Opinion
A139222 A139235
11-29-2017
FRIENDS OF THE EEL RIVER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTH COAST RAILROAD AUTHORITY et al., Defendants and Respondents; NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO TOXICS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTH COAST RAILROAD AUTHORITY et al., Defendants and Respondents; NORTHWESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Marin County Super. Ct. No. CV1103605) (Marin County Super. Ct. No. CV1103591)
The North Coast Railroad Authority (NCRA), a public agency established by Government Code section 93000 et seq., entered into a contract with the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (NWPCo), allowing the latter to conduct freight rail service on tracks controlled by NCRA. Two environmental groups, plaintiffs Friends of the Eel River and Californians for Alternatives to Toxics, filed petitions for writ of mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21000 et seq., 21168.5) to challenge NCRA's certification of an environmental impact report and approval of NWPCo's freight operations. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding CEQA review was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA; 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq.). Because it resolved the case based on federal preemption, the trial court did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' CEQA challenges. In a previous decision, this Court agreed that CEQA was preempted by federal law and affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Following a grant of review of our previous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. Drawing a distinction between NCRA's compliance with CEQA as an act of self-governance and the regulatory effect CEQA review could have on NWPCo as a private rail carrier, the court concluded that while CEQA "cannot be the basis for an order halting NWPCo's operations," the application of CEQA to NCRA as part of the state's own railroad project was not preempted by federal law. (Friends of the Eel River v. North Coast Railroad Authority (2017) 3 Cal.5th 677, 739.) The Supreme Court remanded the matter to this court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." (Id. at p. 740.)
In supplemental briefing filed after this case was returned to us by the Supreme Court (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b)), plaintiffs ask us to address the merits of their CEQA challenges. They acknowledge the superior court has not yet ruled on their claims, but argue that because our review of the administrative record would be de novo, with no deference given to the trial court's ruling (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 427), we should address the claims in the first instance. We decline to do so.
"Although we often exercise de novo review in CEQA cases, the trial court's role of adjudicating those cases in the first instance is not inconsequential. '[I]n many such cases, trial courts provide us with a thorough written opinion which helps to clarify issues for appeal,' and '[a]lthough it is possible a new appeal may follow the hearing on remand, . . . it is also likely such appeal will be narrowed, relieving the burden on this court.' " (Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 758, 844-845; see also Friends of Willow Glen Trestle v. City of San Jose (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 457, 473; Koster v. County of San Joaquin (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 29, 44-45.) Additionally, the parties in this case have raised issues in their supplemental briefing concerning whether NWPCo should be dismissed as a party and, if so, whether it is an indispensable party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (b), whose absence requires a dismissal of the entire action. These issues are most appropriately considered by the trial court in the first instance, as are questions raised by NCRA pertaining to the statute of limitations.
We deny as unnecessary "Plaintiffs' Application for Leave to File a Reply to Respondents and Real Party in Interest's Response Briefs," received by this court on November 14, 2017. Nothing in this opinion should be construed as limiting any party's ability to litigate in the trial court the procedural issues presented in the supplemental briefing filed under California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b). At this juncture, we express no opinion regarding the appropriate resolution of those issues or the merits of plaintiffs' CEQA claims. --------
The matter is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
/s/_________
NEEDHAM, J. We concur. /s/_________
JONES, P.J. /s/_________
BRUINIERS, J.