Opinion
January 20, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.).
The stipulation of settlement was a separation agreement that was incorporated but not merged into the judgment of divorce. As such, it survives as a separately enforceable contract that cannot be set aside by motion but only by a plenary action (Darragh v. Darragh, 163 A.D.2d 648; Kellman v. Kellman, 162 A.D.2d 958; Lambert v. Lambert, 142 A.D.2d 557, 558), providing a context in which to develop a record adequate to evaluate defendant's claims of inequity and overreaching (see, Christian v Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72; Arquiette v. Arquiette, 177 A.D.2d 956).
We affirm only on this ground, without prejudice to defendant commencing a plenary action, without costs. In addition, defendant's motion for a downward modification of maintenance was properly denied absent a showing of an unanticipated and unreasonable change in circumstances (see, Matter of Boden v Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210, 213).
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Sullivan, Ross and Asch, JJ.