In no case known to this court has it been so held. The only reported case in which the issue was even raised in the context of a landlord permitting competition by a cotenant was Friedman v Celfan Bldg. Corp. ( 13 Misc.2d 192). There, the tenant sued the landlord to enjoin it to cause the competitor to discontinue the prohibited sales, or, alternatively, to recover as damages the profits made by the competitor on such sales.
" (Italics supplied.) The "palpably improper" rule was likewise followed in the remaining two cases cited: Friedman v. Celfan Bldg. Corp. ( 13 Misc.2d 192) and Rosen v. Gotham Equip. Corp. ( 16 Misc.2d 891). A Third Department case, although not directly in point, seems to shed some further light on the problem.
Where a party is "unable" to obtain the necessary information at the time when a bill is required to be served, but there is reasonable prospect that he will be able to do so before trial, such statement is sufficient, otherwise, meritorious claims might be defeated through preclusion orders calling upon the plaintiff prematurely to specify information obtainable by examination before trial, or, by calling adverse parties and their employees, not to mention strangers, as hostile witnesses at the trial. ( Schlank v. East Riv. Sav. Bank, 272 App. Div. 56, 58 [1st Dept.]; Friedman v. Celfan Bldg. Corp., 13 Misc.2d 192, 194 [Kings County].) The plaintiff may state, acting in good faith, that he has "no present knowledge" as to certain matters under oath.