Opinion
12456-20L
09-18-2024
RICHARD HERBERT FRIEDBERG, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER
Jennifer E. Siegel, Special Trial Judge
Petitioner filed his Petition on October 21, 2020, in response to a notice of determination dated September 14, 2020, sustaining a proposed levy concerning tax periods in 2010. The case is currently before the Court on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 9, 2024.
As has been said many times before, summary judgment serves to "expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials." Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). We may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, we must construe facts and make inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sundstrand, 98 T.C. at 520.
A taxpayer may raise a challenge to the existence or amount of his underlying tax liability in a collection proceeding only if the taxpayer "did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability." I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B). This matters here because, when the underlying liability is not at issue, we review collection determinations for an abuse of discretion. Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). In contrast, where the underlying liability is properly at issue, our review is de novo. Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000). Whether petitioner had a prior opportunity to dispute the Commissioner's imposition of the trust fund recovery penalties underlying the collection activity at issue is thus a question of material fact, and it is not definitively resolved on the record before us.
Upon due consideration and for cause, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 9, 2024, is denied.