In proceeding against Relator for violation of order, the question of whether the order was erroneously issued, cannot be raised, but only the question as to whether it is void: Exparte Testard, 102 Tex. 287; Exparte Ellis, 37 Cr. App., 539, 542. In proceedings to enforce by contempt obedience to an injunction the Court need not consider the merits of the controversy or whether the injunction was properly granted: Ft. Worth Driving Club v. Ft. Worth Fair Ass'n. 56 Texas Civ. App. 162[ 56 Tex. Civ. App. 162]; Exparte Warfield, 40 Cr. App., 413, 421. On jurisdiction of Supreme Court to issue writ of mandamus against District Judge: Constitution of Texas, Art. 5, Sec. 3; R.S. 1526 as Amended by 35th Leg. Ch. 75, Sec. 1; Terrell v. Greene, Dist. Judge, 88 Tex. 539, 545; C.C. S.F. Ry. Co. v. Muse, Dist. Judge, 207 S.W. 897; Pickle v. McCall, 86 Tex. 212 [ 86 Tex. 212].

A detailed history of this case may be found in the proceedings of former appeals. See 56 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 121 S.W. 213, and 103 Tex. 24, 122 S.W. 254, Ann.Cas. 1912d 67. Only such general statement, therefore, will now be made as is deemed necessary to the present disposition. In 1905 David Evans was the owner of a tract of about 32 acres of land situated near the city of Ft. Worth.

'" Citing the statutes. In Fort Worth Driving Club v. Fort Worth Fair Association, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 121 S.W. 213, 215, an injunction prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor on certain leased premises had been entered, appealed from, and a bond in the form of a supersedeas bond given, after which the defendants, who had been enjoined, proceeded to violate the terms of the injunction. The defendant who had appealed was cited before this court for contempt, and fined.

The supersedeas bond is in the ordinary form, though no order was entered below, in the dissolving of the temporary restraining order, suspending the judgment of the court during the appeal; consequently the injunction was not in force pending such appeal. Driving Club v. Ft. Worth Fair Association. 56 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 121 S.W. 213. Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, on the grounds, among others, that the subject-matter of the suit has ceased to exist, which motion contains the following allegations, so far as affects that particular feature: "Now come the appellees, by their attorneys and move this court to dismiss the appeal herein for the following good and sufficient reasons, to wit: Because this is a suit to enjoin the commissioners' court of Panola county from paying out and creating any debt payable out of the $144,000 which had theretofore been transferred to the second-class road and bridge fund, and that, before this suit had been filed, contracts had been made and bids advertised by said commissioners' court with parties to build, make, improve, and construct such roads and bridges in Panola county in an amount sufficient to exhaust said money, and because the work has been performed by the contractors in conformity with the orders of the court, and the money paid for said work as