The district court based its ruling upon our 1976 decision in Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp. Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Rio. Harris appeals. 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 (1976).DISCUSSION
As to the government, three cases directly support their argument of exclusivity. In Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 (1976), an employee of a construction company who had contracted with Harrah's for some construction work was injured while working on Harrah's property. After the accident he received workers compensation, but thereafter sued Harrah's.
Since NIIA was enacted, this court has held that compensation from SIIS is the sole remedy an injured employee has against his employer when the injury resulted from an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 452, 552 P.2d 337, 340 (1976); see also NRS 616.270 (3) (recodified as NRS 616B.612 (3)) ("the employer shall be relieved from other liability for recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury"); NRS 616.
The clients claim that once immunity attaches to Karadanis and Maloff as partners in the construction firm that immunity also immunizes them as partners in the casino partnership and protects the Sundowner Casino partnership as well. The clients cite Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 (1976), in which an injured worker attempted to sue Harrahs as an owner of the premises where the injury occurred even though the Harrahs corporation was immune as the statutory employer of the injured worker. We held in Frith that Harrahs did not lose its immunity as an employer "just because it was also the owner of the real property where the injury occurred."
By reason of this circumstance the employers argue that they are totally insulated from other liability on account of the industrial accident. Sharrock and Schupbach were employed by Stauffer Chemical which operated the plant at Henderson for Montrose Chemical. Outboard has conceded that Montrose, as the principal of Stauffer, is entitled to the same protection under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act as Stauffer. This concession resulted from our decision in Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 (1976). Employers who accept the Act and provide and secure compensation for injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment are "relieved from other liability for recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury. . . ."
The Nevada Supreme Court has stated that the Nevada Legislature "did not intend to create any private civil remedy through" the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Act ("NOSHA"). Frith v. Harrah S. Shore Corp., 552 P. 332, 340 (Nev. 1976). The Ninth Circuit has stated that "OSHA violations do not themselves constitute a private cause of action for breach."
As to the dismissal of the remaining claims, to the extent that appellant attempted to state separate causes of action based on NRS Chapter 618 and NRS 209.131, we affirm the district court's dismissal of those claims. See Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 451, 552 P.2d 337, 340 (1976) (explaining that there is no private civil remedy for a violation of the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Act codified in NRS Chapter 618); see also NRS 209.131 (setting forth the duties of the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections but providing no indication that the Legislature intended to create a private right of action to address the Director's alleged failure to fulfill his duties); Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 951, 959, 194 P.3d 96, 101 (2008) (providing that the absence of a provision creating a private right of action suggests that the Legislature did not intend to create one). Nevertheless, we note that if appellant is able to produce evidence demonstrating that respondent violated these provisions, such evidence may be used to support his general negligence claims. See Robertson v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 32 F.3d 408, 410–11 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining that, while a violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which is similar to Nevada's
The Nevada workers' compensation system provides the exclusive remedy of an employee against his employer for workplace injuries.See Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 452, 552 P.2d 337, 340 (1976). A corollary to the immunity rule is that claims for tort damages in connection with workplace injuries are only sustainable against persons or entities other than a statutory employer or persons in the same employ.
]" Horton, 125 Ga. App. at 70, 186 S.E.2d at 472. In Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 450, 552 P.2d 337, 339-40 (1976), the Nevada Supreme Court found that "[n]othing can be found in the language of . . . [the safe workplace] act suggesting a civil action by an employee injured by reason of an unsafe place of employment." In Barth v. Downey Co., 71 Wis.2d 775, 239 N.W.2d 92 (1976) the Wisconsin court premised the owner's liability on his retention of supervision and control.
This court has previously determined that NOSHA does not confer upon an employee a private right of action. Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337 (1976). Indeed, the statutory procedure for obtaining redress provides that an aggrieved employee must file his or her complaint with the division (the Division of Occupational Safety and Health of the Department of Industrial Relations).