Opinion
19-CV-9692 (CM)
11-26-2019
YVONNE FROST, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK (HRA), et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL :
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this frivolous action. By order dated November 19, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
A claim is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (holding that "finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible"); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A]n action is 'frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
By order dated November 7, 2019, the Court barred Plaintiff from filing future civil actions IFP in this Court without first obtaining from the Court leave to file. See Frost v. New York City (HRA), ECF 1:19-CV-8936, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2019). Plaintiff filed this action on October 21, 2019, before the bar order went into effect. This action, however, is not a departure from Plaintiff's pattern of frivolous filings. She asserts that "[a] few people in government sit down and decipher what they are going to do with your life and how they are going to spend your money." ECF No. 2, at 5. And she claims that "[t]hey are holding me as prisoner. They have experimented on me, stole my children, block my paths, driven a wedge between my family and myself, stole my compensation money and most times been unresponsive." Id. Even when read with the "special solicitude" due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474-75, these allegations rise to the level of the irrational, and there is no legal theory on which Plaintiff can rely. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to assign this matter to my docket, mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, and note service on the docket.
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: November 26, 2019
New York, New York
/s/_________
COLLEEN McMAHON
Chief United States District Judge