Pursuant to the efficient proximate cause doctrine, "[i]n the determination whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of two causes, the efficient cause—the one that sets the other in motion—is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other cause may follow it and operate more immediately in producing the disaster." Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 499 (1968). Generally, ACC clauses "in insurance policies are an attempt to contract around the general application of the Efficient Proximate Cause [doctrine]."
However, the court notes that the efficient-proximate-cause doctrine seems to work in favor of the insured in the vast majority of cases. See, e.g., Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 863 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Nev. 1994) (rag negligently left in pipe (covered) predominates over pipe erosion (excluded)); Brian Chuchua's Jeep, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 10 Cal.App.4th 1579. 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 444 (1992) (earthquake (covered) predominates over soil contamination (excluded)); Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 242 A.2d 749 (Conn. 1968) (fire (covered) predominates over demolition of adjoining building (excluded));State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Von Der Lieth, 820 P.2d 285 (Cal. 1991) (negligent construction by third party (covered) predominates over landslide (excluded)); Wallach v. Rosenberg, 527 So.2d 1386 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988) (neighbor negligence (covered) predominates over earth movement and water damage (excluded)); Vormelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N.W.2d 287 (Mich.Ct.App. 1972) (contractor negligence (covered) predominates over earth movement (excluded)). The efficient-proximate-cause doctrine does not apply to a case involving more than one cause where none of the causes is sufficient by itself to cause the loss.
Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to property described in Coverages A and B not excluded or excepted in this policy is covered. Plaintiffs argue that the contamination exclusion applies only to non-fortuitous, continuous eventualities that occur over time, not to an accidental "occurrence" such as Santa Fuel's negligence. Plaintiffs also contend that under the train of events test, adopted by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 242 A.2d 749 (1968), Santa Fuel's negligence was the proximate cause of the contamination. See also, Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 415 Mass. 24, 610 N.E.2d 954 (1993).
The efficient proximate cause is the predominating cause of the loss. An example of the efficient proximate cause doctrine in action is Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 242 A.2d 749 (1968). The policyholder owned the Frontis building, a four-story building sharing a common wall with an adjoining building.
The clearest interpretation of this rule comes from the Alaska Supreme Court. For examples of other states that have adopted the efficient proximate cause rule, see State Farm Fire Cas Co v. Von Der Lieth, 54 Cal 3d 1123; 2 Cal Rptr 2d 183; 820 P2d 285 (1991); Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins Co, 156 Conn 492; 242 A2d 749 (1968); Chase v. State Farm Fire Cas Co, 780 A2d 1123 (DC App, 2001); Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins Co, 415 Mass 24; 610 NE2d 954 (1993); Fawcett House, Inc v. Great Central Ins Co, 280 Minn 325; 159 NW2d 268 (1968); Toumayan v. State Farm Fire Cas Co, 970 SW2d 822 (Mo App, 1998); Western Nat'l Mut Ins Co v. Univ of North Dakota, 2002 ND 63; 643 NW2d 4 (ND, 2002); Alf v. State Farm Fire Cas Co, 850 P2d 1272 (Utah, 1993); Allstate Ins Co v. Raynor, 143 Wash 2d 469; 21 P3d 707 (2001).Allstate Ins Co v. Smiley, 276 Ill App 971; 659 NE2d 1345, 1354 (1995)
current cause doctrine" that when two or more concurrent causes or events take place, the efficient cause — the one that sets the other in motion — is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed. Under this analysis, the Town argues that the allegation that Officer Millington made no attempt after the collision to render aid to Cynthia Hearst, or Tammy Cheatham who were identifiable victims in imminent harm of death when he ran past them, and the allegations that the victims death or injuries were caused by the negligence of police Chief Theodore Ambrosini in that he, inter-alia, failed to properly supervise and train officer Millington with regard to regulations concerning high speed pursuits or failed to designate appropriate channels of communication or reasonable and prudent guidelines for the conduct of high speed pursuits state non vehicle-related negligence which was a substantial factor or the efficient cause of the collision which resulted in the injuries. The Town cites Frontis v. Milwaukee Insurance Company, 156 Conn. 492 (1968) for the proposition that Connecticut ascribes to the concurrent cause doctrine in determining whether or not a loss is covered by an insurance policy or excluded by an exception. Frontis involved a fire which had destroyed one four-story building which shared an undamaged party wall with another four-story building.
However, rather than viewing proximate cause as a single act or omission that is most immediately responsible for an injury, the Court of Appeals has stated that "`where there is a concurrence of two causes, the efficient cause — the one that sets the others in motion — is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed. . . .'" Id. (quoting Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 242 A.2d 749 (Conn. 1968)). "[I]n considering what is the proximate and what [is] the remote cause of an injury, `[t]he inquiry must always be whether there was any intermediate cause disconnected from the primary fault, and self-operating, which produced the injury.'" Unkelsbee, 41 A.2d at 171 (quoting Aetna Ins. Co., 95 U.S. at 130 (quoting Milwaukee St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876))).
, under the “train of events test,” “the active efficient cause that sets in motion a train of events which brings about a result without intervention of any force started and working actively from a new and independent source is the proximate cause.” Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 242 A.2d 749, 753 (Conn. 1968) (cleaned up)
"In the determination whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of two causes, the efficient cause—the one that sets the other in motion—is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other cause may follow it and operate more immediately in producing the disaster." Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 499 (1968). "[W]hat is meant by proximate cause is not that which is last in time or place, not merely that which was in activity at the consummation of the injury, but that which is the procuring, efficient, and predominant cause."
In the determination whether a loss is within an exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of two causes, the efficient cause — the one that sets the other in motion — is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed, though the other cause may follow it and operate more immediately in producing the disaster.Id. at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 499 (1968)). In Sansone, homeowners brought an action against the insurance company for failure to pay for damage caused by termites.