Opinion
C/A No. 8:19-cv-02019-HMH-JDA
08-05-2019
David Frost, Petitioner, v. Chief Beatty, Director of Charleston County Detention Center, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
David Frost ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this habeas corpus action purportedly under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is a pretrial detainee and is currently incarcerated at the Charleston County Detention Center. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
The Court notes that the caption of Petitioner's original hand-written pleading in this action lists sections 2255, 2254, 2253(c), and 2241 of the federal habeas statute. The clerk of court opened the case as a petition seeking habeas relief under § 2254. The Court will address the proper construction of Petitioner's pleadings in its analysis below.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner commenced the instant federal habeas action to challenge his incarceration at the Charleston County Detention Center by filing a single-page, hand-written memorandum, which was construed as a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, along with a letter in support of his petition. [Docs. 1; 1-1.] By Order dated July 22, 2019, Petitioner was instructed to file with the Court a habeas petition on the standard court form. [Doc. 5.] Thereafter, Petitioner filed the proper court form [Docs. 1-4; 1-7], along with additional attachments [Doc. 1-5], which were attached to his original filing. The Court construes the original filing along with the filing on the standard court form [Docs. 1; 1-4; 1-7] together as the Petition in this habeas action, and the Court has carefully reviewed each of the documents [Docs. 1-1; 1-5] submitted by Petitioner in support of his Petition. Further, the Court takes judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's pending state criminal case. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
As noted, Petitioner purports to bring this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1.] He makes the following allegations. Petitioner contends that he was served with an arrest warrant (warrant number 2018A1020900205) for shoplifting on January 14, 2019. [Docs. 1-1 at 1; 1-4 at 2.] Petitioner contends that the warrant was dated October 20, 2018, and stated that the crime was committed on October 20, 2018. [Docs. 1-1 at 1; 1-4 at 2.] However, Petitioner contends, the alleged crime actually happened on October 28, 2018, eight days after the warrant was issued. [Docs. 1-1 at 1; 1-4 at 2.] According to Petitioner, an affidavit in support of the warrant (affidavit number 2018-0009777) stated that the alleged crime happened on October 28, 2018. [Docs. 1-1 at 1; 1-4 at 2.]
Accordingly, Petitioner contends that, based on this information, he was falsely arrested. [Doc. 1-4 at 5.] Petitioner also contends that he has been incarcerated for more than six months without any results and that he has not been to court yet. [Docs. 1-1 at 1; 1-4 at 2.] For his relief, Petitioner seeks immediate dismissal of the charges and monetary compensation in the amount of $250,000 for pain and suffering. [Docs. 1-1 at 1; 1-7 at 8.]
Petitioner has attached to his Petition a copy of the affidavit for arrest warrant, an incident report, and the arrest warrant. [Docs. 1-2; 1-5.] The affidavit for arrest warrant is dated November 14, 2018, and states, in relevant part, as follows:
[Petitioner] did within the town of Mount Pleasant, County of Charleston, State of South Caorlina, on or about the dates of October 20th 2018 , violate the criminal laws of the State of South Carolina, namely, Shoplifting >$2000 at [a Lowe's store] in violation of Section, 16-13-110 of the South Carolina Code of Laws . . . .[Doc. 1-5 at 2 (emphasis in original).] The affidavit was signed by the affiant and the magistrate judge and dated November 14, 2018. [Id.] The arrest warrant was also signed by the affiant and the magistrate judge and dated November 14, 2018. [Id. at 1.] Like the affidavit, the arrest warrant states that probable cause existed to support the charge that Petitioner committed the crime of shoplifting on October 20, 2018. [Id.] Finally, according to the incident report, dated October 30, 2018, an officer was dispatched to the Lowe's store on October 30, 2018, where the store's Loss Prevention Manager stated that two men entered the store on October 28, 2018, and took eight Dyson vacuum cleaners. [Doc. 1-2 at 2.] Petitioner appears to argue that, because the affidavit and arrest warrant contain conflicting dates concerning when the alleged shoplifting occurred, using both the dates of October 20, 2018, and October 28, 2018, the warrant is defective and he was therefore falsely arrested.
On October 28, 2018 [Petitioner] did enter the Lowe's store . . . and was caught on video surveillance taking eight Dyson vacuum cleaners and throwing them over a security fence to a car that was waiting. The vacuums were loaded into the vehicle and the driver drove off while [Petitioner] exited the store. . . .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se petition filed in the above-captioned case. The review was conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Further, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012). Pursuant to this rule, a district court is "authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face." McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
Further, Petitioner filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Petitioner appears to be a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Petitioner had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening his lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Petition if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Petitioner is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner's Challenge to his Pretrial Detention
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983"). Here, Petitioner challenges his arrest and current detention in the Charleston County Detention Center, seeking habeas relief under various sections of the federal habeas statute, specifically listing on his Petition §§ 2255, 2254, 2253(c), and 2241. However, these statutes are not interchangeable, as they are separate and have distinct purposes. See Miller v. Cannon, No. 2:17-cv-2752-TMC-MGB, 2017 WL 6731503, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 516438 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2018). A prisoner incarcerated on a state conviction may bring a post-conviction challenge to the validity of a state conviction or sentence by filing a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 778 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that § 2254 "mandates that district courts entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court"). "On the other hand, a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is generally brought as a post-conviction challenge to the execution of a federal sentence, parole decision, calculation of good time credits, or prison disciplinary action." Miller, 2017 WL 6731503, at *2. Neither of these situations applies here as Petitioner has not been convicted of his pending state charges, nor is he challenging the execution of a federal sentence, parole decision, calculation of good time credits, or prison disciplinary action.
