still be indebted to Union, and he would not be entitled to any recovery.
In his opposition to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, Fullman admits that he failed to pay union dues and that he "realized his actions were wrong . . ." Additionally, after he was terminated from Adventure Trails, Fullman attempted to get reinstated by paying his delinquent union dues, which Union declined to accept. See Ex. J to Lucidi Affidavit.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Union's motion for summary judgment is granted. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of April, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant Teamsters Local 35's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 28), Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 31), Plaintiff Andrew Fullman's Oppositions thereto (Docket Nos. 30 36) and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 34), it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion is GRANTED, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED, and judgment is entered on behalf of Defendant and against Plaintiff. This case is now CLOSED.