A multiple listing service is basically an arrangement for brokers in a given locality to pool their listings and split their commissions. See Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864, 868 (1967). Brokers who are members of the multiple listing service submit their listings to a central bureau which then publishes and distributes a catalog of available properties. Under traditional agency principles, a listing contract which authorizes the listing broker to list the property with a multiple listing service permits the listing broker to create a subagency with other members of the multiple listing service.

We have often held a real estate broker owes to his client the duty to exercise the utmost good faith. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 73 Wn.2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968). We said in Moon v. Phipps, 67 Wn.2d 948, 954, 411 P.2d 157 (1966):

And, from this agency relationship springs the duty and the obligation upon the part of the listing broker, as well as on the part of his subagents, to exercise the utmost good faith and fidelity toward his principal, the seller, in all matters falling within the scope of his employment. Valley Land Office, Inc. v. O'Grady, 72 Wn.2d 247, 432 P.2d 850 (1967); Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Farrell v. Score, 67 Wn.2d 957, 411 P.2d 146 (1966); Henderson v. Johnson, 66 Wn.2d 511, 403 P.2d 669 (1965); Karle v. Seder, 35 Wn.2d 542, 214 P.2d 684 (1950); Westerbeck v. Cannon, 5 Wn.2d 106, 104 P.2d 918 (1940); Ewing Clark, Inc. v. Mumford, 157 Wn. 617, 289 P. 1026 (1930); Easterly v. Mills, 54 Wn. 356, 103 P. 475 (1909); Cantwell v. Nunn, 45 Wn. 536, 88 P. 1023 (1907); 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §§ 83, 84 (1964); 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 41 (1938). [2] Furthermore, there flows from this agency relationship and its accompanying obligation of utmost fidelity and good faith, the legal, ethical, and moral responsibility on the part of the listing broker, as well as his subagents, to exercise reasonable care, skill, and judgment in securing for the principal the best bargain possible; to scrupulously avoid representing any interest antagonistic to that of the principal in transactions involving the principal's listed property, or otherwise self-dealing with that property, without the explic

Clerk's Papers at 85.Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 528-29, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Pilling v. Eastern and Pac. Enters. Trust, 41 Wn. App. 158, 162, 702 P.2d 1232, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1014 (1985); First Church of Open Bible v. Cline J. Dunton Realty, Inc., 19 Wn. App. 275, 279, 574 P.2d 1211 (1978). In making the statement in the text, we do not consider RCW 18.86, which was enacted long after the events in issue here.

We should recognize that real estate brokers and their salespersons, with whom property is frequently listed for sale and marketed either directly or through a multiple-listing service, ordinarily become the agents of the seller for the purpose of finding a purchaser. See Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 525-26, 429 P.2d 864, 867 (1967). Included in that usual agency relationship between the real estate broker or salesperson and the seller is the strict duty of undivided loyalty and disclosure. Clinton Land Co. v. M/S Associates, Inc., 340 N.W.2d 232, 234 (Iowa 1983); Miller v. Berkoski, 297 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Iowa 1980); see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 ("Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency.").

Furthermore, in accomplishing this a realtor has a fiduciary duty to his client. Carroll v. Watson (1978), 176 Mont. 344, 578 P.2d 308. Fiduciary duties encompass full disclosure, First Trust v. McKenna (1980), Mont., 614 P.2d 1027, 37 St.Rep. 1026; Lyle v. Moore (1979), 183 Mont. 274, 599 P.2d 336; good faith, Frisell v. Newman (1967), 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864; and acting in the client's best interests. Once a broker involves himself with the completion of a transaction, he must continue to act in accordance with the above fiduciary duties.

Such is the Washington and universal rule. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 526, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Patrick v. Cochise Hotels, 76 Ariz. 136, 143, 259 P.2d 569 (1953); Loughlin v. Idora Realty Co., 259 Cal.App.2d 619, 629, 66 Cal.Rptr. 747 (1968); Hardy v. Davis, 223 Md. 229, 232, 164 A.2d 281 (1960); Bell v. Strauch, 40 Tenn. App. 384, 409, 292 S.W.2d 59 (1954); Guisinger v. Hughes, 363 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962); Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., 611 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 392 (1958). As materiality defines the duty to disclose, the uncontested facts here do not permit this court to find such a duty as a matter of law.

There can be no question that Brokerage House, Inc., became appellants' agent when it obtained the exclusive listing for the sale of appellants' business. It therefore follows that because appellee Laurel Miller was a broker, agent and manager of Brokerage House II, a branch of Brokerage House, Inc., she was also appellants' agent. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967). Certain duties and obligations spring from this type of agency relationship.

See Homefinders v. Lawrence, 80 Idaho 543, 335 P.2d 893 (1959); Synnott v. Shaughnessy, 2 Idaho 122, 7 P. 82 (1885); Meerdink v. Krieger, supra; Koller v. Belote, 12 Wn. App. 194, 528 P.2d 1000 (1974); Investment Exch. Rlty., Inc. v. Hillcrest Bowl, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 714, 513 P.2d 282 (1973); In re Estate of Baldwin, 34 Cal.App.3d 596, 110 Cal.Rptr. 189 (1973); Brandt v. Koepnick, 2 Wn. App. 671, 469 P.2d 189 (1970); Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Restatement (Second) of Agency, §§ 390, 392 (1958); Seavey, Agency § 150; 12 Am.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 87. The question here is whether Oppel made full and truthful disclosure of all material facts to his principals and disclosed his personal interests in the transaction. The parties appear to be in an agreement with the trial court's finding that Oppel made full disclosure of his capacity.

We have often held a real estate broker owes to his client the duty to exercise the utmost good faith. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wn.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 73 Wn.2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968). We said in Moon v. Phipps, 67 Wn.2d 948, 954, 411 P.2d 157 (1966):