However, there is legal authority holding that a pretrial detainee may bring a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, "which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the present status of the case pending against him." United States v. Tootle, 65 F.3d 381, 383 (4th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted). "The general grant of habeas authority in § 2241 is available for challenges by a state prisoner who is not in custody pursuant to a state court judgment—for example, a defendant in pre-trial detention . . . . In these situations, not covered by the limitations in § 2254, the general grant of habeas authority provided by the Constitution and § 2241 will provide jurisdiction for state prisoners' habeas claims." Hao Qing Zhan v. Wilson, No. 8:12-cv-3052-RBH, 2013 WL 4500055, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a prisoner "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
Nevertheless, regardless of how the instant Petition is characterized, it is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below. "Call it a motion for a new trial, arrest of judgment, mandamus, prohibition, coram nobis, coram vobis, audit querela . . ., the name makes no difference. It is substance that controls." Melton v. United States, 359 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2004). Abstention under Younger
Petitioner is awaiting trial on state charges for shoplifting, and he seeks to interfere with his pending state prosecution. Specifically, Petitioner seeks release from pretrial detention, claiming that he was falsely arrested on the basis of a faulty affidavit and arrest warrant.
"Generally, a detainee's 'attempt to dismiss an indictment or otherwise prevent a prosecution' is not attainable through federal habeas corpus." Miller, 2017 WL 6731503, at *3 (quoting Dickerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1987)). Granting Petitioner's requested relief would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin a pending state court criminal prosecution against him. Because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings "except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances." Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: "[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings." Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Petitioner is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings, and he asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief." Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted "that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights." Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
Petitioner challenges the validity of his pending criminal charges, and he asks this Court to dismiss the charges against him. A ruling in Petitioner's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the criminal charges pending against him and would significantly interfere with the ongoing state criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, 'whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'") (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010).
This Court finds that Petitioner can assert his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings and he can challenge the arrest warrant and affidavit in those proceedings as part of his criminal defense. The United States Supreme Court has pointed out that federal district courts "should withhold relief in [a] collateral habeas corpus action where an adequate remedy available in the criminal proceeding has not been exhausted." Stack v. Boyle, 72 S. Ct. 1, 6 (1951); see also Jackson v. Boone, No. 2:16-cv-2099-MBS-MGB, 2016 WL 4579972, at *3 (D.S.C. June 30, 2016) (dismissing as premature a habeas petition brought by pretrial detainee), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 4541676 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2016), aff'd, 678 F. App'x 175 (4th Cir. 2017); Tyler v. Chavis, No. 9:17-cv-00501-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 1424026, at *2 (D.S.C. April 10, 2017) (same), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1406559 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2017).
In the event that Petitioner is convicted in state court, the usual route of direct appeal in the state appellate courts will be available to him. See Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010). Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal. United States v. Foster, 296 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1961) ("By this strategy the defendant seeks to substitute another remedy for appeal, and to achieve an immediate review of interlocutory orders without awaiting final judgment as is required for an appeal . . . . [T]he defendant may not maintain such a petition but must first stand trial, and may later renew his contentions in the course of an appeal to this court in the event of his conviction."). The proper procedure is for Petitioner to pursue the normal avenues of appellate and post-conviction review in the state courts. Because Petitioner has not exhausted his available procedures, such as through his criminal trial and any available appeals, Petitioner may not seek habeas review in this Court. Payne v. Carrol, No. 2:17-cv-1296-TLW-MGB, 2017 WL 3084481, at *4 (D.S.C. June 7, 2017), Report and Recommendation by 2017 WL 3066887 (D.S.C. July 19, 2017).
Accordingly, at this time, Petitioner's claims are unexhausted and premature. See, e.g., Moultrie v. Reynolds, No. 9:15-cv-198-DCN-BM, 2015 WL 5474471, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2015) ("Petitioner's federal remedy of a writ of habeas corpus under either 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254 can only be sought after he has exhausted all of his remedies in the courts of the state of South Carolina."); Corder v. Warden Charleston Cty. Corr. Ctr., No. 2:15-cv-4873-RMG-MGB, 2016 WL 1171513, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Mar. 23, 2016) (dismissing petition brought by pretrial detainee as premature and barred by Younger). Thus, this Court should abstain from hearing this action and should dismiss the Petition. Claims for Money Damages are barred by Heck
Petitioner also seeks money damages. However, money damages are not available in this habeas action. Even if the Court were to construe this action as one seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Petitioner would not be entitled to the requested relief. Thus, to the extent that Petitioner is seeking money damages based on his allegedly unlawful incarceration, his claim is premature because his conviction and sentence have not been invalidated. In Heck, the Supreme Court pronounced,
A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the "favorable termination" requirement, which Petitioner has not alleged he has satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Heck holding applies to this case. Petitioner seems to allege that he was falsely arrested in violation of his constitutional rights. However, Petitioner does not allege that he has been convicted or that his conviction has been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A favorable determination on the merits of Petitioner's claim for money damages would imply that Petitioner's criminal proceedings are invalid. Thus, even if this action were construed as one seeking relief under § 1983, such a claim should be dismissed because a right of action has not accrued.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Jacquelyn D. Austin
United States Magistrate Judge August 5, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).