Opinion
November 23, 1999
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Harold Tompkins, J.), entered May 28, 1998, denying defendants' motion to vacate their default, and order, same court and Justice, entered August 25, 1998, directing entry of judgment in the sum of $139,335, unanimously reversed, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, without costs, and the motion to vacate granted.
D. Bunji Fromartz, for Plaintiff-Respondent.
Paul E. Kerson Ben Niderberg, for Defendant-Appellant.
WILLIAMS, J.P., RUBIN, SAXE, FRIEDMAN, JJ.
Given our preference for disposition of cases on the merits (see,Santora McKay v. Mazzella, 211 A.D.2d 460, 463; DFI Communications v. Golden Penn Theater Ticket Serv., 87 A.D.2d 778, 779), we find that Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendants' motion to vacate their default where they had demonstrated both a meritorious defense to this action and a reasonable excuse for their default. In this regard, counsel's actual engagement in Family Court constituted a reasonable excuse for the default under the circumstances (Abate v. Long, 261 A.D.2d 252, 690 N.Y.S.2d 267; Salemo v. Geller, 260 A.D.2d 153, 685 N.Y.S.2d 616).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.