Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-1275
12-11-2023
ALEXANDER FRYE Plaintiff, v. DAVID DENNIS, Dispute Resolution Team Leader Better Business Bureau, And VIA PATH TECHNOLOGIES Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
The Court respectfully recommends that the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff, Alexander Frye (“Plaintiff'), commenced this civil action on July 13, 2023, by sending a Complaint to the Court without a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) or filing fee. ECF No. 1. The Court entered an Order closing the case and instructing the Plaintiff as to how to reopen this civil action. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's order closing the case. ECF No. 5. The Court responded to Plaintiffs Motion by granting an extension of time in which to file his Motion for IFP with the appropriate forms. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP on August 21, 2023. ECF No. 9. The Court granted the Motion and reopened the case on August 23, 2023. ECF No. 12. Plaintiffs Complaint was docketed that same day, ECF No. 13, and supplemented on August 30, 2023, because the original Complaint was missing pages. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff also filed exhibits to his supplemental civil rights Complaint at ECF Nos. 18 and 18-1.
Plaintiff alleges that in February 2023, he sent his tablet to Via Path Technologies (“Via Path”) for repair. Via Path “reflashed it.” ECF No. 16 at 3. On June 8, 2023, he sent the tablet again for evaluation and Via Path determined the problem was a software issue. Plaintiff alleges that the tablet was still not working properly. Via Path indicated that “[i]f the refurbished repair didn't work, it's not a software issue.” Id. Plaintiff “put in several tickets” and Via Path responded that “putting in tickets repeatedly for the same issue constitutes harassment.” Id. Plaintiff then filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”) and the BBB assigned him an identification number. Plaintiff asserts that Via Path stated the problem is a hardware issue when in fact, according to Plaintiff, it is not. Id. He also alleges that Defendants are state or local officials. Id. at 4. He further alleges that Via Path is under contract with the Department of Corrections. Id. at 7.
Plaintiff claims that these actions violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 4. He alleges that he has sustained pain and suffering, severe anxiety, and loss of access to educational materials. Id. at 6. As relief, he seeks the replacement of his tablet with a refurbished one with a one-year warranty and a 90-day battery warranty. In the alternative, he seeks a refund of all the money he has “put into the tablet[,]” amounting to $900.00. Id. Finally, he seeks his computer support access to be reinstated. Id.
B. Legal Standards
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity (28 U.S.C. § 1915A). The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from governmental officers or employees.
The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). In reviewing a pro se plaintiffs complaint, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the pro se plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). A complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.” Id. at 555. The court need not accept inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Additionally, a civil rights claim “must contain specific allegations of fact which indicate a deprivation of constitutional rights; allegations which are nothing more than broad, simple and conclusory statements are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983.” Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”) (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g, Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mmdragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
C. Analysis
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under this provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct in the complaint was committed by a person or entity acting under color of state law and that such conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Piecknick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). Section 1983 does not create rights; it simply provides a remedy for violations of those rights created by the United States Constitution or federal law. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
In liberally construing the facts set out by Plaintiff, it appears that he is attempting to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. In Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), the United States Supreme Court set forth the standard for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment when addressing non-medical conditions of confinement. The Court held that the prisoner must prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference that deprived him of‘“the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.'” Id. at 298-99, 301-05 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Prison conditions will constitute cruel and unusual punishment only if they result in serious deprivations of a prisoner s basic human needs. See Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). “Only conditions that are so reprehensible as to be deemed inhumane under contemporary standards or deprive an inmate of minimal civilized measures of the necessities of life violate the Eighth Amendment.” Spellman v. Doe, Civil Action No. 3:22-69, 2023 WL 2666694, at *2 (M.D. Pa. March 28, 2023) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992)) (other citation omitted).
To succeed on an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, the inmate must demonstrate both an objective element - that the deprivation was sufficiently serious-and a subjective element - that the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable mind. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Prison conditions may objectively violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when inmates are deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
Here, Plaintiffs complaints concerning Via Path's attempted repairs to his tablet hardly rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable violation under the Eighth Amendment. See generally Spellman, 2023 WL 2666694, at *1 (access to proper repairs for inmate's tablet, along with other complaints, failed to state a claim pursuant to the Eighth Amendment). Via Path's inability to repair Plaintiffs tablet is not objectively, a sufficiently serious deprivation of a basic human need. Indeed, far more egregious conditions have failed to meet this standard. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (“It is questionable if having a cold cell or atoilet that backs up sometimes is really an “atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1026-28 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that being made to sleep on dirty mattress on floor did not make out an Eighth Amendment claim). Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts to suggest that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. All allegations and exhibits to the Complaint show that efforts were made to assist Plaintiff with his tablet. See Plaintiffs Exhibit to Complaint, ECF No. 18-1 (Letter from Via Path outlining repair efforts and finding damage to USB port which voided warranty).
Moreover, Defendant David Dennis (“Dennis”) in his capacity as “Dispute Resolution Team Leader for the Better Business Bureau” appears to have simply accepted Plaintiff s complaint with the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”) and assigned him an identification number. ECF No. 16 at 3. Plaintiff alleges nothing further as to Defendant Dennis. These allegations do not rise to the level of a conditions of confinement claim.
In addition, the Better Business Bureau is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. It is a private nonprofit membership organization that assists in the resolution of consumer complaints. See Better Business Bureau, httns://www.bbb.ore. (last visited December 6, 2023).
The Court recognizes that in a civil rights action, a court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so, when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, any attempt to amend would be futile as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that the Complaint, ECF No. 16, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 A(b)(1) because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.