(citation omitted)); Chapalas v. Papachristos, 185 Ga. 544, 547-48 ( 195 SE 737) (1938) ("[W]e cannot think that the testator, in relieving the executor from the duty of making returns, intended also to make him unanswerable in any court on the question of settlement; and if he is subject to the jurisdiction of any court on that question, there is no reason to say that he is not amenable to the [probate court].").Cf. Fuller v. Fuller, 217 Ga. 691, 694 (1) (a) ( 124 SE2d 741) (1962) (holding that allegations that amounted to mere apprehension of injury were insufficient to form the basis for an injunction); Elam v. Elam, 72 Ga. 162, 162 (2) (1883) ("A fear on the part of complainants, that if defendant should sell the property and pocket the proceeds, they would be unable to realize anything upon their claims against the estate which she represents, is a naked allegation; it must be shown clearly upon what grounds such fear rests.").Compare Cannon, 269 Ga. at 673 (allegations of fraud and mismanagement by executor sufficient to compel an accounting), with Marshall v. Marshall, 268 Ga. 687, 689-90 (3) ( 492 SE2d 188) (1997) (allegations of suspected mismanagement, without specificity, were insufficient); Fuller, 217 Ga. at 694 (1) (a) (allegations of potential harm were insufficient); Elam, 72 Ga. at 162 (1), (2) (same).

Paragraph 15 of the support agreement provided that upon the death of the father of the two minors it would be a charge on his estate and his executor was directed "to fulfill all the obligations of this contract until the complete termination thereof prior to the distribution of any part of his estate to any other parties." The cases relied on by the appellees ( Lipton v. Lipton, 211 Ga. 442 ( 86 S.E.2d 299); McGahee v. McGahee, 204 Ga. 91 ( 48 S.E.2d 675); Fuller v. Fuller, 217 Ga. 691 ( 124 S.E.2d 741)) are distinguishable from the case at bar. This suit for specific performance was not premature.