Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara, Thomas P. Anderle, Judge, No. 1245707
James O. Kahan and Leric C. Goodman, for Appellant.
Stephen P. Wiley, City Attortney, City of Santa Barbara, for Respondents
Robert D. Hart and Deborah D. Hart, in pro per, Real Parties in Interest.
YEGAN, J.
Friends of Outer State Street appeals from the judgment denying its petition for a writ of administrative mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Appellant challenged the Santa Barbara City Council's (City Council) approval of zoning modifications, a zoning exception, a tentative subdivision map, and a condominium conversion permit for a building owned by Robert D. Hart and Deborah D. Hart, real parties in interest. Appellant contends that the City of Santa Barbara's zoning modification procedure is unconstitutional, that the City Council abused its discretion, and that the City Council conducted an unfair hearing. We affirm.
The Harts' appellate brief, submitted in propria persona, is not helpful in a legal sense because their factual allegations are not supported by references to the record and their arguments are not supported by citation to legal authorities. "A party on appeal has the duty to support the arguments in the briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations. We have no duty to search the record for evidence and may disregard any factual contention not supported by proper citations to the record. [Citation.]" (Air Couriers Intern. v. Employment Development Dept. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 923, 928.) " '[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Mission Shores Ass'n v. Pheil (2008)166 Cal.App.4th 789, 796.)
Facts
The Harts own the property at 3408-3412 State Street in the City of Santa Barbara. The original structure at that location was a one story commercial building. In 2004 the Santa Barbara Architectural Board of Review approved the remodeling of the commercial building and the addition of a second story containing four apartment units. A building permit was issued and the improvements were constructed. Each apartment unit has two bedrooms and measures between 858 and 888 net square feet. The commercial rental unit on the first floor measures approximately 3,500 net square feet. The project provides 18 parking spaces for the tenants.
On July 19, 2006, a Santa Barbara Staff Hearing Officer approved the Harts' application to convert the commercial rental unit and the four apartments into one commercial and four residential condominium units. The Santa Barbara Municipal Code (Municipal Code) requires two parking spaces for each residential condominium unit, but the hearing officer granted an exception allowing one parking space for each unit. The hearing officer granted a modification allowing additions on the first floor "to encroach into the front yard setback along State Street." The hearing officer approved a tentative subdivision map for the project and the issuance of a condominium conversion permit.
James O. Kahan, appellant's counsel, personally appealed from the hearing officer's decision to the Santa Barbara Planning Commission (Planning Commission.) The Planning Commission upheld Kahan's appeal and denied the Harts' application.
The Harts appealed to the City Council. The City Council overturned the Planning Commission's decision, upheld the Hart's appeal, and approved the project. The City Council also granted a modification of a parking requirement. Appellant subsequently filed its petition for a writ of administrative mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The document filed by appellant in the trial court is captioned: "Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; Petition for Writs of Administrative and Traditional Mandamus; Prayer for Attorney Fees." (Some capitalization omitted.)
Standard of Review
The constitutionality of Santa Barbara's zoning modification procedure involves solely a question of law. This issue, therefore, is subject to independent review. (See Citizens for Hatton Canyon v. California Dept. of Transp. (2003)112 Cal.App.4th 838, 843.) Application of a modification procedure to zoning is, however, addressed to the council's discretion.
"Abuse of discretion is established if the [City Council] has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) In determining whether the City Council's findings are supported by the evidence, we apply the substantial evidence test. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 510, 513-514 (Topanga); Guardians of Turlock's Integrity v. Turlock City Council (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 584, 598.) " 'The scope of our review... is identical with that of the superior court.... [W]e must examine the findings made by the [agency] itself to determine whether they were supported by substantial evidence, rather than limiting ourselves to a review of the findings made by the trial court. [Citations.]' [Citation]. The burden is on [appellant] to show there is no substantial evidence whatsoever to support the findings of the [agency]. [Citation.]" (Saad v. City of Berkeley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212.)
