Defendant contends that the terms "under control" or "under proper control" have a well defined meaning under the decisions of this court, and that by those terms is meant, such control as would permit the defendant to stop his car with a reasonable degree of celerity, and that the driver of an automobile is required to exercise ordinary care to have his car under such control. Carruthers v. Campbell, 195 Iowa 390, 192 N.W. 138, 28 A.L.R. 949; Looney v. Parker, 210 Iowa 85, 230 N.W. 570; Duncan v. Rhomberg, 212 Iowa 389, loc. cit. 400, 236 N.W. 638; Hanson v. Manning, 213 Iowa 625, 239 N.W. 793; Morse v. Inc. Town, 213 Iowa 1225, 241 N.W. 304; Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa 192, 251 N.W. 147; Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 253 N.W. 147; Shutes v. Weeks, 220 Iowa 616, 262 N.W. 518. In Carruthers v. Campbell, 195 Iowa 390, loc. cit. 392, 192 N.W. 138, 139, 28 A.L.R. 949, this court said:

Carlton v. Stanek, 38 S.W.2d 505 (6); Heyde v. Patton, 39 S.W.2d 813 (1); Clifton v. Caraker, 50 S.W.2d 758. Since plaintiff admitted that he was asleep at the time of the accident and consequently exercising no care whatever for his own safety, he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Oppenheim v. Barkin, 159 N.E. 628, 262 Mass. 281, 61 A.L.R. 1228; Fry v. Smith S.C. (Iowa), 253 N.W. 147. Since contributory negligence was an issue in the case, the giving of plaintiff's instruction No. 4 directing a verdict for plaintiff without reference to plaintiff's contributory negligence, constituted reversible error. Cody v. Well, 280 S.W. 83, l.c. 84; Daniel v. Pryor, 227 S.W. 102 (9); Pence v. K.C.L.S. Co., 59 S.W.2d 633 (10).

But there is nothing to warrant the assumption that she undertook such task until, as the court observed, it was too late, and after she discovered the impending danger she gave prompt notice. In Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 253 N.W. 147, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a passenger in an automobile who fell asleep was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It was therefore not plaintiff's absolute duty to be on the lookout. It is conceded by counsel for defendant that the negligence of a husband driver is not imputed to the wife passenger in the absence of a joint enterprise and the trial court so held. It is suggested in counsel's brief, though not seriously argued, that the negligence of plaintiff's husband was the sole proximate cause of the collision and plaintiff's injuries.

There should be no greater lookout required of a passenger with respect to a railroad crossing than with respect to any other road danger. Our rules are expressed in Ehlinger v. State, 237 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Iowa 1976); Glandon v. Fiala, 261 Iowa 750, 755, 156 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1968); Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 1298, 253 N.W. 147, 149 (1934) (passenger asleep). They are in conformity with Prosser's statement of a passenger's obligation:

See also 8 Am. Jur.2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, section 535. In Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 253 N.W. 147, plaintiff riding in front seat of car driven by her husband voluntarily went to sleep and remained so at the time of the accident. We held she was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is on all fours with the facts here and defeats defendants' contention made in their third assigned error.

" Other passenger cases bearing on the passenger's freedom from contributory negligence are: Carpenter v. Wolfe, 223 Iowa 417, 273 N.W. 169; Frideres v. Lowden, 235 Iowa 640, 17 N.W.2d 396; Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 253 N.W. 147; Schwind v. Gibson, 220 Iowa 377, 260 N.W. 853; and Rogers v. Jefferson, 223 Iowa 718, 272 N.W. 532, 277 N.W. 570. — Reversed and remanded. All JUSTICES concur.

The prevailing view seems to be that while falling asleep is not negligence per se, it may be considered by a jury as a contributing factor. Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 253 N.W. 147; Cody v. Bennett, 177 Wn. 199, 31 P.2d 83; Austin v. B. M.R., N.H., 197 A. 809; Frank v. Markley, 315 Pa. 257, 173 A. 186; Austine v. Penn. R., 342 Pa. 423, 20 A.2d 774. Compare Powers v. State, 178 Md. 23, 11 A.2d 909. Our conclusion is that the plaintiffs' No. 1 prayer was properly refused. We also find no error in the refusal of the plaintiffs' prayers Nos. 3, 5 and 6, which were predicated upon negligence of the defendant, without reference to contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs.

Oertwig's duty was not an absolute one to discover the Semler car. He was required only to use reasonable care under the circumstances to maintain a lookout to discover other persons or vehicles on the highway. Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 1300, 253 N.W. 147, 149; Gregory v. Suhr, 221 Iowa 1283, 268 N.W. 14, and citations. That specifications of negligence may be thus paraphrased, see Smith v. Pine, 234 Iowa 256, 263, 12 N.W.2d 236, 241, and citations. [2] II. Plaintiff's petition alleges Oertwig was negligent in driving at an excessive and dangerous speed and in failing to stop within the assured clear distance ahead. In its instructions the court combined these two specifications and stated them in this way: that Oertwig failed to operate the truck at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than was reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the highway and other conditions then existing, and failed to drive at a speed which would permit him to stop within the assured clear distance ahead.

"You are instructed that the driver of a motor vehicle on the highway is not under any duty to anticipate that a child which is not in plain view will suddenly and unexpectedly run from a place of concealment into the path of the driver's car, but he should at all times keep a lookout for what may happen on the highway ahead of him." Appellant relies on the case of Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 1299, 253 N.W. 147, 149. However, a comparison of the instruction given in that case and this shows that they are not similar.

Under such a state of the evidence it was not necessary that the court should call attention to the matters asked for in the three instructions requested by the defendant. Fry v. Smith, 217 Iowa 1295, 253 N.W. 147; Hoover v. Haggard, 219 Iowa 1232, 260 N.W. 540. [2] II. The defendant urges that the court in giving instruction No. 1 should not have submitted the specification of recklessness which is as follows: