Because Harman's participation in a chain of events was not the proximate cause of Beals's death in the instant matter, we need not address under what circumstances a chain of events might constitute the proximate cause of an injury or death in a different factual scenario. See, e.g., Fuller v. Hessler, 226 Mich. 311, 314–315, 197 N.W. 524 (1924) (holding, outside of the governmental immunity context, that proximate cause does not exist between an earlier cause and the injury where “independent human agency ... broke the relation of alleged cause and effect.”). It bears repeating that this case arose in the scope of governmental employment.
This he predicates on the fact that a period of 9 hours elapsed between his said act of negligence and plaintiff's injuries and on the theory that an independent, subsequent act of negligence intervened as an efficient cause of the injuries namely, negligence of the garage owners in failing to erect barricades around the dangerous premises to keep people out. In support he cites Luck v. Gregory, 257 Mich. 562, and Fuller v. Hessler. 226 Mich. 311. The cases are distinguishable from this in that the intervening causal factor there consisted of an overt act, not a failure to act as claimed here. Defendant urges, however, that even though the intervening negligence consists only of a failure of another to act to prevent injury to plaintiff, it must be held to render his own negligence a remote rather than a proximate cause and, in law, excused, under authority of Schneider v. C.H. Little Co., 184 Mich. 315. and Fowles v. Briggs, 116 Mich. 425 (40 LRA 528, 72 Am St Rep 537). In Schneider, however, this Court said, with respect to such claim (p 324), "the cases * * * do not go so far."
As Michigan courts have recognized, in common usage, when persons refer to a public place, the reference typically applies to a location on real property or a building. See, e.g., People ex rel. Allegan Prosecuting Attorney v. Harding, 343 Mich. 41, 47, 72 N.W.2d 33 (1955) (stating that, as applied to an “inclosure, room, or building,” a public place is one where, by general invitation, members of the public attend for reasons of business, entertainment, instruction, or the like, and are welcome as long as they conform to what is customarily done there) (citation and quotation marks omitted); People v. DeVine, 271 Mich. 635, 640, 261 N.W. 101 (1935) (holding that an act of indecent exposure occurring on the front porch of a private dwelling that was frequented by neighbor children was done in a public place); Fuller v. Hessler, 226 Mich. 311, 313, 197 N.W. 524 (1924) (stating that a privately owned vacant lot is not a public place within the meaning of an ordinance referring to streets, alleys, or public places); Westland v. Okopski, 208 Mich.App. 66, 75–77, 527 N.W.2d 780 (1994) (holding that the Knights of Columbus Hall was a public place); People v. Adams, 150 Mich.App. 181, 184, 388 N.W.2d 254 (1986) (recognizing that the front steps leading into an apartment are a public place). The parking lot of a business that is open for the general public's use—even if it is intended for the use of the business's customers alone—is a public place in this ordinary sense.
As Michigan courts have recognized, in common usage, when persons refer to a public place, the reference typically applies to a location on real property or a building. See, e.g., People ex rel. Allegan Prosecuting Attorney v. Harding, 343 Mich. 41, 47, 72 N.W.2d 33 (1955) (stating that, as applied to an “inclosure, room, or building,” a public place is one where, by general invitation, members of the public attend for reasons of business, entertainment, instruction, or the like, and are welcome as long as they conform to what is customarily done there) (citation and quotation marks omitted); People v. DeVine, 271 Mich. 635, 640, 261 N.W. 101 (1935) (holding that an act of indecent exposure occurring on the front porch of a private dwelling that was frequented by neighbor children was done in a public place); Fuller v. Hessler, 226 Mich. 311, 313, 197 N.W. 524 (1924) (stating that a privately owned vacant lot is not a public place within the meaning of an ordinance referring to streets, alleys, or public places); Westland v. Okopski, 208 Mich.App. 66, 75–77, 527 N.W.2d 780 (1994) (holding that the Knights of Columbus Hall was a public place); People v. Adams, 150 Mich.App. 181, 184, 388 N.W.2d 254 (1986) (recognizing that the front steps leading into an apartment are a public place). The parking lot of a business that is open for the general public's use—even if it is intended for the use of the business's customers alone—is a public place in this ordinary sense.