"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings an appellate court must ' "... determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent, sustains the findings subject to review, resolving any reasonable doubts in favor of those findings. [Citation.] In making this determination the appellate court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the judgment or decision of the tribunal below and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to support it." ' [Citation.]" (Topanga, supra,214 Cal.App.3d at p.1357.) The appellate court " ' "may reverse an agency's decision only if, based on the evidence before the agency, a reasonable person could not reach the conclusion reached by the agency." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Harris v. City of Costa Mesa (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 963, 969.)
We independently review appellant's challenge to the fairness of the hearing before the City Council. (Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 705, 711; Clark v. City of Hermosa Beach (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1169.)
Constitutionality
Appellant contends that Santa Barbara's zoning "modification procedure lacks sufficient objective standards to meet the requirements of the United States and California Constitutions for equal protection and due process." This contention is waived because appellant has failed to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority. (Nelson v. Avondale HOA (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.)
Abuse of Discretion
Front Yard Setback Modification
The Zoning Ordinance requires a 10-foot front yard setback for one-story buildings and a 20-foot setback for two-story buildings. (Ord. § 28.45.008.D.4) The original one-story commercial building, with a front yard setback of approximately three feet, was a legal nonconforming building because it was constructed prior to the adoption of the setback requirement. Additions to the original building were permissible provided that they conformed to current zoning standards. (Ord. § 28.87.030.D.1. a. (6).) The Harts sought a modification of the setback requirement because the remodeling of the original building "included first-floor roof overhangs and columns that encroached further into the front yard setback." The second story addition has a setback of approximately 27 feet, so it exceeds the current 20-foot setback requirement.
The Santa Barbara Municipal Code provides that a "modification" of yard regulations may be granted "where the modification is consistent with the purposes and intent of this Title [Title 28, also known as "The Zoning Ordinance", and is necessary to (i) secure an appropriate improvement on a lot, [or] (ii) prevent unreasonable hardship, [or] (iii) promote uniformity of improvement" (§ 28.92.110.) In approving the hearing officer's grant of a modification of the setback requirement, the City Council made the following findings: "The first floor setback of the project is generally consistent with many other existing buildings on the northerly side of State Street.... " "The modification is consistent with the purposes and intent of the Zoning Ordinance and is necessary to secure an appropriate improvement on a lot and prevent unreasonable hardship."
Municipal Code section 28.01.001 provides that Title 28 "shall be known as 'The Zoning Ordinance.' " Unless otherwise stated, all code references are to The Zoning Ordinance.
The City Council's findings are set forth in its staff report. Appellant contends that these findings were not "properly adopted" by the City Council. At the conclusion of the hearing before the City Council, Mayor Blum said, "We've got to do the findings." City Attorney Stephen Wiley declared: "The findings actually to uphold the appeal are in the staff report." Mayor Blum replied, "Okay," and no one objected. Based on this colloquy between Wiley and Blum in the presence of the entire City Council, we conclude that the City Council adopted the staff report findings as well as the reasons for those findings as set forth in the staff report. (See Respers v. University of Cal. Retirement System (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 ["an administrative agency may make findings by incorporating findings made by others" provided that "the record... reflect[s] some adoptive act by the agency"].)
Appellant argues that the setback modification is inconsistent with the purposes and intent of The Zoning Ordinance because it conflicts with the express legislative intent "to prevent the volumes of traffic on State Street from exceeding acceptable limits and to limit increased air pollution, due to vehicular traffic." (§ 28.45.008.B.) But appellant fails to explain how the setback modification for the encroaching "first-floor roof overhangs and columns" would have an adverse impact on traffic or air pollution.
Appellant claims that there are no facts or even an attempt to justify a hardship. But there is substantial evidence in the City Council's staff report to support the finding that the setback modification was necessary to prevent unreasonable hardship. The staff report notes that the first-floor remodeling encroachments "were proposed in response to comments made by the Architectural Board of Review during the review of the project." The Architectural Board of Review approved the remodeling and addition of the second story. A building permit for these improvements was issued. The Harts constructed the improvements in reliance upon the approval of the Architectural Board of Review and the building permit. In these circumstances, a reasonable person could conclude that the enforcement of the setback requirement as to the first story would cause unreasonable hardship to the Harts.
