Opinion
Record No. 1679-92-4
July 6, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY QUINLAN H. HANCOCK, JUDGE.
Wm. Bruce Gair (Donna Porter Gair; Garth R. Porter; Porter Gair, on briefs), for appellant.
Philip F. Hudock for appellee.
Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick.
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Thomas Fricke (husband) appeals the trial court's order denying his motion for a reduction in child support based upon a change in circumstances, and denial of his request for injunctive relief that would have restrained Rosanne Fricke (wife) from enrolling the parties' minor children in private school. Wife cross-appeals the denial of her request for attorney's fees. Finding no error, we affirm.
The parties are familiar with the facts; therefore, we recite only those facts necessary to explain our decision. The parties were married for almost fourteen years and had two children, Katherine, age 15, and Thomas Jr., age 12. The parties entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement on March 19, 1990, which resolved all issues as to marital property, support, custody and visitation. Both parties requested that the property settlement agreement be incorporated into any final decree of divorce. The matter was referred to a commissioner in chancery, who recommended that the agreement be incorporated. No exceptions were filed to the commissioner's report.
On March 3, 1992, husband filed a motion to modify child support and sought a determination of whether the children should remain in private school. Both of these issues were explicitly provided for in the parties' property settlement agreement. That motion was not heard until June 11, 1992, which was nineteen days after the entry of the May 23, 1992 final decree of divorce in this matter. The final decree of divorce incorporated the parties' property settlement agreement without any reservation for a subsequent determination of child support. No appeal was taken from the final decree of divorce.
On appeal, husband argues that the trial court considered the wrong period of time in determining whether a change of circumstances existed that would justify a reduction in his child support payments. In denying husband's motion for a reduction in child support, the trial court ruled as follows:
During 1990 and all subsequent years, [husband's] wages have been in excess of the wages which he earned in 1989 (which the court finds to be the base year against which all support obligations of the [husband] under paragraphs 6.A. and 6.B. of the agreement are to be measured). Accordingly, since the [husband's] income each year since 1989 has been greater than his 1989 income, [husband] has not established a material change in circumstances from 1989 which would require any change in his child support obligations, including those obligations set out in Section 6.B. of the Property Settlement Agreement.
We find that the May 23, 1992, final decree of divorce operated as the trial court's adjudication of the appropriate amount of child support due as of the date of that decree. Therefore, husband had the threshold burden of proving "that a material change of circumstance has occurred since the last award or hearing to modify support." Hiner v. Hadeed, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, 425 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1993); see also Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 446-47, 258 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1979);Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 156-57, 409 S.E.2d 470, 472-73 (1991). Because we find no evidence in the record indicating a change in circumstances during the nineteen day period between the entry of the final decree and the modification hearing, we affirm the trial court's denial of husband's motion for a reduction in child support.
The trial court examined the entire period from 1989, a calculation date specified in the parties' property settlement agreement, to the date of the modification hearing. Although the trial court considered a greater time period than was necessary, it properly determined that no material change in husband's circumstances had taken place during the critical nineteen day period following the entry of the last order of support. "When a trial court reaches the correct result for the wrong reason, its judgment will be upheld on appeal."Dziarnowski v. Dziarnowski, 14 Va. App. 758, 762, 418 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1992).
Husband also appeals the denial of injunctive relief on the basis that the trial court erroneously applied a "best interests of the child" standard. We find this claim to be without merit. "[T]he determination whether to award an injunction is to be made by the chancellor, in the exercise of his discretion, after balancing the equities." McCauley v. Phillips, 216 Va. 450, 454, 219 S.E.2d 854, 858 (1975). Contrary to the husband's contention, the trial court's determination that it was in the children's best interest to remain in private school does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. In balancing the equities, the trial court properly considered the evidence presented by both sides regarding the effect that a change in schools might have upon the children.
Furthermore, husband, in his motion for injunctive relief, prayed:
That the Court determine whether it is in the best interests of the children to attend private schools under the circumstances of this case.
Husband cannot now complain that the trial court answered the very question that he submitted for determination.
Wife appeals the trial court's denial of her request for attorney's fees. Prior to the modification hearing, both sides agreed that the hearing would take no longer than three hours. On the date of the hearing, the parties again represented to the court that the matter would be completed by 1:00 p.m. and that the matter "should go today." The evidence presented by both parties took longer than expected, and the trial court found it necessary to terminate the hearing and rule upon the matters already argued. The trial court denied wife's request for attorney's fees, stating that "because of the time constraints I have not even heard from her."
"An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the trial court's sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of discretion." Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). However, a trial court must have evidence justifying or explaining the amount of attorney's fees awarded. See Westbrook v. Westbrook, 5 Va. App. 446, 458, 364 S.E.2d 523, 530 (1988). In this case, because the trial court was unable to receive sufficient evidence to justify an award of attorney's fees, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of wife's motion.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm. Wife's motion for additional attorney's fees expended in this appeal is denied.
Affirmed.