1. The appellant in effect contends the evidence does not exclude his own reasonable hypothesis, which is that he was not fleeing but was attempting to get help for his companion Stroupe, who appellant did not know had attempted armed robbery. Viewing the evidence in favor of the verdict, as we are required to do on appeal (see Johnson v. State, 231 Ga. 138 (1) ( 200 S.E.2d 734); Fulford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 546 (1) ( 241 S.E.2d 646)), we find the evidence authorized the following findings: Appellant Victor Adams lived at Tybee Island beach with his girl friend and his 17-year-old nephew. Appellant was to start temporary work in a few days as a shrimper.
" Williams v. State, 232 Ga. 203, 204 ( 206 S.E.2d 37). "As the evidence did not demand a finding that the defendant's actions were justified, as self-defensive measures, the jury's verdict was authorized. See Fulford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 546 (1) ( 241 S.E.2d 646); King v. State, 148 Ga. App. 310 ( 251 S.E.2d 161); McClenton v. State, 150 Ga. App. 573 (1) ( 258 S.E.2d 168)." Miller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 639, 641 (1), supra.
The trial judge found as a matter of fact that the recorder's court judge merely corrected a clerical error (OCGA § 15-1-3 (6)) and did not intend to forfeit the appellant's cash bond. On appeal, we will not disturb that finding of fact as long as there is evidence to support it. Ridgley v. Helms, 168 Ga. App. 435, 438 ( 309 S.E.2d 375); Fulford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 546 (1) ( 241 S.E.2d 646). Moreover, the evidence clearly shows that the recorder's court judge and solicitor discussed the case and clearly intended to leave the case open. The question remaining is whether this clerical error in making the docket entry showing a cash bond forfeited, operated itself to amount to a prosecution and bar a second prosecution.
See Peacock v. State, 154 Ga. App. 201 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 807). As the evidence did not demand a finding that the defendant's actions were justified, as self-defensive measures, the jury's verdict was authorized. See Fulford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 546 (1) ( 241 S.E.2d 646); King v. State, 148 Ga. App. 310 ( 251 S.E.2d 161); McClenton v. State, 150 Ga. App. 573 (1) ( 258 S.E.2d 168). We have carefully examined the record and transcript and conclude that under the evidence presented at trial a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
Appellant argues that on this evidence she was either guilty of murder or not guilty of any crime because of self defense and that the elements of voluntary manslaughter, the crime of which she was convicted, are not present. This argument is clearly meritless. White v. State, 129 Ga. App. 353 ( 199 S.E.2d 624) (1973); Fulford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 546 ( 241 S.E.2d 646) (1978). "To the contrary, the evidence showed that the defendant had been seriously provoked by the deceased and that the killing occurred as a result of a heated family disturbance.
The state's evidence was sufficient to authorize the verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Pinkney v. State, 144 Ga. App. 768 (1) ( 242 S.E.2d 364); Fulford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 546 (1) ( 241 S.E.2d 646). 2.