In any event, a finding of unreasonable hardship was not a prerequisite for the setback modification. Even in the absence of such hardship, the modification would be warranted if the City Council found that it was necessary to "promote uniformity of improvement." (§ 28.92.110.) The City Council in effect made the requisite finding when it found that "[t]he first floor setback of the project is generally consistent with many other existing buildings on the northerly side of State Street.... " Appellant offers no argument showing that this finding is not supported by substantial evidence. "Under the substantial evidence test, the agency's findings are presumed to be supported by the administrative record and the appellant challenging them has the burden to show they are not. [Citations.]" (SP Star Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 459, 469.)
Parking Modification
For multiple residential units with two or more bedrooms per unit, The Zoning Ordinance requires two parking spaces per unit irrespective of whether the unit is an apartment or a condominium. (§ 28.90.100.G.3.c.) We refer to this requirement as "the residential parking requirement." The Zoning Ordinance separately requires, as a prerequisite for condominium conversions, that two parking spaces be provided for each two-bedroom unit. (§ 28.88.040.J.) We refer to this requirement as "the condominium conversion parking requirement." These two requirements mandated that the project provide eight parking spaces for the four residential units. Other code provisions required 14 spaces for the first-floor commercial unit. Thus, a total of 22 parking spaces were necessary, but only 18 spaces were available.
The hearing officer granted an exception to the condominium conversion parking requirement and allowed one parking space per residential unit. The hearing officer did not consider granting a modification of the residential parking requirement because she assumed that the project qualified as a "mixed use development," which would result in a 50 percent reduction of the required parking. (§ 28.90.100.H.1.a.)
The Zoning Ordinance provides that the hearing officer or Planning Commission may grant "an exception" to the physical requirements for condominium conversions. (§ 28.88.040.N.)
During Kahan's appeal to the Planning Commission, it was discovered that the project did not qualify as a mixed use development. Accordingly, in their appeal to the City Council, the Harts requested that they be granted a modification of the residential parking requirement to allow one parking space per residential unit. The City Council granted the modification and approved the hearing officer's grant of an exception to the condominium conversion parking requirement. The exception and modification reduced the required number of parking spaces from 22 to 18.
The Zoning Ordinance provides that a parking modification may be granted where "the modification will not be inconsistent with the purposes and intent of [The Zoning Ordinance] and will not cause an increase in the demand for parking space or loading space in the immediate area." (§ 28.92.110.A.1.) The City Council made the appropriate findings: "The modification to allow less than the required number of parking spaces will not be inconsistent with the purposes and intent of the Zoning Ordinance and will not cause any increase in the demand for parking spaces in the immediate area. The parking demand would be met by the provision of four parking spaces reserved for the residential units and 14 spaces that would be shared by the residential and commercial uses in the mixed-use development."
Appellant contends that "[t]he approval for the parking modification... violated the intent" of The Zoning Ordinance because the modification conflicts with the express legislative intent "to prevent the volumes of traffic on State Street from exceeding acceptable limits and to limit increased air pollution, due to vehicular traffic." (§ 28.45.008.B.) Appellant made the identical argument with respect to the setback modification. Appellant fails to explain how the parking modification would adversely affect traffic or air pollution.
Appellant argues that the City Council's findings are inadequate because they were merely a repetition of the language in the applicable portion of The Zoning Ordinance. (AOB 28) Appellant's argument lacks merit because the findings and supporting staff report sufficiently "expose the [City Council's] mode of analysis." (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 517, fn. 16.) The findings state that the total of 18 spaces would provide adequate parking for both the residential and commercial units. The staff report explains in detail why the 18 spaces would be adequate.
