Opinion
19-CV-9691 (CM)
11-15-2019
YVONNE FROST, Plaintiff, v. NYC MTA; CITY OF NEW YORK (HRA), Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL :
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court's federal question jurisdiction. The Court grants Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
A claim is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that "finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible"); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A]n action is 'frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff drafted this complaint using the general complaint form provided by this Court, asserting claims of "wrongful action" and unfair treatment," allegedly occurring in "New York, Brooklyn, Bronx" from "10/12/19 — present." (ECF 2 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts the following:
Page numbers refer to those generated by the Court's electronic case filing system.
On 10/18/19 a MTA [sic] teller awakes me and tells me there are no trains running on this side of the platform or the other side. The time was 11:50 p.m. The teller told me I have to leave the Beverly Road station.(Id. ¶ III.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and money damages. (Id. ¶ 4.)
I believe this MTA teller thought I would have risen stupid and just follow what he had just told me. First I said to him it's not making sense why couldn't you not awaken me in time to catch the last train out the Beverly Road station?
DISCUSSION
Even when read with the "special solicitude" due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474-75, Plaintiff's claims rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on which she can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Between September 16, 2019, and November 6, 2019, Plaintiff filed more than thirty cases in this Court. Because Plaintiff abused the privilege of proceeding IFP, the Court has barred her from proceeding IFP, unless she obtains leave of Court to do so. See Frost v. City of New York (HRA), No. 1:19-CV-8936, 5 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2019) (describing Plaintiff's litigation history and imposing filing injunction).
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket.
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this order as a "written opinion" within the meaning of Section 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002. SO ORDERED. Dated: November 15, 2019
New York, New York
/s/_________
COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge