Frey Son v. United States

13 Citing cases

  1. North Coast Stevedoring Co. v. United States

    17 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1927)   Cited 4 times
    In North Coast Stevedoring Co. v. United States, 17 F.2d 874 (C.C.A. 9th), the vessel was sold by the United States under a conditional bill of sale, which provided that no liens could be imposed.

    While the prohibition against incurring liens is not as explicit as it might be, yet, when the agreement is construed as a whole, it leaves no doubt in the mind that it was the purpose and intent of the seller to protect the vessel against claims and liens that would have priority to, or preference over, the title of the government. Such has been the construction uniformly placed on similar contracts in other jurisdictions. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 961; Frey Son v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 963; P.H. Gill Sons Forge Mach. Wks. v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 964; The Liberator (C.C.A.) 5 F.2d 585; United States v. Robins Dry Dock Repair Co. (C.C.A.) 13 F.2d 808. See, also, United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361. The only inquiry made by the appellant was of the agent or local manager at Seattle and the Pacific Coast manager at San Francisco. These parties knew nothing about the terms of the contract of sale, or the ownership of the vessel, and made no representation as to either.

  2. United States v. Robins Dry Dock Repair Co.

    13 F.2d 808 (1st Cir. 1926)   Cited 23 times

    " In Frey Sons v. United States, 1 F.2d 963, 964, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had before it a contract of sale substantially identical with the agreements in the case at bar. It held that the agreed purchaser in possession was without authority to pledge the credit of the vessel and denied the supply man a lien for that reason.

  3. The American Star

    11 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1926)   Cited 2 times

    This means that the mortgagor would not suffer any lien to be created, nor permit one to be continued. It was the duty of the appellant to exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain whether the master had authority to impose a lien on the vessel, and, if it had done its duty, it would have ascertained that both the agreement and mortgage prohibited him from doing so. It is therefore responsible for what a diligent inquiry would have revealed. Gill, etc., Works v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 964; Frey Son, Inc., v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 963; The Hoxie (D.C.) 291 F. 599; Standard Oil Co. v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 961; United States v. Amos D. Carver, 43 S. Ct. 181, 260 U.S. 482, 67 L. Ed. 361. The American Star Line never knew the appellant or had any dealings with it. Lambert Bros., a New York corporation, with its principal office in New York, was the general agent of the company to supply its vessels with coal. Security of £ 10,000 had been furnished by the company to Lambert Bros. through the Equitable Company of New York. The appellant appears to have been a subagent of Lambert Bros., through which it furnished the supplies and brought suit. It is the well-established rule that a general agent is not entitled to a lien for supplies furnished as he is presumed to rely upon the credit of the owner.

  4. Old Dominion Steamship Company v. United States

    3 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1925)   Cited 1 times

    PER CURIAM. The decree of the District Court (297 F. 534) is affirmed, on the authority of United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361, and the decisions of this court in Gill v. United States (Sept. 29, 1924) 1 F.2d 964, Frey v. United States (Sept. 29, 1924) 1 F.2d 963, and Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Sept. 29, 1924) 1 F.2d 961. Affirmed.

  5. Standard Oil Co. v. United States

    1 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1924)   Cited 14 times

    The District Judge, therefore, was right in dismissing the libels. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361; Colonial Beach Co., Owner Claimant of the Steamer St. Johns, v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 260 U.S. 707, 43 S. Ct. 246, 67 L. Ed. 474; Morse Dry Dock Repair Co. v. United States (C.C.A.2d Circuit) 1 F.2d 233; P.H. Gill Sons Forge Machine Works v. United States (C.C.A. 4th Circuit) 1 F.2d 964 (opinion filed this day); Frey Son, Inc., v. United States (C.C.A. 4th Circuit) 1 F.2d 963 (opinion filed this day). Affirmed.

  6. P.H. Gill Sons Forge Machine Works v. U.S.

    1 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1924)   Cited 11 times

    The affidavits of the officers of the libelant show that they knew the ships had been built by the Shipping Board and possession acquired from it by the States Steamship Corporation. The absence of any authority of the States Steamship Corporation to place a lien on the vessels would have appeared by any inquiry either of the officers of the States Steamship Corporation or of the Shipping Board, or by inspection of the ships' documents; but no inquiry was made. The cases fall clearly within United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361, and Colonial Beach Company, Owner and Claimant of the Steamer St. Johns, v. Quemahoning Coal Co., 260 U.S. 707, 43 S. Ct. 246, 67 L. Ed. 474; Deibert Barge-Building Co. v. United States (C.C.A. 4th Circuit) 289 F. 805; Morse Dry Dock Repair Co. v. United States (C.C.A.2d Circuit) 1 F.2d 233; Standard Oil Co. v. United States (C.C.A. 4th Circuit) 1 F.2d 961 (opinion this day filed); Frey Son, Inc., v. United States (C.C.A. 4th Circuit) 1 F.2d 963 (opinion this day filed). Affirmed.

  7. Kane v. Motor Vessel Leda

    355 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. La. 1972)   Cited 11 times

    The result thus suggested has in fact been the holding in subsequent cases. Deibert Barge-Bldg. Co. v. United States, 4 Cir. 1923, 289 F. 805; The Henry S. Grove, W.D.Wash. 1923, 287 F. 247; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 4 Cir. 1924, 1 F.2d 961; Frey Son, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cir. 1924, 1 F.2d 963; John Baizley Iron Works v. United States, E.D.Pa. 1925, 6 F.2d 25. But where the conditional sale agreement providing against liens was not recorded and the conditional vendee, whose name was on the vessel and who was in possession, asserted ownership, the supplier who made inquiry without ascertaining the true facts was permitted to assert liens.

  8. Interstate Tractor Equipment Co. v. the Mylark

    90 F. Supp. 466 (D. Or. 1950)   Cited 3 times
    In Interstate Tractor & Equipment Co. v. The Mylark, 90 F.Supp. 466 (D. Oregon 1950), the court considered a clause in which the purchaser of a vessel was to keep it 'free and clear of all liens and encumbrances.' The court held that even this language did not take away from the purchaser the right to incur liens and that the clause did not 'clearly and unambiguously show that the contract purchaser was without authority to bind the vessel for supplies and other necessaries furnished by material-men.

    " Claimants contend that the construction of such language is governed by United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S.Ct. 181, 67 L.Ed. 361, and by the following cases, all of which adhere to the rule laid down in the Carver case: United States v. Voelp, 4 Cir., 296 F. 119. The Westhaven, D.C., 297 F. 534, affirmed Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. U.S., 4 Cir., 3 F.2d 1021, Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 4 Cir., 1 F.2d 961, Frey Sons v. U.S., 4 Cir., 1 F.2d 963, North Coast Stevedoring Co. v. U.S., 9 Cir., 17 F.2d 874. In the Carver case: "The United States owned the vessels, but they were in the possession of the corporation under charters by which the corporation was to pay all costs and expenses incident to the use and operation of the vessels, and `will not suffer nor permit to be continued any lien, incumbrance, or charge which [has or] might have priority over the title and interest of the owner in said vessel.' It was stipulated further that in any event within fifteen days the charterer would make adequate provision for the satisfaction or discharge of every claim that might have priority over the title, c., or would cause such vessel to be discharged from such lien in any event within fifteen days after it was imposed.

  9. The Aljohn

    7 F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1934)   Cited 1 times

    The libelant did not make inquiry with due diligence to ascertain the relations between the ship and Foster, the person giving the order, to ascertain the full extent of his authority, and the libelant has no lien on the Aljohn. United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361; Morse Dry Dock Repair Co. v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 233; The Morganza (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 964; The Susquehanna (D.C.) 3 F.2d 1014; New York Harbor Dry Dock Corp. v. United States (D.C.) 14 F.2d 698; The Roseway (C.C.A.) 34 F.2d 130; Standard Oil Co. v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 961; Frey Son v. United States (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 963. All that was necessary to give the libelant knowledge that Foster had no right to impose a lien on the Aljohn was to have had one of its employees board the boat, as the notices, conspicuously posted thereon, would have furnished the necessary information, and this the libelant did not do.

  10. The Olympia

    58 F.2d 638 (D. Conn. 1932)

    Under this statute, it is authoritatively established that no lien at all arises in favor of one furnishing repairs and supplies to a chartered vessel at the request of the charterer, where reasonable investigation would have disclosed that there was a charter which forbade such liens. U.S. v. Carver 260 U.S. 482, 43 S. Ct. 181, 67 L. Ed. 361; The Roseway (C.C.A.) 34 F.2d 131; The Capitaine Faure (D.C.) 5 F.2d 1008; Id. (C.C.A.) 5 F.2d 1009; The Anna E. Morse (C.C.A.) 286 F. 794; Frey Son v. U.S. (C.C.A.) 1 F.2d 963. It is impossible to find any basis for distinction between the rights of one furnishing to a charterer and one furnishing to a conditional vendee of the vessel.