No. 05-05-00461-CR
Opinion issued January 24, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F04-55704-NJ. Affirmed.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FITZGERALD, and LANG.
Opinion By Justice FITZGERALD.
A jury convicted Carl David Fuery of aggravated promotion of prostitution. During the punishment phase, appellant pleaded true to one enhancement paragraph. The trial court found the enhancement paragraph true and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment and a $1000 fine. In two points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At approximately noon on September 1, 2004, Dallas police detective Adolio Rios was driving through the parking lot at the Royal Inn on Northwest Highway. Rios and five other officers, who worked undercover in a six-man vice squad, were driving unmarked vehicles. As Rios was about to exit the parking lot, appellant drove up in a pickup truck and asked Rios if he was looking for a girl. Rios told appellant he needed at least six girls. Appellant told Rios the girls would cost $60 each, and instructed Rios to follow him to another hotel where appellant could get two of the girls. Rios followed appellant to a Holiday Inn Select that was one and a half miles away. The other five officers, who were together in one vehicle, followed Rios. When they arrived at the Holiday Inn Select, appellant went inside for several minutes, then came out alone and said the girls were not there. Appellant used his cell phone to call the women, then instructed Rios to follow him to the Cool Breeze Motel on Irving Boulevard, which was about five miles away. Rios again followed appellant, and the other officers followed Rios. At the Cool Breeze Motel, appellant told Rios to rent a room. Appellant said he would "get the girls," and that while Rios and his partner were having sex with two of the girls, appellant would go back and get four more girls. Rios and one of the other officers rented a room, then waited inside the room for appellant. Officers Michael Mendez and Eloy Carrillo testified that after Rios and another officer went into the room, appellant left the motel. Appellant returned fifteen minutes later with two women in the cab of his truck, identified as Sherrian Evans and Charisa Knight. When the women walked towards the motel room, the manager of the motel confronted them and told them they did not have a room and to leave the property. The women walked back to appellant's truck. Mendez and Carillo got out of their vehicle and walked toward appellant. Mendez asked Evans how much it cost to have sex; Evans said sixty dollars. Mendez then asked appellant if he paid the money to the girls or to appellant. Appellant said, "You pay the girls the money; then afterwards, they'll give me my money." The officers took out their badges and arrested appellant, Evans, and Knight. At trial, Rios, Mendez, and Carrillo identified photographs of Evans and Knight as the same women they had arrested for prostitution. Both Mendez and Carrillo testified that Evans and Knight were the same women they saw in appellant's truck at the Cool Breeze Motel who agreed to have sex with them for money. Mendez testified that Knight had a valid Texas driver's license on her person. Carrillo testified that Evans had either a valid Texas driver's license or identification card with her. Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Under either review, the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). To obtain a conviction for aggravated promotion of prostitution, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly owned, invested in, financed, controlled, supervised, and managed a prostitution enterprise that used at least two prostitutes, namely Sherrian Evans and Charisa Knight. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 43.04(a) (Vernon 2003). Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because the State failed to prove the individuals named in the indictment were the same two women the police had encountered that day or that they were in fact prostitutes. Appellant asserts the State did not call the women to testify, no copy of the women's identification was presented, and there was no in-court identification of the women. Mendez and Carrillo testified that both Evans and Knight were arrested and charged with prostitution. The officers identified Evans and Knight by Texas driver's licenses or identification cards. Additionally, Mendez and Carrillo identified photographs of Evans and Knight in court as the two women whom appellant had brought to the motel to have sex with the Mendez and Carrillo for money. Having reviewed all of the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's determination that appellant engaged in aggravated promotion of prostitution. See Sanders, 119 S.W.3d at 820; Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484-85. We overrule appellant two points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.