In Frost v Cockerham, 164 Mich.App. 759, 763; 417 N.W.2d 599 (1987), the defendant objected to requests to admit that were served by the plaintiff. At the resulting hearing, the parties stipulated that the defendant would respond to the requests within seven days, but no responses were ever made.

A quitclaim deed conveys any and all right, title, and interest that a grantor has in the lands described in the deed. Frost v Cockerham, 164 Mich App 759, 765-766; 417 NW2d 599 (1987). Individually, petitioners no longer had any interest in the subject property after it was conveyed to the LLC.

ther version [of MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A), governing compulsory joinder of claims], because . . . the new action amounted to relitigation of a decided issue under a different theory."); Randles v. Hudson, 1999 WL 33455039, *1 (Mich.App. Feb. 19, 1999) ("While this lawsuit may involve a new issue or legal theory not . . . raised in the former suit, e.g., the gross negligence exception to governmental immunity, the doctrine of res judicata applies to all claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that could have been raised in [the] previous lawsuit but were not, i.e., where the same facts or evidence are essential to the maintenance of the two actions.") (citations omitted); Purification Sys., Inc. v. Mastan Co., 198 N.W.2d 807, 808-10 (Mich.App. 1972) (prior action where plaintiff sought recovery for breach of contract precluded plaintiffs' later action seeking recovery in implied contract or quantum meruit for the same transaction or occurrence), overruling o.g. recog'd by Frost v. Cockerham, 417 N.W.2d 599 (Mich.App. 1987). Nonetheless, the movants identify no Michigan authority to convince this court that the Michigan Supreme Court would hold that the Griffins' claims against them are precluded because their putative privy (Seldom Rest) did not take the steps necessary to assert them against these defendants in the prior action ( Deere v. Seldom Rest).