Appellant further argues that the City did not have the authority to grant the parking modification because, unlike the parking exception, the modification was not considered by the Planning Commission and therefore was not part of the appeal. But the parking issue was clearly part of the appeal and was considered by the Planning Commission. The Planning Commission's resolution upholding Kahan's appeal states that the mixed-use development rule as it relates to parking is not being met. The parking issue reasonably encompassed the grant of a parking modification which, like the exception granted by the hearing officer, would allow one space per residential unit instead of the two spaces required by The Zoning Ordinance. The hearing officer would have granted the modification but for his mistaken assumption that the project qualified as a mixed use development. On appeal to the City Council, the Harts requested a modification. The City Council, therefore, had the authority to grant the modification.
Tentative Subdivision Map
Appellant argues: "The Tentative Map for this project must be denied because it is not consistent with the Noise Element of the City's General Plan which requires that the maximum noise levels for residential properties shall not exceed 60 [dBA Ldn].... This project exceeds that maximum level." "The 'findings' for the Tentative Map ignored this inconsistency by not mentioning noise and attempting to obfuscate this issue with a recitation of the conclusion of law that the 'map is consistent with the General Plan.' "
In finding that the tentative subdivision map is consistent with the General Plan, the City Council did not abuse its discretion on the noise issue. As explained in the City Council's staff report, that finding is supported by substantial evidence. The report noted that, pursuant to the "City's Noise Element Land Use Compatibility Guidelines,... the 'normally acceptable' noise exposure for private outdoor living areas is 60 dBA Ldn or less." An engineering study concluded that outdoor noise levels at the project were between 60.5 and 62.5 dBA Ldn, "with the primary noise source being traffic on State Street." The report concluded: "Given that the existing noise levels are only slightly higher than the normally acceptable level of 60 dBA Ldn and are well below the 70 dBA Ldn level where there would be an environmental concern, a finding of consistency with the General Plan noise guidelines can be made." The report observed that "the recently released Upper State Street Study Report includes a recommendation that the MTD bus stop located directly in front of the project site be relocated to the west.... [T]he relocation of the bus stop may reduce the noise level of private outdoor living spaces to 60 dBA Ldn or less."
Appellant argues that "the trial court erred by allowing the zoning code to be rewritten with two modifications so that it could make a finding that the tentative map was consistent with the zoning." In support of this argument, appellant cites a paragraph from the trial court's ruling at page 685 of the clerk's transcript. This paragraph did not result in a "rewriting" of the zoning code. The trial court merely noted that the City Council's "approval of the modifications was reasonable and supported by the evidence."
Condominium Conversion
Appellant contends that "[t]he trial court erred by not recognizing numerous requirements for a Condominium Conversion Permit." Appellant argues that the City Council's findings are inadequate because one required finding is missing: that "[t]he owner has made a reasonable effort to assist those tenants wishing to purchase their units for purposes of minimizing the direct effect on the rental housing market created by relocating such tenants." (§ 28.88.120.G.) But appellant has not cited any evidence in the record showing that a tenant had expressed a desire to purchase his or her unit. In view of the lack of such evidence, this finding was not applicable.
Appellant contends that the project did not meet "the private storage space" standard for condominium conversions. Section 28.88.040.E provides: "Each unit shall have at least 200 cubic feet of enclosed weatherproofed and lockable private storage space, in addition to guest, linen, pantry, and clothes closets customarily provided. Such space shall be for the sole use of the unit owner. Such space shall be accessible from the garage or parking area for the unit it serves."
The City Council's staff report includes the following discussion on the private storage issue: "The applicant, as part of the condominium conversion application, proposes to construct the required 300 cubic feet of storage area [but section 28.88.040.E requires only 200 cubic feet] for each residential unit as shown on the proposed plan. The storage areas would be attached to the wall inside the parking area. It is not anticipated that there would be a safety issue when residents access these storage units because vehicles would be moving slowly through this area." During the hearing before the City Council, the Harts' counsel acknowledged that the required storage area had not yet been constructed. But she declared that the storage area was a "non-issue" because "[i]t's shown in the plans."
