Pretermitting whether the trial court's allowance of this questioning was erroneous, we find any prejudice therefrom to be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of appellant's guilt. See Fuller v. State, 230 Ga.App. 219, 221(2), 496 S.E.2d 303 (1998). 5.
See Burtts v. State, supra at 403(3). The juror's possible recognition of the victim and a spectator and his concern over possible recognition at a later date are more innocuous than many other instances of juror relationships and fears which have not furnished a ground for disqualification. Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 799(2) ( 493 S.E.2d 136) (1997); Thornton v. State, 264 Ga. 563, 573(13)(b) ( 449 S.E.2d 98) (1994); Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219(1) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998); Waddell v. State, 224 Ga. App. 172, 175(3)(b) ( 480 S.E.2d 224) (1996); Bell v. State, 203 Ga. App. 109, 110(2) ( 416 S.E.2d 344) (1992). Under the circumstances, it is impossible to discern any harm from Pennie's absence. It would be rank speculation to hold that her presence could have resulted in the juror's disqualification or made a guilty verdict any less likely.
Corza v. State, 273 Ga. 164, 166 (2) ( 539 SE2d 149) (2000).Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 220-221 (2) ( 496 SE2d 303) (1998). (d) Carrie contends that her trial counsel performed deficiently by eliciting and failing to object to testimony from Bridges and K. G. that Carrie had previously paid other girls to dance erotically at her home.
See Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 178 ( 563 SE2d 847) (2002). See Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 219-220 (1) ( 496 SE2d 303) (1998) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse for cause a potential juror who was friends with the arresting officer because the juror "stated with certainty that he could render a decision based on the law and the evidence"); Croom v. State, 217 Ga. App. 596, 597-598 (2) ( 458 SE2d 679) (1995) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse for cause a potential juror who was engaged to the arresting officer because the juror specifically indicated that she could render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the case). DOYLE, Judge.
OCGA § 24-9-20(b).Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 221(2) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998). 2.
Lively, 262 Ga. at 511 (1). See Rucker v. State, 270 Ga. 431, 432-33 (2) ( 510 S.E.2d 816) (1999); Garland v. State, 263 Ga. 495, 495-97 (1) ( 435 S.E.2d 431) (1993); Brown, 246 Ga. App. at 65 (2); Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 219-20 (1) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998). We deplore the significant burden a retrial will impose on the victim, her family and her community.
In this case, the record as a whole shows no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its failure to remove Hill for cause. See Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219 (1) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998). 3. Brown argues that the court erred in denying his pre-trial motion for change of venue because the extensive newspaper and radio coverage and the nature of the offenses created an inherently prejudicial environment.
Thus, Fulton-Fritchlee has waived any objection to the use of her medical records for impeachment purposes on these occasions. See generally Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 220 (2) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998); Ramey v. Leisure, Ltd., 205 Ga. App. 128, 132 (2) ( 421 S.E.2d 555) (1992). 2.
Before O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14 (b) (1) was amended in 1997, only prior misdemeanor shoplifting convictions could be considered in seeking felony for a fourth shoplifting conviction. See generally Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 221 (3) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998). The 1997 statutory amendment to O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14 (b) (1) (C), provided that, "[u]pon conviction of a fourth or subsequent offense for shoplifting, where the prior [shoplifting] convictions are either felonies or misdemeanors, or any combination of felonies and misdemeanors . . ., the defendant commits a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years; and the first year of such sentence shall not be suspended, probated, deferred, or withheld."
The state is entitled to inform the jury of all the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime or crimes charged, and we find no error in admitting the evidence of drug and alcohol use as part of the res gestae even though it may have incidentally placed Ramsey's character in evidence. See Garcia v. State, 267 Ga. 257, 258 (4) ( 477 S.E.2d 112) (1996) (defendant's in-custody statement that he was addicted to drugs was admissible as res gestae evidence because it was relevant to what transpired shortly before, during and shortly after the crime); Giddens, supra (lab test indicating defendant had marijuana in his system just after stabbing the victim was admissible as res gestae, particularly where defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime was critical); Fuller v. State, 230 Ga. App. 219, 220 (2) ( 496 S.E.2d 303) (1998) (state was properly allowed to cross-examine defendant about drug and alcohol use on the day of the crime because it related to his state of mind and was part of the res gestae). Inasmuch as the relevant inquiry is whether the evidence tends to show the accused's state of mind shortly before, during, or shortly after the commission of the crimes, the fact that Ramsey's admission regarding his drug and alcohol use at the time of the crimes came months later is inconsequential.