Opinion
B162356.
7-8-2003
ANDREW FULLER et al., Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents, v. MICHAEL ANDERSON et al., Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Daniel E. Engel and Daniel E. Engel for Appellants. Tharpe & Howell, Paul M. Bielaczyc and Eric B. Kunkel for Respondents.
A judgment includes both money damages and injunctive orders. Here we are asked to decide if payment of the money portion of the judgment entitles the debtor to receive an acknowledgement of full satisfaction of the judgment. We conclude that it does.
A jury found, among other things, that the parties were negligent in creating conditions that permitted a landslide to occur on their respective, abutting properties. Based upon the parties stipulation, the court ordered that the net sums of the jurys damage awards be placed in an account for remediation of the landslide and reconstruction of the slope. Pursuant to the stipulation, the court also ordered the parties to agree upon a final repair plan to be funded in the future according to a formula set forth in the judgment.
Respondents Andrew Fuller and Stephanie Greene (Fullers) moved to compel appellants Michael and Hillary Anderson (Andersons) to acknowledge full satisfaction of the judgment, including costs, in the sum of $ 57,051.20. The Andersons opposed the motion, claiming that the Fullers only partially satisfied the judgment in that there remained executory orders to repair the slope damaged by the landslide and to maintain the hillside. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Code of Civil Procedure section 724.010, which concerns the satisfaction of judgments, refers only to money judgments. We agree and affirm.
FACTS
The Andersons and the Fullers filed cross-actions seeking damages and injunctive relief to repair a landslide between their properties. By special verdict, the jury found that both parties created a nuisance and determined their comparative fault for negligence. Among other things, the jury found that the Fullers were liable to the Andersons in the sum of $ 56,855.20. With court costs, the Fullers owed the Andersons $ 57,051.20.
These money damages were recited in the written judgment on special verdict. Pursuant to the parties stipulation, the judgment also ordered them to place the net sums of their awards into a joint interest bearing account for remediation of the landslide and reconstruction of the slope. The stipulated order also provides that repair of the landslide would be accomplished "by the parties agreeing upon the final repair plan." To ensure that the stipulation will be carried out, the judgment provides that the trial court retains jurisdiction over the matter.
The Fullers insurer paid $ 57,051.20 to satisfy the money portion of the judgment and made a written demand for acknowledgment of full satisfaction of judgment. ( § 724.050, subd. (b).) But, the Andersons filed only an acknowledgment of partial satisfaction of the judgment. ( § 724.120.) The Fullers moved to compel compliance with their written demand for acknowledgement of full satisfaction of judgment. ( § 724.050, subd. (d).) The Andersons opposed the motion because the Fullers had not completed the injunctive component of the judgment.
The court granted the motion, explaining that "although the judgment entered after trial has both an injunctive component and a monetary component, the statutes relating to satisfaction of judgment limit their application to money judgments.
. . . Since the monetary component of the judgment on the cross-complaint has been fully performed by cross-defendants, a Full Satisfaction of Judgment must be executed. The Court has expressly retained jurisdiction over the injunctive component of the judgment, which ensures the enforceability of the injunctive relief which was ordered." This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
The Andersons contend there is no basis for the trial court to compel them to execute an acknowledgement of full satisfaction of judgment because not all of the terms of the judgment have been met, including further payments to the joint fund. We conclude that such an acknowledgment is required because the money award portion of the judgment set forth a specific sum immediately due which was paid in full. ( §§ 680.270, 724.050.) The court-ordered injunctive relief was not a money judgment. It contemplates future payments of undetermined additional sums by the parties to a joint fund for the reconstruction project.
Enforcement of Judgments
Where the issue presented is one of statutory construction, our task is "`to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute." (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227; see also Steinfeld v. Foote-Goldman Proctologic Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 13, 17-18.) We look first at the words used in the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.
If, as here, there is no ambiguity, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said and the plain meaning of the statute governs our construction. (Allen, p. 227.)
A nuisance may be enjoined or abated and damages may be recovered as well. ( § 731.) For purposes of enforcing the judgment, however, section 680.230 defines "judgment" as an "order, or decree entered in a court." Section 680.270 is even more specific, defining a "money judgment" as "that part of a judgment that requires the payment of money." (Italics added.) "A money judgment may be satisfied by payment of the full amount required to satisfy the judgment . . . ." ( § 724.010.) "When a money judgment is satisfied, the judgment creditor immediately shall file with the court an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment." ( § 724.030.)
Section 724.050 provides, in pertinent part, "(a) If a money judgment has been satisfied, the judgment debtor . . . may serve . . . a demand in writing that the judgment creditor do one or both of the following: [P] (1) File an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment with the court. [P] (2) Execute, acknowledge, and deliver an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment to the person who made the demand. . . . [P] (d) If the judgment creditor does not comply with the demand . . . the person making the demand may apply to the court on noticed motion for an order requiring the judgment creditor to comply with the demand." (Italics added.)
In filing their acknowledgment of "partial" satisfaction of judgment, the Andersons admitted the Fullers paid $ 57,051.20, which is the full amount of money currently ordered to be paid by this judgment. The Andersons assert, however, that the cost of remediation and reconstruction will far exceed the amounts originally ordered and paid into the joint account. This argument misses the point. Payment of the sum certain contained in the judgment entitles the judgment debtor to receive acknowledgment of full satisfaction.
The stipulated injunctive portion of the judgment contemplates that the parties will agree upon a final repair plan after execution of this judgment. Additional sums of money may be required for such repair, and the stipulation sets forth a formula for the parties to contribute to a joint fund for that purpose. But, the only part of the judgment that requires the immediate payment of money by the Fullers, pursuant to the special verdict of the jury, is the part which the Andersons acknowledge was paid in full pursuant to the judgment. For purposes of acknowledgment of full satisfaction of the money judgment, we are not concerned about sums of money that may be required to be placed in a joint account to satisfy a remediation plan that does not yet exist. Thus, there is no judgment creditor to be satisfied by the terms of the injunctive relief. Indeed, the trial court retained jurisdiction specifically to ensure that the injunctive portion of the judgment will be carried out by both of the parties according to its terms.
The Andersons assert that filing a full satisfaction of judgment would promote fraud upon third parties who may consider extending credit to the Fullers. They argue that such third parties will be deceived into believing that the Fullers have fulfilled all their obligations on this project. We disagree. The judgment is a public record which potential creditors may peruse. Indeed, the Andersons may benefit from the ability of the Fullers to obtain further financing as a result of the payment on this judgment. Such financing may assist the Fullers in contributing money which may be necessary to fulfill the terms of the injunction.
Attorney Fees and Costs
The trial court ruled that no attorney fees or costs are allowed either party in this matter. That ruling was in error. Section 724.080 states that "in an action or proceeding maintained pursuant to this chapter, the court shall award reasonable attorneys fees to the prevailing party." Because respondents prevailed on the motion, which we affirm on appeal, they are entitled to attorney fees both for trial proceedings and this appeal. (Ibid.)
The cause is remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees to be awarded the Fullers. ( § 724.080; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134; People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Brothers Santa Ana Theater (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 378, 211 Cal. Rptr. 501.)
The judgment is affirmed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., and COFFEE, J. --------------- Notes: All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.