Thus, the project complies with the private storage area standard because the plans require the construction of this area. Appellant contends: "It was an impossibility to build the storage area on the site" because "there is not adequate room for both the storage and back-up room for parked automobiles." But appellant has failed to demonstrate this impossibility by citation to facts in the record. Appellant notes that, at the hearing before the Planning Commission, an architect opined that "there's not room on that site to build such storage [space]." The architect, however, did not set forth the factual basis for his opinion, and the plans indicate that there is room for the storage area. Appellant acknowledges that the required private storage area is shown on the plans.
Appellant contends that the most glaring error is that the "building did not qualify for exemption from [the] five year prohibition for condominium conversion because it did not comply with [the] standards for new condominium construction." Appellant relies on section 28.88.030.E, which provides: "Once a building permit has been issued, a building may not be converted unless the certificate of occupancy for the building was issued more than five (5) years prior to the date the owner files with the City an application for the approval of a tentative condominium map or conversion to a hotel or similar use, unless the building satisfies the City's requirements for new condominium construction." (Italics added.) As a result of the exception and modifications approved by the City Council, the Harts' building satisfied the requirements for new condominium construction. Thus, there was no violation of the five-year rule of section 28.88.030.E.
Appellant's remaining contentions concerning condominium conversion requirements are repetitious of contentions considered earlier in this opinion or are waived because they are not supported by meaningful legal analysis with citations to authority and facts in the record. (Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546; People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282-283.)
Unfair Hearing Before the City Council
Oral Testimony
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing it to put on any oral testimony concerning the unfair hearing issue. This contention is waived because it is not supported by reasoned argument and citations to authority. (Nelson v. Avondale HOA, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.) The contention is also waived because appellant has failed to demonstrate that it made an offer of proof in the trial court as to the content of the proposed testimony. (See Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Intern. Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1164-1165.)
Ex Parte Communications
Appellant contends that "[t]he 'hearing' in this matter was unfair and violated fundamental principles of due process because at least three council members had ex parte communications with the developers.... These ex parte communications prevented the City Council members from being impartial hearing officers." In support of its contention, appellant refers to a remark by Councilman Schneider at the hearing. Schneider said that he and two other council members had conducted "an informational meeting" with the Harts.
Appellant has not shown that the City Council improperly relied on ex parte communications received from the Harts during the "informational meeting." As appellant points out in its opening brief, the record does not disclose the content of these communications. Appellant, therefore, has failed to establish that ex parte communications "prevented the City Council members from being impartial hearing officers."
Parking Modification
Appellant contends that the City Council's grant of a parking modification violated fundamental principles of fairness and due process because the parking modification was not part of the appeal. As discussed above, the parking issue was part of the appeal, and that issue reasonably encompassed the grant of a parking modification allowing one space per residential unit.
Adequate Time at Hearing
Appellant contends that the opponents of the project "were not given adequate time to make a presentation" at the hearing before the City Council. The record does not support appellant's contention. The record shows that the City Council allocated 30 minutes for members of the public to voice their views. During this period, 18 persons spoke for and against the project. Everyone who requested to speak at the hearing was allowed to do so.
In support of its contention, appellant cites Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 705 (MHC). In MHC this court held that a rent control proceeding violated due process because the administrative agency's "findings rested on testimony of tenants who were not subject to cross-examination." (Id., at p. 708.) We also noted that the administrative agency had "placed a two-minute limit on testimony which unduly restricted the evidentiary presentation." (Id., at p. 715.)
MHC is distinguishable. Here, the City Council did not make findings based on testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing. The members of the public who spoke at the hearing informally expressed their views on whether the City Council should uphold the Harts' appeal and approve the condominium conversion. In MHC we observed that the rent control proceeding was not "an informal public hearing where speakers are not sworn and cross-examination could inhibit public comment. [Citations.]" (MHC, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 712.) We pointed out that "[t]he rent control ordinance requires findings and testimony under oath, and the [rent control] board exercised 'judicial-like' powers in deciding the parties' rights involving their individual leases. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
City Attorney - Bias
Appellant contends that it was denied due process because the city attorney was biased in favor of the project. According to appellant, this bias tainted the City Council's decision because the city attorney was acting as its legal advisor.
Appellant alleges that the city attorney was biased because he "refused to prosecute the setback violation." But the city attorney had good reason for not prosecuting this violation. An email dated April 11, 2008, explained that "the City will not enforce on these encroachments, as they have approved building permits."
Appellant further alleges that the city attorney was biased because "[i]n November 2006, Assistant City attorney Scott Vincent attempted to direct the Planning Commission to influence the Planning Commissioners to deny the appeal and approve the project, but he was unable to convince them to override their expert opinions." We disregard this conclusionary characterization of Vincent's conduct that is not supported by citations to facts in the record. "To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by... citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.]" (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)
Finally, appellant alleges that bias was shown at the hearing before the City Council when "City Attorney Wiley reinforced the staff approval by minimizing the encroachment as minor (only eaves) and discussing the Subdivision Map Act in a way to imply that there were no grounds for denial." The conclusionary allegation about the subdivision map is waived because it is not supported by citations to facts in the record. (In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) As to the eave encroachment, Wiley stated that, if he had been asked to initiate a code enforcement action for the encroachment, he probably would have responded that such an action would not be successful because the encroachment was minor and was constructed pursuant to a building permit. Wiley's statement does not establish bias by the city attorney in favor of the condominium conversion.
City Attorney - Concurrent Representation
Appellant faults the city attorney for his "concurrent representation in this matter." Concurrent or dual representation problems arise where an attorney is "acting as an advocate for one party in a contested hearing while at the same time serving as the legal advisor for the decision-maker." (Howitt v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1575, 1579.) Appellant fails to cite facts in the record showing that the city attorney was acting as an advocate for the Harts.
City Attorney - Conflict of Interest
Appellant contends that it was denied a fair hearing before the City Council because a conflict of interest should have resulted in the disqualification of the entire city attorney's office. The conflict allegedly arose because an assistant city attorney reported that in 2007 her spouse had received over $100,000 in income from the law firm of Price, Postel & Parma, which represented the Harts. Appellant has not preserved this issue for appeal because he failed to raise it during the proceedings before the City Council. (Chrisman v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 155 Cal.App.4th 29, 41-42.)
In any event, appellant offers no authority requiring the disqualification of the entire city attorney's office merely because an assistant city attorney's spouse had a relationship with the law firm representing the Harts. " '[I]f courts regularly disqualified attorneys and their law firms from representing clients with interests adverse to clients represented by the attorney's spouses' law firms, courts would effectively preclude married lawyers from practicing in the same communities as their spouses.' [Citation.]" (Derivi Const. & Architecture, Inc. v. Wong (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1276; see also DCH Health Services Corp. v. Waite (2002)95 Cal.App.4th 829, 834 [court rejected "the suggestion" that issues concerning "whether lawyer-client conflicts arise... should be resolved solely by reference to the marriage relationship"].)
City Attorney - Refusal to Comply with Public Records Request
Appellant contends that it was denied due process because the city attorney's "refusal to comply with [a] public records request was part of the coverup to conceal secret negotiations and the deal [with the Harts]." This contention is waived because it is not supported by reasoned argument, citations to authority, and citations to facts in the record. (People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 441, fn. 8; In re S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)
Appellant alleges: "Kahan Declaration Re: Public Records Act (CT 493-499) and the incorporated exhibits explain some of the violations of the [California Public Records Act] and related Due Process violations." This is an attempt to incorporate by reference arguments made in the trial court papers. Such incorporation by reference is impermissible; all arguments must be fully set forth in the appellate briefs. (Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, 334 ["An appellant cannot rely on incorporation of trial court papers, but must tender arguments in the appellate briefs"]; see also Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 295, fn. 20; Colores v. Board of Trustees (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1301, fn. 2.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents and Real Parties to recover costs.
We concur, GILBERT, P.J.,COFFEE, J.